Archive for August, 2010


WASHINGTON, Aug 20 (Reuters) – Between 1971, when Richard Nixon launched the war on drugs, and 2008, the latest year for which official figures are available, American law enforcement officials made more than 40 million drug arrests. That number roughly equals the population of California, or of the 33 biggest U.S. cities.

Forty million arrests speak volumes about America’s longest war, which was meant to throttle drug production at home and abroad, cut supplies across the borders, and keep people from using drugs. The marathon effort has boosted the prison industry but failed so obviously to meet its objectives that there is a growing chorus of calls for the legalization of illicit drugs.

In the United States, that brings together odd bedfellows. Libertarians in the tea party movement, for example, and Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), an organization of former police officers, narcotics agents, judges and prosecutors who favor legalizing all drugs, not only marijuana, the world’s most widely-used illicit drug.

In Mexico, President Felipe Calderon has proposed a debate on the legalization of drugs – an implicit admission that the war he launched against his country’s drug cartels in 2006 cannot be won by force alone. (The death toll has just risen above 28,000 and keeps climbing). Calderon’s predecessor, Vicente Fox, followed up by declaring that since prohibition strategies had failed, Mexico should consider legalizing „the production, sale and distribution of drugs.“

It’s difficult to see how that could work without parallel moves in the United States, the main market for Mexican drugs, and it’s equally difficult to imagine Congress or state legislatures signing off on the regulated sale of cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine.

But there is growing acceptance that marijuana should be treated differently. Support for less rigid policies spans the political spectrum and has come from unexpected quarters. Sarah Palin, the darling of the American right, recently stepped into the debate on marijuana by describing its use as a „minimal problem“ which should not be a priority for law enforcement.

That’s a view widely shared. Last year, a blue-ribbon panel chaired by three former Latin American presidents (Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, Cesar Gaviria of Colombia and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil) published a report that rated the drug war a failure and urged governments to look into „decriminalizing“ the possession of marijuana for personal use.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END?

„Taking all this together, there is reason to believe that we are at the beginning of the end of the drug war as we know it,“ says Aaron Houston, a veteran Washington lobbyist for marijuana policy reform.

Far-fetched? Perhaps. But how many people in the late 1920s, at the height of the government’s fight against the likes of Al Capone, would have foreseen that alcohol prohibition would end in just a few years? Prohibition lasted from 1920 to 1933 and is now considered a failed experiment in social engineering.

Alcohol and marijuana prohibition have much in common: both in effect handed production, sales and distribution of a commodity in high demand to criminal organizations, both filled the prisons (America’s population behind bars is now the world’s largest), both diverted the resources of law enforcement, and both created millions of scoff-laws.

According to government estimates, up to 100 million Americans have tried marijuana at least once and the list of prominent citizens who admit having smoked it at one point or another is impressive. It includes President Barack Obama, his predecessor, George W. Bush, Supreme Court Judge Clarence Thomas, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Senator John Kerry, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Vice President Al Gore. Not to forget Bill (I didn’t inhale) Clinton.

The argument for making marijuana legal is straightforward: it is thought to account for around 60 percent of the profits of international drug cartels, estimated at up to $60 billion annually. Take almost two thirds of that business away and the cartels‘ power to corrupt and confront the state, as they do in Mexico, will decline sharply.

How close (or far) the United States is to an end to marijuana prohibition will become clear on November 2, when voters in California decide on a ballot initiative known as Proposition 19. Its official title, the Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act of 2010, reflects what marijuana reform advocates around the country have long campaigned for – treat it like alcohol and tobacco.

The act would allow Californians over 21 to own, cultivate or transport up to an ounce of marijuana for personal use. This is distinct from marijuana for medical purposes, which is already legal in California and 13 other states, as well as the District of Columbia.

Public opinion polls on the proposition so far give no clear picture. A yes vote would be virtually certain to hasten changes elsewhere — California is not only America’s most populous state, it also has a long track record for setting trends. (You can contact the author at Debusmann@Reuters)

Werbeanzeigen

Die USA befinden sich nicht nur im Irak und in Afghanistan im Krieg. Sie sind auch in den Drogenkampf in Mexiko involviert – einen Konflikt direkt vor ihrer Haustür, der buchstäblich mit ihren eigenen Waffen ausgetragen wird: 90 Prozent der Gewehre und Granaten stammen aus den USA.

Von Ralph Sina, WDR-Hörfunkstudio Washington

Drogenkrieg in Ciudad Juarez (Foto: AP) Großansicht des Bildes

[Bildunterschrift: Eine Szene wie aus einem Kriegsgebiet: Patrouille vor einer Bar in Ciudad Juarez. ]
Er ist in den US-Nachrichtensendungen ständig präsent: der Krieg der mexikanischen Drogenbanden, nur wenige Meilen entfernt von der Grenze zu den Bundesstaaten Kalifornien, Arizona, Texas und New Mexiko. Immer mehr US-Bürger ahnen: Ihr Land ist nicht nur in die Kriege im Irak und in Afghanistan verwickelt, sondern in einen noch viel blutigeren Konflikt direkt vor ihrer Haustür, ausgefochten mit regelrechten Kriegswaffen.

Großteil der Waffen stammt aus US-Produktion

Waffen (Foto: dpa) Großansicht des Bildes

[Bildunterschrift: 90 Prozent der im Drogenkrieg eingesetzten Waffen stammen aus den USA. ]
90 Prozent dieser Waffen – darunter Maschinengewehre, Granaten und ferngezündete Bomben – stammen aus US-amerikanischer Produktion und wurden von Mittelsmännern der Drogenbanden auf dem Territorium der USA gekauft. Für die 7000 staatlich lizensierten US-Waffenläden entlang der amerikanisch-mexikanischen Grenze ist der eskalierende Krieg ein höchst profitables Geschäft. Wie der US-Fernsehsender NBC berichtet, versorgen diese Waffenläden Mexikos Mörderbanden buchstäblich mit allem – einschließlich schwerer Maschinengewehre, für die es ja dank einer Entscheidung des US-Kongresses und der ehemaligen Bush-Administration kein Verkaufsverbot mehr gibt.

28.000 Tote in dreieinhalb Jahren

„Ich denke, das ist ein Fehler“, gibt US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton zu, als sie nach den US-Waffenlieferungen an Mexikos Drogen dealende Massenmörder gefragt wird. 28.000 Menschen starben in den letzten dreieinhalb Jahren im Kugelhagel rivalisierender mexikanischer Banden, darunter auch mehrere US-Bürger. Die Obama-Regierung fürchtet, der mexikanische Nachbar könne schon bald ein ‚failed state‘ werden, ein anarchisches Gebilde mit unkalkulierbaren Folgen für die direkt angrenzenden US-Bundesstaaten. Doch die Waffenlobby der USA sorgt dafür, dass der Verkauf von Kriegsgerät an Privatpersonen weiterhin möglich ist – und damit auch der Export an Mexikos Drogenmilizen.

Die versprochene Hilfe lässt auf sich warten

Dennoch behauptet US-Präsident Barack Obama, die mexikanische Regierung könne bei ihrem Kampf gegen die Drogenmafia auf die volle Unterstützung des nördlichen Nachbarn zählen. Fast alle Güterzüge Richtung Süden würden zum Beispiel von US-Sicherheitsbehörden genau überprüft. Als Partner gebe man der mexikanischen Regierung eben, was sie zum Erfolg im Drogenkrieg brauche.

Drogenkrieg in Ciudad Juarez (Foto: AP) Großansicht des Bildes
[Bildunterschrift: Ein vermummter Polizeibeamter vor einem Hotel in Ciudad Juarez.]
Drogenkrieg in Ciudad Juarez (Foto: AP) Großansicht des Bildes
[Bildunterschrift: Soldaten überwachen die Vernichtung von Drogen im Feuer.]

Doch das sind nur schöne präsidiale Worte. Die 1,3 Milliarden Dollar, die der US-Kongress bereits 2008 zur Bekämpfung des Drogenschmuggels bewilligt hatte, liegen immer noch auf US-Staatskonten. Verzweifelt warten die mexikanischen Drogenbekämpfer auf die von den USA seit Langem versprochenen Helikopter, Überwachungsflugzeuge und Drohnen. Man werde den mexikanischen Behörden bei der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche durch Drogendealer helfen, versprachen die USA.

Waffen für Drogen

Doch bisher ist kaum etwas geschehen – obwohl mexikanische Drogenkartelle mittlerweile auch in den USA zu den größten kriminellen Vereinigungen zählen, so der Fernsehsender NBC. Kein Wunder: Die USA sind nicht nur der Hauptlieferant der Waffen, sondern auch der Hauptabnehmer der Drogen.

Man werde jetzt neue Programme zur Bekämpfung der Drogennachfrage in den USA umsetzen, verspricht Obama. Doch das dürfte eher eine stumpfe Waffe im Kampf gegen Mexikos Drogenbarone bleiben. Die morden in letzter Zeit gerne mit ferngezündeten Autobomben, wie jüngst im mexikanischen Bundesstaat Tamaulipas – ganz nach dem Vorbild von Al Kaida.

„Depressive illness was described by Hippocrates in ancient Greece, but effective therapeutic agents did not emerge until the 1950s. Today, almost all antidepressant Drugs in clinical use increase levels of certain neurotransmitters in the brain, in particular norepinephrine and serotonin. Although these medications are beneficial, a sizeable minority of patients remain resistant to their therapeutic effects. Moreover, in most patients, there is a delay of weeks to months before the drugs take full effect. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop faster-acting drugs,“ writes John F. Cryan, Senior Lecturer, School of Pharmacy, Department of Pharmacology and Therapeutics, Alimentary Pharmabiotic Centre, University College Cork, Ireland, in this week’s journal of Science.

Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), afflicts about 17% of the population at some point in their lives, and is frequently a disabling disorder . Those who suffer from MDD more often than not do not get any relief from the initial medication prescribed. Thus begins what can be a frustrating journey of side-effects and delayed relief due to the fact that most antidepressant drugs take weeks or months to produce the therapeutic effect intended.

Ronald Duman, Professor of Psychiatry and Pharmacology Director, Division of Molecular Psychiatry and Abraham Ribicoff Research Facilities, Yale University, and senior author of a recent study, reportedly have found that a single dose of the drug ketamine can produce an antidepressant effect within hours and lasting up to a week.

Ketamine, which can produce psychotic episodes, cause damage to brain function with long-term use, and kill in high doses, is not a great candidate for ongoing therapy. However, researchers noted that ketamine has shown to be effective as a rapid way to treat people with suicidal thoughts; many suicidal patients respond weeks later with traditional drugs.

Yale researchers discovered that in rats, ketamine restored connections between brain cells damaged by chronic stress and quickly improved depression-like behavior. Investigating exactly how the drug works, scientists found that ketamine activates a signaling pathway in the brain called the mammalian target of rapamycin pathway (mTOR), suggesting new therapeutic targets for antidepressant drug development.

“The pathway is the story. Understanding the mechanism underlying the antidepressant effect of ketamine will allow us to attack the problem at a variety of possible sites within that pathway,” says George Aghajanian, Professor of Psychiatry, Yale School of Medicine.

Other antidepression drugs do not appear to activate this mTOR pathway. Based on investigation of a few different classes, serotonin selective reuptake inhibitors (SSRI), the tricyclic antidepressants, and even electroconvulsive seizure, similar effects with those classes of antidepressants have not been evidenced.

The August 20 issue of the journal Science, report that the new findings should hasten the development of a safe and easy-to-administer form of the anti-depressant ketamine. Ketamine use has a proven track record in remarkably effecting severelydepressed patients.

“It’s like a magic drug—one dose can work rapidly and last for seven to 10 days,” said Duman.

In an interview, Duman said „There are two major findings, I think, of the paper. A single dose of this NMDA, antagonist, ketamine, produces an increase in the number of connections in a part of the brain—the prefrontal cortex—that’s known to be involved in depression and treatment response. This is a really dramatic finding that a drug can increase the connections between neurons within a relatively short timeframe.“

„To put that into perspective, there are quite a few studies in the field that have demonstrated that stress and depression—models of depression in preclinical studies—produce the opposite effect – they actually cause atrophy of neurons and decrease the size of the dendritic or processes of neurons. So, here’s a drug that’s able to rapidly reverse the actions of and produce the opposite actions of what is occurring with chronic stress or depression.“

He cites the second major finding, „related to the mechanism and the signaling pathways that
underlie that effect. Ketamine can rapidly increase a signaling cascade that regulates
translation of proteins at the synapse or at the contact site of neurons, that’s known to be involved in control of protein synthesis. It’s been implicated in models of learning and memory, and is required for protein synthesis–dependent long-term memory.“

Duman admits that studying something like depression or any psychiatric illness in rodents is difficult. Behavioral tests have been devised modeling certain aspects of depression, such as
helplessness or confusion enabling testing as to whether or not ketamine can produce an antidepressant response. The mTOR pathway, is identical in all mammals, therefore the same in rats and humans.

Reporting in Science Magazine, Nanxin Li, Laboratory of Molecular Psychiatry, Center for Genes and Behavior, Departments of Psychiatry and Neurobiology, Yale University School of Medicine cites, „The rapid antidepressant response after ketamine administration in treatment-resistant depressed patients suggests a possible new approach for treating mood disorders compared to the weeks or months required for standard medications. Our results demonstrate that these effects of ketamine are opposite to the synaptic deficits that result from exposure to stress and could contribute to the fast antidepressant actions of ketamine.“

‚The dissociative anesthetic effects of ketamine have also been applied within the realm of postoperative pain management. Low doses of ketamine have been found to significantly reduce morphine consumption as well as reports of nausea following abdominal surgery.‘ The Medscape Journal of Medicine (2008).

Other possible illnesses that could benefit from treatment with ketamine are bi-polar depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It is also used widely in veterinary medicine.

Treatment of Alcohol addiction and drug addiction in Germany, using Ketamine, psychotherapy and group therapy, resulted in successful withdrawal and continued abstinence for more than one year.

Developed early in the 1960’s, Ketamine was commonly used as an anaesthetic for soldiers in Vietnam. Recreational use began as early as 1967 when it was referred to as „mean green“ and „rockmesc“. Gaining in popularity and known as „K“, „Ket“, „Special K“ and „Vitamine, the ‚party drug‘ use increased through the ’90’s, prompting it’s placement in Schedule II of the United States Controlled Substance Act in August, 1999.

Recreational use (abuse) of Ketamine produces profound psychological effects, characterised by a sense of detachment from one’s physical body and external world, which mimic schizophrenia. Psychotic reactions, intense hallucinations, perception of falling and flying and a complete dissociation from the real world occur during the state of unconsciousness.

The effect on the mind is so dibilitating that users may not remember their own names or know they are human, or what that means. The process of returning to reality is slow; movement is extremely difficult and recognizing their surroundings or being aware of their body can take hours. The long term neurological damaging effects of Ketamine are not completely clear, however premature death has been linked to reacreational use of the drug.

Believing the use of this new information about how Ketamine works could be developed into a pill form of the drug, that is much safer and more convenient, for the treatment of severe depression.

Laura Lamp King

source: http://www.foodconsumer.org/newsite/…320100217.html

Coalition forces in Afghanistan have taken £712million of heroin in what is the world’s biggest seizure of the drug.

The haul of 5.7tonnes was seized with 11.3tonnes of opium, worth £141million, and 841kg of hashish valued at £3.3million.

During the operation last month, 63 terrorists were killed, ten armed insurgents and drug traffickers of national and foreign citizenship arrested, and 14 Afghan hostages released.

The raids took place with Afghan police in the Bahramcha and Haji Wakil areas of Helmand province, where British forces are based.

It was aimed at seizing drugs before they are exported and possibly make their way on to the streets of Europe.

Bomb and weapon making materials were also taken in the operation.

The drugs, along with 4.5tonnes of ammonium chloride used to turn opium into heroin, were burnt and two processing factories destroyed.

The heroin seizure alone was more than the entire amount seized during the first three months of this year.

Afghan interior minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi said: ‘Our special counter-narcotics forces have brought a fantastic achievement to the people of Afghanistan.

‘The seizure of heroin represents the largest single seizure of heroin not only in Afghanistan but the world.’

Helmand’s former head of counter-narcotics Philippa Brown said the amount of the seized drug represented 25-30 per cent of Britain’s annual consumption of heroin.

‘We are making these seizures in conjunction with giving out alternative crops including wheat, grape and fruit trees to show that there is an
alternative to poppy cultivation,’ said Mrs Brown.

Opium seizures in Helmand are significantly higher than levels last year but prices for the drug have also risen sharply, British officials warned.

Bad weather, disease and insect damage have resulted in the cost of a kilogramme of raw opium rocketing from £29 to £142.

http://www.metro.co.uk/news/839114-7…s-biggest-haul

Borderline personality disorder is far more common than has been previously recognized, with a prevalence rate as high as 5.9% in the general population (1). The disorder has high morbidity and mortality: these patients have higher rates of suicide and poor functioning and utilize more mental health resources than most patients with axis I diagnoses (2). Psychotherapeutic treatments for borderline personality disorder typically show partial efficacy, and while patients may respond to medications in a circumscribed and often transient manner, there are currently no pharmacologic treatments for borderline personality disorder approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Patients are, therefore, left without the benefit of reliable and effective therapies. Furthermore, pharmacotherapeutic and neurobiological research that might inform treatment in borderline personality disorder has made less progress than one would hope, especially considering the seriousness and pervasiveness of the disorder.

The article in the current issue by Prossin and colleagues (3) holds promise for helping to move the field forward. They present evidence that patients with borderline personality disorder suffer from a definitive abnormality in opioid activity. While there has been a great deal of interest in the opioid system in borderline personality disorder (4), until this study, the role of opioids in borderline personality disorder was largely theoretical with little empirical support. The few pieces of evidence—reviewed by Stanley and Siever (4)—include 1) decreased endogenous opioids, especially beta-endorphins and met-enkephalins, in self-injurers with cluster B personality disorders (predominantly borderline personality disorder) compared to individuals without self-injury (5); and 2) a reported association between a μ-opioid gene polymorphism and borderline personality disorder. Prossin and colleagues, however, are the first to measure μ-opioid receptor binding directly in the brains of living patients with borderline personality disorder.

They used a μ-opioid ligand, [11C]carfentanil, to examine binding in the cerebral cortex of patients with borderline personality disorder during induction of neutral and sad sustained emotional states. The participants were female patients with borderline personality disorder and matched healthy comparison subjects. During the neutral state, the patients showed more μ-opioid binding in regions of the prefrontal cortex, in the reward center (accumbens), and in the amygdala, while the comparison subjects showed more μ-opioid binding in the thalamus. μ-Opioid binding in the prefrontal cortex during the neutral mood correlated negatively with neuroticism in borderline personality disorder. During induced sadness, neurotransmission mediated by μ-opioid receptors was greater in the patients than in the comparison subjects. An important feature of the study is that it experimentally manipulated the subjects’ emotional state, since opioid ligand binding is likely to be state dependent. The authors interpreted the greater baseline μ-opioid receptor availability in borderline personality disorder as perhaps reflecting a deficit in endogenous circulating opioids. The results also seems to suggest that enhancement of endogenous opioid availability during sad mood is greater in patients with borderlinepersonality disorder than in healthy subjects, which might reflect a compensatory response and is consistent with lower levels of endogenous opioids in self-injurers (5).

Opioid-Deficit Model
How might abnormal opioid activity help to explain the symptoms and etiology of borderline personality disorder? For decades, researchers have theorized that at least one behavior common in borderline personality disorder—self-cutting—relates to abnormalities in opioid activity. It has long been noted that patients with borderline personality disorder report that they engage in self-cutting not as a suicidal act but, rather, as a means to relieve psychic pain. Many patients report that they do not feel physical pain at the moment when they cut themselves; instead, cutting engenders feelings of relief or well-being. One view of cutting in borderline personality disorder is that it represents a method of endogenous opioid generation. In this view, patients learn to cut themselves, thereby releasing opioids, which reward their behavior. This, coupled with evidence that patients with borderline personality disorder who do not cut themselves are less symptomatic than those who do, led to efforts to treat borderline personality disorder with opiate antagonists by eliminating the positive feedback from cutting. While we know of no large-scale randomized, controlled trial, pilot studies on the efficacy of opiate antagonists showed mixed results (reviewed in reference 4) and overall showed that while opiate antagonists may slightly decrease cutting behavior, they do not improve the intrapsychic distress that leads to the cutting (6). This lack of diminished distress is consistent with the model of opioid deficiency.

Thus, a promising way of construing cutting behavior in borderline personality disorder is to consider that these patients may have a preexisting deficit in endogenous opioids. According to this view, patients are self-medicating by cutting themselves, attempting to attenuate severe intrapsychic distress that healthy individuals—without such a deficit—would not be experiencing. This is consistent with the observation that opiate antagonists might decrease cutting behavior by rendering ineffective the patient’s attempts to treat his or her pain (thereby decreasing the frequency of cutting) but would not relieve the underlying intrapsychic distress. A deficit in opioids is also consistent with the high rate of opiate abuse in borderline personality disorder, as patients may be compensating for a deficit in endogenous opioids. Not only is there is a high rate of opiate abuse in borderline personality disorder, but there is also a high rate of borderline personality disorder among patients seeking substance abuse treatment; for instance, 44.1% of individuals seeking buprenorphine treatment have borderline personality disorder (7). Clinically, it has been noted that individuals with borderline personality disorder who are taking opiates report feeling euthymic rather than euphoric, while withdrawal is associated with sustained dysphoria.

An opioid-deficit theory of borderline personality disorder might explain far more than the self-injurious behavior of these patients. For example, their extraordinary difficulties in social behavior may also be linked to a preexisting deficit in endogenous opioids. The endogenous opioid system not only regulates pain but also has an important role in social behavior. This system, through μ-opioid receptors, has long been implicated in regulation of emotional and stress responses. Reductions in its function have been associated with attachment behavior deficits and anxiety-like responses in animal models. In many species, the soothing and comforting that infants receive from maternal grooming and touching is mediated through the opioid system (8). In human beings, opioids are involved in normal and pathological emotion regulation (9) in addition to their more traditional role in modulating the sensory and affective dimensions of pain (10). In short, there is reason to think that endogenous opioids facilitate normal social function in healthy individuals.

If the proposed model is accurate, then a deficit in endogenous opioids might go some way toward explaining not only cutting behavior and substance abuse in borderline personality disorder but also the almost ubiquitous social dysfunction observed inthis condition. Gunderson has argued for a greater focus on interpersonal dysfunction in understanding borderline personality disorder, stating that the relational style characteristic of the disorder “offers the best discriminators for the diagnosis” of borderline personality disorder (11). Mood shifts and self-destructive behaviors in borderline personality disorder seem to arise specifically in response to interpersonal triggers (12). Furthermore, the domains of intrapsychic pain and interpersonal dysfunction in borderline personality disorder are closely linked.

Clinical Implications
The findings of Prossin and colleagues have both broad and specific clinical implications. Broadly, they lend support to a model of an opioid deficit in borderline personality disorder that may be “hard wired” (consistent with the high heritability of borderline personality disorder). This view could provide a heuristic model to help patients and clinicians understand the social disruption in borderline personality disorder. The satisfaction that normally accompanies closeness to other people both in early attachment and throughout life may elude patients with borderline personality disorder. If these individuals do not have sufficient endogenous opioids, then the continual craving for relationships and heightened reaction to their loss is understandable. Such a model could provide a better understanding and improve management of disappointment in relationships for patients. It might also destigmatize the disorder; the difficulty in forming a therapeutic alliance, for example, could be reconstrued as the result of an opioid deficit. Furthermore, it provides support for targeting the μ-opioid receptor as a novel molecular target for pharmacotherapy in borderline personality disorder.

References
1. Grant BF, Chou SP, Goldstein RB, Huang B, Stinson FS, Saha TD, Smith SM, Dawson DA, Pulay AJ, Pickering RP, Ruan WJ: Prevalence, correlates, disability, and comorbidity of DSM-IV borderline personality disorder: results from the Wave 2 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions. J Clin Psychiatry 2008; 69:533–545
2. Zanarini MC, Frankenburg FR, Khera GS, Bleichmar J: Treatment histories of borderline inpatients. Compr Psychiatry 2001; 42:144–150
3. Prossin AR, Love TM, Koeppe RA, Zubieta J-K, Silk KR: Dysregulation of regional endogenous opioid function in borderline personality disorder. Am J Psychiatry 2010; 167:925–933
4. Stanley B, Siever LJ: The interpersonal dimension of borderline personality disorder: toward a neuropeptide model. Am J Psychiatry 2010; 167:24–39
5. Stanley B, Sher L, Wilson S, Ekman R, Huang YY, Mann JJ: Non-suicidal self-injurious behavior, endogenous opioids and monoamine neurotransmitters. J Affect Disord 2010; 124:134–140
6. Schmahl C, Meinzer M, Zeuch A, Fichter M, Cebulla M, Kleindienst N, Ludascher P, Steil R, Bohus M: Pain sensitivity is reduced in borderline personality disorder, but not in posttraumatic stress disorder and bulimia nervosa. World J Biol Psychiatry 2010; 11(2, part 2):364–371
7. Sansone RA, Whitecar P, Wiederman MW: The prevalence of borderline personality among buprenorphine patients. Int J Psychiatry Med 2008; 38:217–226
8. Panksepp J, Herman BH, Vilberg T, Bishop P, DeEskinazi FG: Endogenous opioids and social behavior. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 1980; 4:473–487
9. Kennedy SE, Koeppe RA, Young EA, Zubieta JK: Dysregulation of endogenous opioid emotion regulation circuitry in major depression in women. Arch Gen Psychiatry 2006; 63:1199–1208
10. Zubieta JK, Smith YR, Bueller JA, Xu Y, Kilbourn MR, Jewett DM, Meyer CR, Koeppe RA, Stohler CS: Regional mu opioid receptor regulation of sensory and affective dimensions of pain. Science 2001; 293:311–315
11. Gunderson JG: Disturbed relationships as a phenotype for borderline personality disorder (commentary). Am J Psychiatry 2007; 164:1637–1640
12. Brodsky BS, Groves SA, Oquendo MA, Mann JJ, Stanley B: Interpersonal precipitants and suicide attempts in borderline personality disorder. Suicide Life Threat Behav 2006; 36:313–322
AN

August 13, 2010 — The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reports that new opioid recommendations will be unveiled early next year. The agency told Medscape Medical News the risk evaluation and mitigation strategies, known as REMS, are scheduled to be approved in 2011, with roll out and implementation to follow.

Regulators had been projecting a summer release, but a recent advisory committee vote against the agency’s proposal was a blow to the plan. Most committee members agreed that safety measures for opioids are urgently needed but voiced concern that the current approach does not go far enough to protect the public.

According to some reports, there are more deaths from opioid overdoses than from heroin and cocaine overdoses combined.

„FDA is currently reviewing the input from the advisory committee and the public,“ said Karen Mahoney, from the agency’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. „We have not yet made any final decisions on the REMS program. Once final decisions are made, FDA will communicate these requirements to the manufacturers, and they will have up to 120 days to submit a program for FDA’s review and approval.“

Herbert Neuman, MD, vice president of medical affairs and chief medical officer at Covidien Pharmaceuticals, says he is eagerly awaiting the new plan. The company already has REMS in place for hydromorphone extended-release (Exalgo). „We will modify our approach to comply with whatever the requirements will be,“ Dr. Neuman said during an interview, adding that he looks forward to the clarity a final decision will afford.

The advisory committee’s 25 to 10 vote against the first proposal, which was largely favored among industry, sent a strong message to regulators that new recommendations will require more teeth.

The plan will alter the prescribing landscape for opioid therapies and is expected to have important implications for an estimated 4 million patients.

Mandatory Education

Advisory committee members recommended mandatory training for prescribers. They called on Congress to initiate new legislation to link physician education to the existing Drug Enforcement Administration registration system. More than 1 million clinicians are currently registered to prescribe opioids.

The committee, led by Jeffrey Kirsch, MD, from the Oregon Health and Science University in Portland, argued that the overwhelming public health problem of opioid misuse is in part beyond the regulatory control of the FDA and will require a multidisciplinary approach.

It is a view shared by many, including Seddon Savage, MD, president of the American Pain Society, who recently told Medscape Medical News that Drug Enforcement Administration involvement is „the best long-term solution.“

Perry Fine, MD, president elect of the American Academy of Pain Medicine, says he agrees. „The Drug Enforcement Administration is already involved, so it makes sense to include education.“ Dr. Fine points out that in the absence of a well-designed uniform curriculum focused on opioid therapies in medical schools, continuing education is necessary. „We need to learn about opioids in the same way we learn about sterile technique or appropriate use of antibiotics,“ he said.

The advisory committee called on regulators to add immediate-release drugs to the current plan, which presently includes only extended-release and long-acting formulations.

All Controlled Drugs

Dr. Fine has concerns about whether all drug schedules will be included in the REMS, or just schedule II products. „This wasn’t brought up by the FDA or the advisory committee, and it could have a chilling effect on prescriptions,“ he said. If only schedule II compounds have more stringent requirements, then physicians may opt out by prescribing less-monitored alternatives. „They may not prescribe the most useful drug, and focus instead on other nonmedical issues, putting patients in an even more vulnerable position than they already are in.“

Dr. Fine says electronic health records may help — a patient’s electronic file could record all physician visits and prescription refills. „This is a concern not only with opioids, but with all medications that could have contraindications for a variety of reasons,“ he noted.

The timeline for the FDA’s plan has moved more than once. Dr. Fine says this is not surprising. „It is an extraordinary undertaking that will have enormous implications, and it is important to carefully weigh the consequences of any proposed action,“ he said. „It’s important the FDA does something reasonable and responsible.“

source: http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/726875

Findings from a longitudinal study of more than 600 patients with chronic noncancer pain reveal risk factors for opioid misuse are not the same in women as they are in men. The research, published in The Journal of Pain, correlated responses from several validated questionnaires to actual opioid misuse and found women with emotional and affective distress were more likely to misuse both prescribed and nonprescribed drugs, whereas behavioral issues predisposed men to drug misuse (J Pain 2010;11:312-320).

Lead investigator Robert Jamison, PhD, associate professor, Departments of Psychiatry, Anesthesiology, and Perioperative and Pain Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, said insights like these might transform the way clinicians approach the management of patients at risk for opioid misuse.

“Given the prominence of sex differences in a variety of pain-related processes, we may eventually arrive at a method for tailoring risk assessment and risk-reducing interventions in part as a function of gender,” he said.

Prior studies have yielded conflicting results regarding gender-specific differences in the quality and incidence of pain, as well as the risk factors that predict medication misuse. To further elucidate the relationship between sex and opioid misuse, Dr. Jamison and several colleagues recruited 276 male and 335 female patients with chronic noncancer pain who were treated at pain management centers in five states. Nearly 67% of patients (average age, 50 years), had chronic low back pain. Forty-six percent were married, 80% were white and 72.5% had a high school education. The patients had been prescribed a variety of opioids, with 27% taking both long- and short-acting medications. To identify factors predictive of opioid misuse, at baseline and five months subsequent, the researchers administered the Screener and Opioid Assessment for Pain Patients (SOAPP-R), the Brief Pain Inventory (BPI) and the Prescription Drug Use Questionnaire (PDUQ). Clinicians completed the Prescription Opioid Therapy Questionnaire (POTQ) and the Aberrant Drug Behavior Index (ADBI). At study outset and completion, urine samples from 356 of the patients were tested for both prescribed and nonprescribed substances. Multiple regression analyses identified significant correlations between specific questionnaire responses and actual opioid misuse, and controlled for possible intervening variables.

Dr. Jamison and his team found women who misused opioids had significantly higher ratings on five particular SOAPP-R items, indicating they felt overwhelmed, had been engaging in arguments or experiencing hurt, were impatient with their physician, had been sexually abused, and were concerned about how they were judged by others. In contrast, men who misused opioids had significantly higher scores on SOAPP-R items indicating a history of arrest, a bad temper, and having friends with alcohol or drug use problems. Significantly more women than men admitted opioid misuse on the PDUQ, whereas men who misused opioids had significantly higher physician-rated ADBI scores than women (P<0.05 for both). On the PDUQ and POTQ, women were more likely than men to report a history of physical and sexual abuse, a history of psychiatric diagnoses and family concerns, whereas men were more concerned with addiction and unexpected positive urine results (P<0.05).

Although the findings indicate important gender-specific risk factors for opioid misuse, Dr. Jamison cautioned that because the study population was older, mostly disabled and had a long duration of pain, these results should not be extrapolated to younger, better-functioning patients with recent-onset pain. Nevertheless, he said, the results should help clinicians discern those patients at highest risk for opioid misuse.

According to Joseph Shurman, MD, chairman of pain management at Scripps Memorial Hospital, La Jolla, Calif., and chair of Casa Palmera, a private treatment center in del Mar, Calif., the findings confirm that, among other risk factors, women who have been sexually abused are more likely to misuse opiates.

“One very brief and sensitive clinical tool for detecting sexual abuse, which the investigators failed to include and which clinicians would do well to use, is the opioid risk tool,” Dr. Shurman told Pain Medicine News. “It measures a broad range of established risk factors, most significantly checking for a history of sexual abuse.”

source: http://www.painmedicinenews.com/index.asp?section_id=82&show=dept&issue_id=654&article_id=15634

Researchers say ayahuasca, found in the Peruvian rainforest, could be used for a variety of ailments

New research suggests ayahuasca, a jungle vine found in the Peruvian rainforest, can have a powerful effect on the human central nervous system when brewed with other plants. Researchers say one of ayahuasca’s most promising uses could be in treating drug and alcohol addiction.

According to the World Health Organization, medicines derived from plants play a major role in the health care of 80 percent of the world’s population. Western medicine has synthesized many of these natural drugs, from the painkillers in willow bark to the anti-cancer compounds in the neem tree, and is constantly searching for more pharmaceuticals in the biodiversity of the world’s forests.

Ayahuasca is one traditional plant-based medicine that has drawn the attention of investigators. In the South American jungles, it is used in religious ceremonies to induce visions and also as a remedy to cure ills.

Vine of the dead could help improve life

At the Onanyan Shobo spiritual retreat center in the rainforest near Iquitos, Peru, shaman Alfredo Kayruna Canayo shows off a section of the twisting, leafy vine. „What ayahuasca means is vine of the dead,“ he explains through an interpreter. „Some people call it soul vine.“

Ayahuasca is known as a master plant, a very powerful remedy that treats the whole person: body, mind, and soul. „The ayahuasca [can] cure anything you have,“ the shaman says. „Start with simple things. For example, it’s very simple to cure or repel the bad energies from your insides. What is the bad energy? One of them could be the fears, then some wound or injury you have.“

VOA – E. Celeste

Shaman Alfredo heads for a treatment at Onanyan Shobo.

Whether the plant is being used for religious or medicinal purposes, ayahuasca is taken only in a ceremonial setting under the direction of an experienced shaman. To turn it into a drink, also called ayahuasca, pieces of the vine are pounded into a pulp and combined with several other plants, then brewed down for eight or more hours into a thick orange liquid.

That combination, shaman Alfredo says, is critical. „Only by itself, this plant doesn’t work good, you have to add this with the other plant – the chacruna – which is the help to the ayahuasca. In Shipibo culture, they believe the chacruna is the wife of ayahuasca because they help and work together.“

A sophisticated chemical concoction

An international research team is investigating the pharmaceutical potential of ayahuasca, known scientifically as Banisteriopsis caapi. Principal investigator, Dr. Charles Grob, is a professor of psychiatry and pediatrics at the UCLA School of Medicine. His team has done a chemical analysis of the medicinal drink.

VOA – E. Celeste

Pieces of the vine are pounded into a pulp and combined with several other plants, then brewed down for eight or more hours into a thick orange liquid.

While the shaman’s characterization of the herbal interaction may be whimsical, Grob says science confirms that the ayahuasca brew is a potent medication. „It’s a very sophisticated form of pharmacology, which somehow the native peoples of the Amazon region have figured out. Ayahuasca is generally a decoction of two plants. Each plant if taken separately has no effects on the human central nervous system, but when taken together there’s a very powerful synergy.“

The active ingredients in the brew are DMT, a naturally occurring brain chemical similar to serotonin, and a natural antidepressant. DMT is inactivated in the human gut, but when combined with the antidepressant, it can be absorbed by the body.

Grob says one of ayahuasca’s most promising uses is in treating drug and alcohol addiction. „Number one, it does not appear to be addictive and the individuals do not develop a tolerance, they do not go through withdrawals, and generally speaking, it is very unusual for people to take it on consecutive days over an extended period of time.“

The potion also has anti-parasitic properties, which can help prevent malaria. There is also some evidence that it diminishes the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease.

An illegal brew, for now

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration classifies the principal active ingredient in ayahuasca as a Schedule 1 controlled substance, which is not considered to have any legitimate medical use. As a result, the ayahuasca brew is illegal in the United States, and most of the pharmaceutical studies are being conducted in South America.

Grob says the studies are important. „There’s great potential to learn about the range of ayahuasca and to explore its therapeutic value, but first steps first, and I think first we need to fully understand how it’s utilized in South America and then do trials in the U.S. and Europe.“

VOA – E. Celeste

Retreats like Onanynan Shobo in the Peruvian jungle, have become popular destinations for the medical tourism industry.

Because many Shamans claim ayahuasca cures a variety of cancers, tumors, and other diseases, the Peruvian jungle has become a popular destination for the medical tourism industry.

Most of the visitors at Onanynan Shobo, where Shaman Alfredo practices, are European, with the remainder coming from the United States, Australia and Asia.

As long as its use in western medicine is illegal, anyone wishing to explore ayahuasca’s medical benefits will have to come to the source in South America.

Dieser Übersetzung des ursprünglich französischen1 Textes liegt die englische Fassung von K.A.Smyngton

(von dem auch das Vorwort stammt) mit dem Titel

“Ayahuasca helps cure drug addiction” zugrunde.
Während einer Entsendung nach Peru entdeckte der Arzt Jacques Mabit schamanische Heilkunde.
Beeindruckt von der großen Pflanzenkenntnis der Eingeborenen bat er um Einweihung. Heute leitet er mit Hilfe von Schamanen ein Zentrum in Amazonien, in dem Drogensüchtige mit Hilfe einer
psychoaktiven Pflanzenzubereitung geheill werden. Diese ist kein Ersatz für konventionelle
Medizin, sondern ein Werkzeug einer anderen Art von Heilkunst.
Meine dreijährige Erfahrung in Peru (1980-83) im Rahmen des Programms “Ärzte ohne Grenzen”
überzeugte mich von einem: die Heiler können Fälle behandeln, in denen die konventionelle Medizin machtlos ist. Meine Rückkehr nach Frankreich erinnerte mich an unsere relative
Machtlosigkeit, besonders in den Bereichen von Psychopathologien und Drogensucht. Ich beschloss
daraufhin, diese therapeutischen Verfahren im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojekts medizinische
Anthropologie genauer zu untersuchen.

Die Aussagen von Schamanen und Heilern erwiesen sich
bald als ein schwieriges Hindernis. “Wer lehrt dich? – Die Pflanzen. – Wie lehren sie dich ihre
Kenntnisse? – Durch Träume oder veränderte Bewußtseinszustände, die durch die Einnahme
psychotroper, nicht suchtbildender Pflanzen hervorgerufen werden.” Kann all dies wahr sein, unter
kontrollierten Bedingungen veri-fiziert werden? Gespräche mit Heilern endeten immer mit der
selben Frage: “Und ich, ein westlicher Arzt, kann, auch ich lernen? – Ja, die Pflanzen werden auch
dich unterrichten, wenn du sie liebst und respektiertst und unter strenger Beachtung der Regeln
einnimmst (Diäten, Fasten, Isolation im Urwald, sexuelle Abstinenz usw). Sie werden zu dir
kommen und zu dir sprechen; das ist der einzige Weg zu lernen.”


DIE HEILER HATTEN RECHT

Diese seltsamen Gespräche brachten mich in ein Dilemma: entweder mußte ich meinen Versuch
aufgeben, zu verstehen, oder aber vorwärts gehen und bescheiden den Selbstversuch akzeptieren.
Einige gute Gründe dafür wurden deutlich, vor allem die Vereinbarkeit von empirischen Ansätzen
mit den Kriterien moderner Wissenschaft. Tatsächlich stützt sich auch die “Wissenschaft” der
Ureinwohner auf sichtbare Tatsachen un weist eine strenge Methodik auf, sie definiert klar die

Bedingungen für den Selbstversuch und für die Vermittlung von Tatsachen, und sie verlangt
konkrete Ergebnisse. Wir, ein junger Ethnobotaniker und ich, beschlossen, bis an die Grenzen
dieser Erfahrung zu gehen und die Behauptungen der Heiler am eigenen Leib zu überprüfen.
Es hat keinen Sinn, fünf Jahre einer anspruchsvollen, schwierigen, aber auch sehr bereichernden
Lehrzeit detailliert zu beschreiben. Die Heiler hatten die Wahrheit gesagt: Pflanzen lehren – bis
dahin, daß wir fähig wurden, die Zubereitung und Anwendung pflanzlicher Arzneitränke und die
heiligen Gesänge zu meistern und therapeutische Sitzungen zu leiten.
Die Einweihung enthielt das Durchleben veränderter Bewußtseinszustände, die zu keinerlei Sucht
oder Abhängigkeit führen. Sie ist das Echo zu den wilden “Gegen-Einweihungen” der Drogensüchtigen. Einige Patienten kamen voran als Ergebnis der Verbindung von Arzt und Heiler.
Trotz beschränkter Mittel ermutigten uns die Ergebnisse, fortzufahren und nach und nach eine
alternative Therapie auszuarbeiten, in der traditionelles Wissen mit modernen psychotherapeutischen Verfahren verbunden wird.


EIN UNGENUTZTES ALTHERGEBRACHTES WISSEN

Peru ist als größter Koka-Produzent bekannt, aber auch ein Land des Konsums. Das am weitesten
verbreitete Produkt ist Kokain-Base-Paste (“crack”). Es führt schnell zu Abhängigkeit und macht
den Konsumenten bald zum Außenseiter. Er braucht große Summen um seine Sucht zu befriedigen.
Andererseits gibt es nur wenige Behandlungszentren, die zudem noch in der Hauptstadt konzentriert
sind.
Außerhalb der Städte zeigen die eingeborenen Heiler eine große Fähigkeit, sich auf diese neuen
Krankheiten einzustellen. In jeder Region sind Methoden entwickelt worden, die auf einer oder
mehreren psychotropen Substanzen basieren (Kaktus mit Meskalin, Lianen usw.). An der Küste
haben peruanische Psychiater die Wirksamkeit auf Erfahrung beruhender Therapien bewiesen, in
denen Meskalinhaltige Kakteen zur Behandlung von Alkoholikern verwendet werden.
Das peruanische Gesundheitsministerium, das sich des enormen Potentials des althergebrachten Wissens bewußt ist, subventioniert ein Institut für traditionelle Medizin. Frankreich unterstützt
diese Forschung mit einem Französischen Institut für Andenforschung. Unsre Tätigkeit stützt sich
auf diese Initiativen. Innerhalb dieses Konzepts haben wir in Tarapoto im amazonischen Vorgebirge
Perus mit unseren peruanischen Partnern ein Zentrum für Drogensüchtige gegründet. Die Patienten
kommen freiwillig. Das derzeitige Ziel der Vereinigung besteht darin, eine Struktur zu schaffen, die
15 Patienten dauerhaft aufnehmen kann. Angesichts unserer begrenzten Mittel werden die Patienten
aufgefordert, sich je nach ihrem Zustand und ihren Fähigkeiten an Arbeiten zu beteiligen, die zur
Eigenfinanzierung des Zentrums beitragen (Handwerk, Unterricht, Gartenbau, Baumaßnahmen…).
Das aus unseren Erfahrungen entwickelte Behandlungsverfahren verbindet traditionelle Medizin
mit modernen psychotherapeutischen Techniken. Es besteht aus zwei Phasen: eine kurze körperliche Entgiftung mit purgativen Pflanzen (10 Tage), die die Entzugssymptome verkürzen und
beseitigen soll, gefolgt von einer längeren zweiten Phase (6-12 Monate) der “psychischen” Entgiftung. Diese zweite Phase schließt die rituelle Einnahme psychotroper Pflanzen ein.

Der Patient, der an diesem therapeutischen Prozeß teilnimmt, erfährt die Wiedergeburt eines
inneren Universums, was sich durch Träume, Visionen, flashbacks innerhalb des gewöhnlichen
Bewußtseinszustandes, plötzliche Eingebungen ausdrückt. Nach und nach verläßt er das Chaos und
findet seine innere Ordnung wieder, wobei er ermutigt wird, alles abzustoßen, was nicht zu ihm
gehört – nicht nur die auf den Drogenkonsum zurückgehenden Gifte, sondern auch psychische und
emotionale “Heimsuchungen” die das Selbst vergiften. Die Funktion der psychotropen Pflanzen
besteht darin, die Visualisierung dieses Prozesses durch den Patienten selbst zu ermöglichen, der so
durch ermutigende innere Mechanismen neu erzogen wird. Im Gegensatz zur “Gegen-Initiation” der
Drogensucht führt dieser Prozeß zur Wiedererrichtung einer inneren Ordnung auf den Wegen der
schamanischen Einweihung. Das wesentliche Element der Initiationstechniken im oberen
Amazonasgebiet ist Ayahuasca. Diese “Liane des Todes”, die als Arzneitrank zubereitet wird,
öffnet das Tor der Verbindung zur “Anderen Welt”. Nachdem wir ihre Wirkungen in mehr als 350
rituellen Sitzungen an uns seihst erforscht und gelernt haben, mit ihr umzugehen, haben wir diese Zubereitung zum zentralen Punkt unserer Therapie gemacht.
Während nächtlicher Sitzungen führen wir die Teilnehmer zu einer kontrollierten Veränderung ihres Bewußtseinszustandes. Die psychotropen Wirkungen des Getränks bewirken eine allgemeine
Erweiterung der Wahrnehmungen, eine Beschleunigung der geistigen Funktionen und eine relative hemmung der rationalen Abwehr -ohne Verlust von Bewußtsein oder von Elementen der inneren Dynamik des Teilnehmers, der angeleitet wird, sein inneres Sein zu betrachten. Aufkommende Krisen, aufgedeckte Konflikte, verborgene Ängste werden sämtlich durch Ent-Äußerung gelöst bei
gleichzeitigem Ausscheiden physischer, psychischer und metaphysischer “Gifte”. Die Katharsis ist
in der Regel mit starken Entleerungen (Erbrechen, Durchfall, Schweiß…) und spirituellen Kämpfen
verbunden, die als Aufeinandertreffen von Engeln und Dämonen visualisiert werden. Nachdem die heilende Energie von Ayahuasca die verschiedenen Bereiche gereinigt hat, tritt der Teilnehmer in
ein friedvolles Stadium, in dem er sich mit seinem Körper, seinem Ego und dem ihn umgebenden
Universum versöhnt fühlt. Durch die Entdeckung seines inneren Universums hilft Ayahuasca dem Patienten, seine Begabungen, seine Fähigkeiten, kurz: seine Bestimmung zu finden.
Der Betreffende findet heraus, was er in sich trägt, seinen angemessenen und legitimen Platz im
Leben, er erkennt sein Ziel und seinen Weg. Ayahuasca bewegt sich weiter. Nachdem sie ihre Rolle
gespielt hat, macht sie ihren Platz frei. Nach unserer Erfahrung denken wir, daß ein Drogenabhängiger nach sechs-monatiger Behandlung und rund 20 Sitzungen eine ausreichende
Grundlage hat, um seinen Weg für die Zukunft zu finden. Ayahuasca führt nicht zu Abhängigkeit, sie wird vollständig assimiliert. Darin unterscheidet sie sich grundsätzlich von anderen Drogen. Das
Konzept der Substitution ist der Methode, der wir Folgen, also vollkommen fremd. Wenn Substitution stattfände, dann nur insoweit, als die kontrollierte Einnahme anderer Pflanzen mit
ähnlichen psychotropen Wirkungen die wilde Gewohnheit des Konsumierens bewußtseinsverändernder Substanzen ersetzt. Aus unserer Sicht zeigt der Ersatz einer
suchterzeugenden Substanz durch eine andere, auch wenn letztere legal und durch ärztliche
Verschreibung gemildert ist, nichts anderes als die therapeutische Unfähigkeit, das zugrunde
liegende Problem anzugehen. Der Einsatz von Methadon z.B. ist Teil eines Schemas medizinischer
Unterdrückung. Er ist ein Zudecken, eine – vielleicht elegante und in Krankenhausfarben gehaltene
– Verkleidung, in Wirklichkeit aber eine barbarische Praxis. In unseren Augen zeigt Drogensucht einen – fast immer unbewußten- Versuch, die Grenzen eines individuellen Universums zu

durchbrechen. Er entspricht dem Eindringen in Sphären außerhalb der Grenzen des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins, das den Betreffenden in einem zu engen Raum gefangen hält, in dem er keine befriedigende Antwort auf seine existenzielle Unruhe finden kann. Drogensucht driickt eine tiefe Sehnsucht aus, den Sinn der Existenz wiederzufinden.
Es hat sich herausgestellt, daß gerade die empirischen traditionellen Heil-weisen ein komplexes System von Kenntnissen bieten, die eine Antwort auf dieses Problem geben können. Die
schamanischen Praktiken Amazoniens scheinen in der Lage, zeitgenössische Probleme wie das der
Drogensucht zu handhaben. Sie haben den enormen Vorteil, die der Drogensucht zugrunde liegende
Frage nicht außer acht zu lassen, sondern sie im Gegenteil zu erkennen, anzuerkennen, daß sie
berechtigt ist und schließlich eine Methodik anzubieten, die auf das Nutzen ungewöhnlicher Bewußtseinszustände spezialisiert ist

quelle: http://www.takiwasi.org

10.000 Drogenkranke werden in Österreich mit Ersatzdrogen therapiert. Ein Millionengeschäft für nur sehr wenige Anbieter von Substitutions-Mitteln, die sich nun ein Match um Marktanteile liefern.

Wien. 30.000 Österreicher sind süchtig nach Opiaten wie beispielsweise Heroin. 9828 davon befanden sich Ende 2008 in einer sogenannten Substitutionstherapie mit Ersatzdrogen. Statt den Stoff von der Straße (mit allen seinen Nebenwirkungen) konsumieren die Patienten vom Arzt verschriebene Medikamente. Weil nun durchsickerte, dass im Gesundheitsministerium einmal mehr darüber nachgedacht wird, ob bestimmte Medikamente anderen vorzuziehen und wieder andere gar zu verbieten wären, ist zwischen den Herstellern der Präparate ein Kampf um Marktanteile ausgebrochen.

Es geht ums Geld. Ein Millionen-Euro-Geschäft um eine sichere, weil süchtige Kundschaft, um das nur eine Handvoll Anbieter rittert. Vereinfacht dargestellt verläuft die Frontlinie zwischen den beiden Unternehmen Mundipharma (Jahresumsatz 2007: 25 Mio. Euro) und Aesca Pharma (59 Mio.). Das Mundipharma-Produkt Substitol hat in Österreich einen Marktanteil von 62 Prozent (Quelle: Agentur für Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit, Ages) und beschert dem Unternehmen ein Drittel des Umsatzes. Aesca kommt mit seinen Produkten Subutex und Suboxone zusammen auf 21 Prozent. Den Rest teilen sich Compensan von Lannacher (16 Prozent) und Kapanol von GlaxoSmithKline (ein Prozent). Weil Methadon direkt in Apotheken abgemischt wird, liegen der Ages dafür keine Zahlen zum Marktanteil vor. Insgesamt gaben die Sozialversicherungen 2007 20 Millionen Euro für Ersatzdrogen aus.Aesca stört nun, dass Österreichs Ärzte ihren Suchtpatienten nach wie vor häufig Substitol und Compensan, zwei sogenannte „retardierte Morphine“, verschreiben. Und das, obwohl ihre eigenen Produkte mit dem Wirkstoff Buprenorphin von der derzeit gültigen Verordnung des Gesundheitsministeriums als „Mittel erster Wahl“ bezeichnet werden.

Offenbar in der Hoffnung, mithilfe von medialem Druck in der geplanten Neufassung der Verordnung retardierte Morphine überhaupt zu verbieten, füttert Aesca über die Vermittlung einer PR-Agentur seit einiger Zeit Journalisten mit „Hintergrunddossiers“ über die Vorzüge der eigenen und die Nachteile der Konkurrenzprodukte von Mundipharma und Lannacher. Zum Teil mit Erfolg. In manchen Medien werden retardierte Morphine bereits als „Problemdrogen“ dargestellt. Im Zentrum der Kritik steht das relativ hohe Missbrauchspotenzial von retardierten Morphinen, die wegen möglicher Mehrfachverschreibungen von Ärzten und ihrer „kick“-ähnlichen Wirkung von Süchtigen gerne am Schwarzmarkt ver- und gekauft werden.

Dabei ist objektiv keines der genannten Medikamente besser oder schlechter, gefährlicher oder sicherer als das andere: Das sagt zumindest Marcus Müllner, Bereichsleiter für Arzneimittelsicherheit bei der Ages, die regelmäßig Ärzteberichte, Studien, Fachartikel und Pressemeldungen zum Thema analysiert. Interessant am Ages-Bericht ist auch, dass 2008 nur zwei ärztliche Meldungen über (geringfügige) Nebenwirkungen von Ersatzdrogen einlangten. Beide betrafen Suboxone von Aesca.

Ein der „Presse“ bekannter Arzt, der zahlreiche Suchtpatienten betreut, erinnert sich in diesem Zusammenhang an eine „seltsame Strategieänderung“ der Aesca-Vertreter, die ihn in den vergangenen Jahren regelmäßig aufsuchten, um die Vorzüge der eigenen Medikamente zu bewerben. Nachdem man jahrelang die angebliche Sicherheit von Subutex gegenüber den retardierten Morphinen in den Vordergrund gestellt hatte, legten die Vertreter dem Arzt bei ihrem letzten Besuch Studien vor, die plötzlich das hohe Missbrauchspotenzial von Subutex beschrieben und gleichzeitig die Vorzüge des direkten Nachfolgers Suboxone priesen.

Ärztekritik an Politvorschriften

Während die Politik die Entscheidung über bevorzugte Medikamente (und damit Marktanteile) hinausschiebt, wollen sich die Ärzte nicht mehr verunsichern lassen. Die Österreichische Gesellschaft für arzneimittelgestützte Behandlung von Suchtkrankheit (ÖGABS) hat daher ein (noch nicht veröffentlichtes) Grundsatzpapier erstellt, das auf Grundlage unabhängiger Studien feststellt, dass keines der am Markt befindlichen Medikamente generell besser oder schlechter ist als das andere.

Der Wiener Allgemeinmediziner Horst Schalk, der auch Drogenpatienten betreut, beschreibt das dann so: „Die Patienten sind verschieden und sprechen auf unterschiedliche Medikamente unterschiedlich an. Ein Arzt sollte seinen Patienten daher die Präparate verschreiben, auf die der Patient am besten anspricht

quelle:diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/477270/index.do

According to an evidence review from Pain Treatment Topics, opioid antagonists like
naloxone and naltrexone — which block opioid drugs from activating their receptors — may
be surprisingly helpful for relieving difficult-to-treat pain conditions.
Glenview, IL; March 2009 – Achieving effective, durable, and safe pain relief, especially in
patients with chronic and/or severe pain conditions, can be difficult. For many types of pain,
prescription opioids are among the most effective analgesics. Yet, there is a growing body of
evidence suggesting potential benefits of opioid antagonists, particularly naloxone and
naltrexone.

This is somewhat unexpected because these drugs displace opioid molecules from
their neuroreceptors, and block opioids from attaching to and activating those receptors.
In a peer-reviewed, evidence-based report for Pain Treatment Topics (http://Pain-Topics.org)
editor Stewart B. Leavitt, MA, PhD, describes naloxone and naltrexone pharmacology and the
theoretical foundations of opioid antagonists for pain management. Titled “Opioid Antagonists,
Naloxone & Naltrexone — Aids for Pain Management,” the 16-page report includes summaries
of 17 studies — case examples and clinical trials – investigating opioid-antagonist therapy in adult
humans. The complete report with references can be freely accessed at the Pain-Topics.org
website at <http://pain-topics.org/clinical_concepts/innovations.php&gt;.

Naloxone and naltrexone have been extensively studied in the past, and are FDA-approved for
the treatment of alcoholism or opioid addiction (naltrexone) or opioid overdose (naloxone). A
long-acting form of naltrexone for intramuscular injection also is approved for addiction therapy.
These antagonists also are being used or tested as ingredients in specially formulated opioid
analgesics to deter their misuse or abuse.

Leavitt notes, however, “doses of naloxone or naltrexone used in pain management are generally
much smaller than in other applications; either in the 1 to 5 mg range, referred to as ‘low dose,’ or
less than 1 mg, in microgram amounts, designated as ‘ultralow dose.’ In animal studies and
human trials, low- or ultralow-doses of antagonists appear to enhance the pain-relieving efficacy
of opioid-agonist analgesics, such as morphine, oxycodone, and others. Along with this, tolerance
to and physiologic dependency on opioid analgesics, as well as certain opioid side effects, may

PressRelease-16 be diminished. Furthermore, low-dose naltrexone has been successfully tested by itself as
monotherapy for the management of several pain-related conditions, including Crohn’s disease,
irritable bowel syndrome, and fibromyalgia.”

Explanatory mechanisms of action behind the benefits of opioid antagonists in pain management
are still under investigation. Essentially, appropriately low doses of opioid antagonists have been
postulated to “reset” the opioid-receptor system for a period of time, which seems analogous to
how rebooting a malfunctioning computer clears memory, refreshes the software, and often
restores normal function. With opioid-agonist therapy, the body becomes better attuned to the
beneficial effects of both external opioids, such as morphine, and naturally occurring internal
opioids, such as endorphins.

Clinical research to date on low- or ultralow dose applications of opioid antagonists for pain
management in humans has been limited. Still, the available evidence described in this report
suggests a number of possibilities that may be of interest to healthcare providers and their
patients with pain, including:
Brief detoxification using naloxone for difficult cases of opioid-unresponsive intractable
pain, opioid tolerance, or suspected opioid-induced hyperalgesia.

Ultralow-dose naloxone combined with various opioid agonists for managing
postoperative pain.


Ultralow-dose naltrexone (oral) or naloxone (intrathecal) as a component of intrathecal
opioid analgesia for difficult cases of intractable pain.


Ultralow-dose oral naltrexone combined with opioid agonists to provide an opioid-sparing
effect, offering equivalent pain relief at lower opioid doses.


Oral ultra-low dose naloxone or naltrexone combined with oral opioid analgesics to help
prevent or reverse opioid-induced constipation and to potentially reduce other opioid side
effects.


Ultralow-dose naltrexone to help facilitate more comfortable opioid-agonist tapering.
Low-dose naltrexone monotherapy for Crohn’s disease, and possibly for fibromyalgia and
short-term treatment of irritable bowel syndrome.

“Although further investigations to assess the safety and efficacy of these applications would be
appropriate,” Leavitt suggests, “both of these agents have passed animal and clinical toxicity
studies, and have been used for years in applications other than those described in this research
report. Therefore, it is not surprising that they have exhibited favorable safety profiles when
applied at low- and ultralow-dose levels, with few notices of adverse events or side effects at
these doses when used individually as monotherapy or in combination with opioid analgesics.”
“Naloxone and naltrexone are available today as generic, economically priced drugs, and it is
important that practitioners become aware of the therapeutic options that these may provide for
patient care,” Leavitt concludes. “However, it must be understood that opioid antagonists are not
yet FDA-approved for pain management purposes, so low- or ultralow-dose naloxone or
naltrexone would need to be cautiously prescribed off-label for compounding at properly equipped
pharmacies.”
*** NOTE: The contents of this report are for educational purposes and are not intended to
endorse or promote the off-label prescribing of any drugs. Practitioners are advised to study the
available evidence and use professional discretion in their prescribing decisions.

Pain Treatment Topics and the associated Pain-Topics.org website provide open and free
access to noncommercial, evidence-based clinical news, information, research, and education on
the causes and effective treatment of the many types of pain conditions. The project is
independently produced and currently supported by educational grants from Purdue Pharma L.P.,
Stamford, Connecticut, and Covidien/Mallinckrodt Inc., St. Louis, MO, leading manufacturers of
opioid analgesic products. The sponsors had no participatory role in the initiation or development
of this report on opioid antagonists in pain management.

With at least 25,000 people slaughtered in Mexico since President Felipe Calderón hurled the Mexican Army into the anti-cartel battle, three questions remain unanswered: Who is being killed, who is doing the killing and why are people being killed? This is apparently considered a small matter to US leaders in the discussions about failed states, narco-states and the false claim that violence is spilling across the border.

President Calderón has stated repeatedly that 90 percent of the dead are connected to drug organizations. The United States has silently endorsed this statement and is bankrolling it with $1.4 billion through Plan Mérida, the three-year assistance plan passed by the Bush administration in 2008. Yet the daily torrent of local press accounts from Ciudad Juárez makes it clear that most of the murder victims are ordinary Mexicans who magically morph into drug cartel members before their blood dries on the streets, sidewalks, vacant lots, pool halls and barrooms where they fall dead, riddled with bullets. Juárez is ground zero in this war: more than one-fourth of the 25,000 dead that the Mexican government admits to since December 2006 have occurred in this one border city of slightly over 1.5 million people, nearly 6,300 as of July 21, 2010. When three people attached to the US Consulate in Ciudad Juárez were killed in March this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the murders „the latest horrible reminder of how much work we have to do together.“

Just what is this work?
No one seems to know, but on the ground it is death. Calderón’s war, assisted by the United States, terrorizes the Mexican people, generates thousands of documented human rights abuses by the police and Mexican Army and inspires lies told by American politicians that violence is spilling across the border (in fact, it has been declining on the US side of the border for years).

We are told of a War on Drugs that has no observable effect on drug distribution, price or sales in the United States. We are told the Mexican Army is incorruptible, when the Mexican government’s own human rights office has collected thousands of complaints that the army robs, kidnaps, steals, tortures, rapes and kills innocent citizens. We are told repeatedly that it is a war between cartels or that it is a war by the Mexican government against cartels, yet no evidence is presented to back up these claims. The evidence we do have is that the killings are not investigated, that the military suffers almost no casualties and that thousands of Mexicans have filed affidavits claiming abuse, often lethal, by the Mexican army.

Here is the US policy in a nutshell: we pay Mexicans to kill Mexicans, and this slaughter has no effect on drug shipments or prices.

This war gets personal. A friend calls late at night from Juárez and says if he is murdered before morning, be sure to tell his wife. It never occurs to him to call the police, nor does it occur to you.

A friend who is a Mexican reporter flees to the United States because the Mexican Army has come to his house and plans to kill him for writing a news story that displeases the generals. He is promptly thrown into prison by the Department of Homeland Security because he is considered a menace to American society.

On the Mexican side, a mother, stepfather and pregnant daughter are chased down on a highway in the Valle de Juárez, and shot in their car, while two toddlers watch. On the US side, a man receives a phone call and his father tells him, „I’m dying, I’m dying, I’m dead.“ He hears his sister pleading for her life, „Don’t kill me. No don’t kill me.“ He thinks his niece and nephew are dead also, but they are taken to a hospital, sprayed with shattered glass. The little boy watched his mother die, her head blown apart by the bullets. A cousin waits in a parking lot surrounded by chainlink and razor-wire on the US side of the bridge for the bodies to be delivered so that he can bring them home. The next day, the family takes to the parking lots of two fast-food outlets in their hometown of Las Cruces, New Mexico, for a carwash. Young girls in pink shorts and T-shirts wave hand-lettered signs. They will wash your car and accept donations to help bury their parents and sister, to buy clothes for two small orphans. „This was just a family,“ says cousin Cristina, collecting donations in a zippered bag. She says they are in shock, the full impact of what happened has yet to sink in. So for now, they will raise the money they need to take care of the children. An American family.

Or, you visit the room where nine people were shot to death in August 2008 as they raised their arms to praise God during a prayer meeting. Forty hours later, flies buzz over what lingers in cracks in the tile floor and bloody handprints mark the wall. This was the scene of the first of several mass killings at drug rehab centers where at least fifty people have been massacred over the past two years in Juárez and Chihuahua City. An evangelical preacher who survived the slaughter that night said she saw a truckload of soldiers parked at the end of the street a hundred yards from the building and that the automatic rifle fire went on for fifteen minutes.
Or you talk with a former member of the Juárez cartel who is shocked to learn of a new cabinet appointment by President Calderón because he says he used to deliver suitcases of money to the man as payment from the Juárez cartel.

The claim that ninety percent of the dead are criminals seems at best to be self-delusion. In June 2010, El Universal, a major daily in Mexico City, noted that the federal government had investigated only 5 percent of the first 22,000 executions, according to confidential material turned over to the Mexican Senate by the Mexican Attorney General. What constituted an investigation was not explained

On June 21, Cronica, another Mexico City paper, presented a National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) study that examined more than 5,000 complaints filed by Mexican citizens against the army. Besides incidents of rape, murder, torture, kidnapping and robbery, the report described scenes like the following: „June 1, 2007, in the community of La Joya de los Martinez, Sinaloa de Leyva: Members of the Army were camped at the edge of the highway, drinking alcoholic beverages. Two of them were inebriated and probably under the influence of some drug. They opened fire against a truck that drove along the road carrying eight members of the Esparza Galaviz family. One adult and two minors died…The soldiers arranged sacks of decomposing marijuana on the vehicle that had been attacked and killed one of their own soldiers, whose body was arranged at the crime scene to indicate that the civilian drivers had been the aggressors and had killed the soldier.“

The CNDH also names the army as responsible for the shooting deaths of Martin and Brayan Almanza Salazar, aged 9 and 5, on April 3, 2010, as they traveled to the beach in Matamoros with their family. The only thing noteworthy about these cases is that they ever became public knowledge. Many more victims and survivors remain silent—afraid to report what has happened to them to any Mexican official or news reporter.

Such incidents pass unnoticed in the US press and apparently do not capture the attention of our government. Nor does the fact that in the midst of what is repeatedly called a war against drug cartels by both the American and Mexican governments and press, Mexican soldiers seem immune to bullets. With over 8,000 Mexicans killed in 2009 alone, the army reported losses of thirty-five that year. According to Reporters Without Borders, a total of sixty-seven journalists have been killed in Mexico since 2000, while eleven others have gone missing since 2003. Mexico is now one of the most dangerous places in the world to be reporter. And possibly the safest place in the world to be a soldier.

When there is a noteworthy massacre, the Mexican government says it proves the drug industry is crumbling. When there is a period of relative peace, the Mexican government says it shows their policy is winning. On the night of July 15, a remote-controlled car bomb exploded in downtown Juárez, killing at least three people—a federal policeman, a kidnap victim dressed in a police uniform and used as a decoy and a physician who rushed to the scene from his private office to help dozens of people injured in the blast. A graffiti message attributed the blast to the Juárez cartel and claimed it as a warning to police who work for the Sinaloa cartel.
On July 20, the Mexican ambassador to the United States, Arturo Sarukhan, minimized the Juárez bombing, saying that it was not aimed indiscriminately at civilians and that it did not indicate any escalation in violence. He parroted the declaration of Mexican Attorney General Arturo Chávez that the motivation for the bombing is economic, not ideological, and that „we have no evidence in the country of narco-terrorism.“ US Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual also indicated that this violence in Mexico, which also included a grenade attack on the US Consulate in Nuevo Laredo a few months ago, “is disturbing but has not reached the level of terrorism.” We are supposed to believe in their evidence that 90 percent of the dead are criminals, but that they have no evidence at all of narco-terrorism? This, despite numerous incidents of grenades and other explosives being used in recent attacks in the states of Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Guerrero, Sonora and many other places in Mexico. And that “armed commandos” dressed like soldiers and wielding high-powered machine guns are witnessed at the scenes of hundreds of massacres documented since 2008.

No one asks or answers this question: How does such an escalation benefit the drug smuggling business which has not been diminished at all during the past three years of hyper-violence in Mexico? Each year, the death toll rises, each year there is no evidence of any disruption in the delivery of drugs to American consumers, each year the United States asserts its renewed support for this war. And each year, the basic claims about the war go unquestioned.

Let us make this simple: no one knows how many are dying, no one knows who is killing them and no one knows what role the drug industry has in these killings. There has been no investigation of the dead and so no one really knows whether they were criminals or why they died. There have been no interviews with heads of drug organizations and so no one really knows what they are thinking or what they are trying to accomplish.
It is difficult to have a useful discussion without facts, but it seems to be very easy to make policy without facts. We can look forward to fewer facts and more unquestioned and unsubstantiated government claims.

Such as the response by General Felipe de Jesús Espitia, commander of the Joint Operation Chihuahua, to a 2008 report by El Diario de Juárez that one out of three Juárez citizens believed the army occupation of the city had accomplished little or nothing. „Those who feel this way, it is because their interests are affected or because they are paid by the narco-traffickers,“ he said. „Who are these citizens?“

General Jorge Juárez Loera, the first commander of the Joint Operation Chihuahua, put it this way: „I would like to see reporters change their articles and instead of writing about one more murder victim, they should say, ‚one less criminal.‘ “

source: http://www.thenation.com/article/379…exico?page=0,0

Bridget M. Kuehn

JAMA. 2010;304(3):261-263. doi:10.1001/jama.2010.963

When patients with HIV infection also are addicted to opioids, treating both disorders simultaneously may help improve outcomes and reduce the spread of HIV or other infections transmitted through needle sharing or risky sexual behaviors associated with injection drug use. But accessing such integrated care has sometimes been a challenge for such patients, who generally had to seek care for opioid abuse at addiction treatment centers and primary HIV care elsewhere. This could be logistically difficult and often led to delays in receiving care.

Now, however, buprenorphine prescribing by HIV clinicians is offering patients the option of receiving treatment for both opioid addiction and HIV infection, an approach that a growing body evidence indicates benefits individual patients and public health.

Figure 05072FA
There are currently about 19 000 US physicians certified to prescribe buprenorphine, but experts urge more physicians, particularly those in HIV primary care, to become certified to meet the demand for opioid addiction treatment.

Since 2002, buprenorphine, a partial opioid agonist, has been available in the United States as an office-based treatment for opioid dependence. Physicians who wish to prescribe the drug may under go a training program and become certified through the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) to prescribe buprenorphine (http://buprenorphine.samhsa.gov/). Methadone, a full opioid agonist, remains available through highly regulated, specialized treatment programs.

„Buprenorphine has definitely expanded access [to addiction care],“ said Amina Chaudhry, MD, MPH, an HIV clinician in Baltimore who prescribes buprenorphine. Chaudhry, who is also a medical officer at SAMHSA’s Center for Substance Abuse Treatment in Rockville, Md, explained that even in cities like Baltimore, where there may be specialty addiction programs nearby, the demand for such care often exceeds the available slots. And rural areas may have no specialty addiction programs at all within a reasonable distance.

IMPROVED OUTCOMES


Studies have suggested that patients with HIV infection and untreated opioid addiction often receive HIV treatment later in the course of their illness, may be less adherent to their antiretroviral therapy regimen, and may engage in behaviors such as unprotected sex or injection drug use that put themselves and others at risk of new infections. But treating patients for both HIV and drug use can improve such outcomes. Although much of this research has focused on the effects of methadone, emerging evidence suggests that buprenorphine has similar benefits and may have a few advantages over methadone treatment for patients with HIV.

A recent randomized trial found that office-based care can improve addiction-related outcomes for patients with HIV and opioid addiction and may lead to faster treatment for addiction (Lucas GM et al. Ann Intern Med. 2010;152[11]:704-711). Gregory M. Lucas, MD, PhD, of Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine in Baltimore, and colleagues randomized 93 patients at a Baltimore HIV clinic to receive buprenorphine therapy at the clinic or to receive a referral to specialty addiction treatment elsewhere. Patients randomized to clinic-based opioid agonist treatment with buprenorphine entered addiction treatment much more quickly (84% had initiated such care at 2 weeks compared with 11% in the referral group). During the 12-month trial, participation in opioid addiction treatment was significantly greater in the clinic-based care group (74% participated in such treatment vs only 41% in the referral group). Patients receiving buprenorphine in the clinic also had significantly fewer urine test results that were positive for opioids or cocaine and visited their HIV primary care clinicians more frequently.

However, the researchers did not find differences in HIV-treatment participation or HIV treatment effects between the clinic-based vs referral groups. The authors concluded that the improvements in addiction treatment may have been driven by streamlined access to care because patients referred to outside specialty addiction care may have experienced a delay in treatment initiation. The small sample size may have precluded identifying clinically significant differences in HIV treatment outcomes, they also noted.

The study was part of the Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA’s) Buprenorphine in HIV Primary Care National Evaluation and Support Center (BHIVES; http://www.bhives.org). An analysis of pooled data from 10 sites participating in the HRSA program is under way.

David A. Fiellin, MD, associate professor of medicine at Yale School of Medicine and co-investigator on BHIVES, noted that the program is also probing which approaches to primary care delivery work best in HIV clinics. So far, he and his colleagues have demonstrated in a pilot study that an approach that uses a nurse or other staff member to help coordinate buprenorphine care by overseeing such tasks as urine testing, drug counseling, and medication monitoring can help to reduce drug use among HIV patients, has good retention rates, improves patient function, and promotes patient satisfaction (Sullivan LE et al. Clin Infect Dis. 2006;43[suppl 4]:S184-S190).

Previous studies had suggested that physicians‘ concerns about adherence to antiretroviral treatment by injection drug users with HIV played a role in the likelihood that such patients would be offered highly active antiretroviral therapy or at least experience a delay in receiving such treatment. But results of a French study suggest that integrated treatment of HIV and opioid addiction could allay such concerns. The study found that retention in opioid substitution therapy, either buprenorphine or methadone, is associated with improved virologic outcomes in patients treated with highly active antiretroviral therapy and who had opioid use disorders (Roux P et al. Clin Infect Dis. 2009;49[9]:1433-1440). The study included 53 patients receiving buprenorphine, 28 receiving methadone, and 32 who were not receiving opioid substitution therapy. The median duration of opioid substitution treatment was 25 months.

„Having one-stop shopping for patients means one less barrier to accessing care,“ Chaudhry said.

Buprenorphine also appears to have fewer interactions with antiretroviral drugs than methadone. Elinore F. McCance-Katz, MD, PhD, professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco, and her colleagues published an article reviewing drug interactions involving methadone and buprenorphine and other medications, including antiretroviral therapies (McCance-Katz EF et al. Am J Addict. 2009;19[1]:4-16). Two HIV medications in particular, efavirenz and nevirapine, have been documented to trigger opiate withdrawal in patients taking methadone but not in patients taking buprenorphine, despite observations of reduced levels of both methadone and buprenorphine when these antiretrovirals were given to patients receiving these opioid therapies, noted McCance-Katz in an interview. A possible reason for the observed differences may be that methadone is metabolized to an inactive substance while buprenorphine is metabolized to norbuprenorphine, which also has opioid effects and may protect patients from experiencing opiate withdrawal, McCance-Katz said.

„It’s very difficult to effectively treat patients [with HIV] if they are in withdrawal,“ she said. „They simply don’t comply with antiretroviral therapy if they are in withdrawal.“

Elevated concentrations of buprenorphine have been documented in patients with opioid dependence and HIV taking atazanavir; such elevated levels were associated with cognitive impairment in a few HIV patients in one case study, while another study in non–HIV-infected patients found only increased drowsiness (Bruce RD and Altice FL. AIDS. 2006;20[5]:783-784 and McCance-Katz EF et al. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2007;91[2-3]:269-278). Such elevations of methadone concentrations have not been documented with atazanavir.

„In general, buprenorphine has fewer interactions with HIV medications, but neither drug has been looked at extensively with many other medications,“ she said, adding that many patients with HIV may be taking a number of medications in addition to antiretroviral drugs.

Integrating buprenorphine treatment into the HIV care setting has another potential advantage: it may be easier for clinicians to spot interactions between addiction and HIV therapies when patients receive buprenorphine treatment at their primary HIV clinic, McCance-Katz said. For example, if a patient receives methadone at one clinic and antiretroviral therapy at another, there may be limited communication between clinicians at the 2 sites and adverse events may not be identified.


CLINICIAN ACCEPTANCE


About 19 000 US physicians are certified to prescribe buprenorphine and about 640 000 patients are receiving the prescriptions compared with about 4500 certified prescribers and a little more than 100 000 patients in 2005, according to Nicholas Reuter, MPH, senior public health analyst at SAMHSA. But access to buprenorphine therapy in the HIV primary care setting in the United States may be limited. Reuter noted that psychiatrists and physicians specializing in addiction treatment were early adopters of office-based buprenorphine prescribing. Today, 31% of the prescribers are classified as general or family practitioners, 21% as psychiatrists, 15% as internal medicine specialists, and the remaining third are other specialists who are not HIV clinicians, according to Reuter. (SAMHSA doesn’t track the number of HIV/AIDS specialists who are certified to prescribe buprenorphine.)

A survey of about 500 HIV clinicians (49.7% response rate) who attended International AIDS Society conferences in the United States in 2006 found that only 85 (17%) worked in offices that prescribe buprenorphine. Of the 323 physicians who responded, only 67 (21%) were certified to prescribe the drug, and only 19 (6%) had ever done so (Kunins HV et al. Fam Med. 2009;41[10]:722-728). Additionally, when presented with a vignette of an opioid-addicted patient with HIV, only 16% of the respondents endorsed primary care buprenorphine treatment as the best option for the patient compared with 49% who endorsed buprenorphine treatment in a substance abuse treatment program and 31% who endorsed methadone treatment in a specialty program.

Fiellin noted that other BHIVES efforts have found that clinicians may feel they do not have adequate training and resources to provide addiction treatment but are interested in receiving additional training. The clinics that have implemented primary care buprenorphine care as part of BHIVES have received technical support during implementation, and over time their satisfaction with and sophistication at providing buprenorphine care have improved, he noted.

Another program offering resources to buprenorphine-prescribing physicians is SAMHSA’s Physician Clinical Support System (PCSS), which is directed by Fiellin and includes McCance-Katz as among the clinical experts who work with the program. PCSS helps match new buprenorphine prescribers to more experienced mentors who work in similar settings, including HIV primary care. The program also has drafted a guidance document for buprenorphine prescribing to patients with HIV (http://www.pcssbuprenorphine.org/pcss/documents2/PCSS_OpioidTherapiesHIVDrugInteractions_022808.pdf).

SAMHSA is also working with primary care physicians at federally qualified health centers who may be treating many HIV-infected patients. Reuter explained that the agency would like these centers to offer both buprenorphine and methadone, although the latter would require a center to be licensed as an opioid treatment clinic. He noted that SAMHSA’s goal is to make sure there are as many physicians as possible qualified to provide care to opioid-dependent patients, who may require long-term or recurrent care. For example, the average duration of methadone treatment is 6.8 years. „Our concern is that as long as patients remain engaged in treatment they do very well,“ he said. „A number of patients discontinue and the relapse rate is very high.“

Chaudhry emphasized that primary care buprenorphine treatment is not necessarily a replacement for specialty addiction treatment with methadone or buprenorphine. For example, she noted that some patients may prefer to keep their addiction treatment separate from their HIV care.

„The more treatment choices that providers have to offer the better,“ she said.

A Role for Buprenorphine in Prevention?Between 2004 and 2007, of the 152 917 US individuals in 34 states diagnosed with new HIV infections, 13% of them (n = 19 687) were injection drug users, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2009;58[46]:1291-1295). For those who are already infected with HIV, buprenorphine treatment may reduce the likelihood they will spread the infection to others through needle sharing or unprotected sexual activity. And for opioid-dependant individuals who are not already HIV-infected, primary care buprenorphine treatment may reduce risky behaviors that put them at risk of HIV infection, according to a recent study.

Lynn E. Sullivan, MD, and colleagues from the Yale University School of Medicine in New Haven, Conn, compared drug-related and sex-related risk behaviors in 166 buprenorphine-treated individuals at baseline, 12 weeks, and 24 weeks (Sullivan LE et al. J Subst Abuse Treat. 2008;35[1]:87-92). Reports of intravenous drug use among the individuals declined over time, from 37% at baseline to 12% at 12 weeks, to 7% at 24 weeks. The researchers also found a decline in reports of sex while the patient or their partner was high between baseline (64%) and 12 weeks (13%), although such reports increased to 15% a 24 weeks, and inconsistent condom use with a regular partner remained unchanged.

Such benefits may be particularly important in regions of the world where HIV transmission is driven primarily by injection drug use. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, for example, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS estimates that more than 80% of all HIV infections are caused by contaminated injection equipment (http://www.unaids.org/en/PolicyAndPractice/KeyPopulations/InjectDrugUsers/).

The HIV Prevention Trials Network, an international clinical trials network funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, currently has a phase 3 randomized trial under way in China and Thailand to assess whether buprenorphine in combination with naloxone (to reduce the abuse potential) decreases drug use and HIV-related risk behaviors (http://www.hptn.org/research_studies/HPTN058.asp). The trial, which is enrolling about 1500 HIV-uninfected injection drug users, will randomize individuals to receive either buprenorphine plus naloxone for 1 year or detoxification with buprenorphine plus naloxone for up to 18 days (with a second detoxification if necessary). Both groups will also receive counseling for HIV risk reduction. The study will assess cumulative HIV incidence and death and frequency of drug use and drug-related and HIV-related risk behaviors in the 2 groups.—B.M.K.

Addictive drugs can profoundly affect social behaviour both acutely and in the long-term. Effects range from the artificial
sociability imbued by various intoxicating agents to the depressed and socially withdrawn state frequently observed in chronic
drug users. Understanding such effects is of great potential significance in addiction neurobiology. In this review we focus on
the ‘social neuropeptide’ oxytocin and its possible role in acute and long-term effects of commonly used drugs.

Oxytocin regulates social affiliation and social recognition in many species and modulates anxiety, mood and aggression. Recent
evidence suggests that popular party drugs such as MDMA and gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB) may preferentially activate
brain oxytocin systems to produce their characteristic prosocial and prosexual effects. Oxytocin interacts with the mesolimbic
dopamine system to facilitate sexual and social behaviour, and this oxytocin-dopamine interaction may also influence the
acquisition and expression of drug-seeking behaviour. An increasing body of evidence from animal models suggests that even
brief exposure to drugs such as MDMA, cannabinoids, methamphetamine and phencyclidine can cause long lasting deficits in
social behaviour. We discuss preliminary evidence that these adverse effects may reflect long-term neuroadaptations in brain
oxytocin systems. Laboratory studies and preliminary clinical studies also indicate that raising brain oxytocin levels may
ameliorate acute drug withdrawal symptoms. It is concluded that oxytocin may play an important, yet largely unexplored, role
in drug addiction. Greater understanding of this role may ultimately lead to novel therapeutics for addiction that can improve
mood and facilitate the recovery of persons with drug use disorders.
British Journal of Pharmacology (2008) 154, 358–368; doi:10.1038/bjp.2008.132

Continue reading here: From_ultrasocial_to_antisocial_a_role_for_oxytocin_in_the_acute_reinforcing_effects_and_long-term_adverse_consequences_of_drug_use

Source: http://www.hintergrund.de/index.php?searchword=peter+dale+scott&ordering=&searchphrase=all&Itemid=242&option=com_search

und: http://www.peterdalescott.net/

Von PETER DALE SCOTT, 30. März 2009 –

(Teil 1 von 3) Einleitung

Vor Kurzem habe ich zwei Artikel veröffentlicht, die auf suggestive Ähnlichkeiten der sich wiederholenden Tiefenereignissen („deep events“) der jüngsten amerikanischen Geschichte hinweisen – damit meine ich solche Ereignisse, die wegen ihrer geheimdienstlichen Nähe in den amerikanischen Medien ignoriert, verdreht oder verschleiert werden. Der erste dieser Artikel verwies auf die übergreifenden Ähnlichkeiten vieler Tiefenereignisse seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Der zweite Artikel verwies auf die überraschenden Vergleichspunkte jener beiden Tiefenereignisse, auf die innerhalb kurzer Zeit zwei große amerikanische Kriege folgten: die Ermordung John F. Kennedys und der 11. September. Ich deutete an, dass es hinter diesen ganzen Ereignisse immer wieder Hinweise auf ein Milieu gab, das „Geheimdienstfunktionäre mit Leuten aus der Unterwelt des Drogenhandels“ in Verbindung brachte.

In diesem Artikel möchte ich zunächst einmal die komplexe Landschaft bzw. das komplexe Netzwerk dieses Milieus, das ich als weltweites Drogennetzwerk betitele, darlegen und seine Verbindungen zur so genannten „alternativen“ CIA oder „Schatten-CIA“ aufzeigen. Danach möchte ich veranschaulichen, wie dieses Netzwerk von Banken, einflussreichen Finanzhändlern und alternativer CIA zur Infrastruktur der Kennedy-Ermordung – und zu einer Reihe anderer, oberflächlich unverbundener, wichtiger Tiefenereignisse – beigetragen hat.

In dieser Schilderung sind die Namen einzelner Personen, ihrer Institutionen und ihrer Beziehungen relativ unbedeutend. Von Bedeutung ist stattdessen, dass solch ein Milieu existierte; dass es beständig war und geschützt wurde; und dass es, mit zunehmender Unabhängigkeit von Regierungsbeschränkungen, eine Rolle bei den wesentlichen Tiefenereignissen der letzten 50 Jahre gespielt hat.

Dies alles soll natürlich auch die hier näher zu untersuchende bedeutsame Hypothese stützen, dass dieses beständige Milieu auch zum Desaster des 11. September beigetragen haben mag.

Paul Helliwell, OPC und die CIA

In Gebieten, wo kommunistische Kräfte großen Rückhalt zu genießen scheinen, haben die Vereinigten Staaten immer wieder auf gewalttätige Unterstützung von Gangstern aus dem Drogenmilieu zurückgegriffen, zumindest seit 1945. Zuerst sind diese Arrangements, wie in Italien unmittelbar nach dem Krieg, nur kurzzeitig und ad hoc gewesen. Als Beispiel dient Vito Genovese, ein Mafiaboss aus New York, der als Übersetzer im Büro der Alliierten Militärregierung von Colonel Charles Poletti, einem früheren New Yorker Tammany Politiker eingesetzt war. Am 1. Mai 1947 soll William Donovan, mittlerweile Firmenanwalt und nicht mehr Leiter des „Office of Strategic Services – OSS“ (Amt für strategische Dienste), ein Massaker an politisch Linken in Sizilien finanziert haben, das von dem erst kurz zuvor deportierten Detroiter Mafiaboss, Frank Coppola, organisiert wurde.

Solche Arrangements wurden ab 1948, nachdem der neu geschaffene Nationale Sicherheitsrat das „Office of Policy Coordination“ (OPC) ins Leben gerufen hatte, noch weiter zentralisiert, um „Umstürze feindlicher Staaten“ durchzuführen – d.h. um Gesetzesbrechung als staatliche Politik einzuführen. Dank der OPC gaben die USA von nun an organisierten Drogenhändlern auf der ganzen Welt verdeckt beträchtliche Rückendeckung, im Fernen Osten, Europa, und schließlich auch im Nahen Osten und Lateinamerika.

Diese weltweiten Aktivitäten wurden immer mehr miteinander verknüpft. Seit spätestens 1950 gibt es ein weltweites CIA-Drogennetzwerk, das seitdem mehr oder weniger durchgängig betrieben wird. Besonders im Laufe der Zeit hat dieses Netzwerk zu bisher ungeklärten Tiefenereignissen beigetragen und die Konsolidierung einer Weltherrschaftsmentaliät vorangetrieben, sowohl im In- als auch im Ausland. Im Speziellen war dieses weltweite Drogennetzwerk für solch ungeklärte Tiefenereignisse wie die Ermordung John F. Kennedys, der Tonking-Zwischenfall 1964 und die Iran-Contra-Affäre ausschlaggebend.

Das weltweite Drogennetzwerk ist nicht bloß eine Nebenverbindung zwischen CIA-Agenten und ihren Drogenkontakten. Es ist stattdessen ein weltweiter Finanzkomplex aus heißem Geld, der wichtige Geschäfts-, Finanz-, Regierungs- und Gangsterpersönlichkeiten miteinander verbindet. Seinen eigenen politischen Einfluss erhält es aufrecht durch die systematische Bereitstellung von illegalen Geschäften, Gefälligkeiten und sogar Sex für Politiker auf der ganzen Welt, darunter auch Führungspersonen aus beiden Parteien in den USA. Das Ergebnis ist ein System, das man auch als Imperium der indirekten Herrschaft bezeichnen kann; ein System, das auf seiner Suche nach fremden Märkten und Ressourcen bereitwillig existierende Regierungen untergräbt, ohne dafür progressive Alternativen bieten zu können.

Ein bedeutender Organisator des globalen Drogennetzwerks der Nachkriegszeit — also neben CIA, organisiertem Verbrechen und ihren gemeinsamen Interessen am Drogenhandel — war der ehemalige OSS-Funktionär Paul L.E. Helliwell. Er war Chef der Sonder-Geheimdienstabteilung der OSS in Kunming und später Agent bei OPC und CIA. Außerdem war er gleichzeitig Eigentümer der Bank of Perrine in Key West, Florida, „ein doppelter Waschsalon für den Lansky-Mob und die CIA“, und deren Schwesterbank, der Bank of Cutler Ridge. Hier sieht man eine Reihe von miteinander verbundenen Mafia-CIA Geldwäschebanken im weltweiten Drogennetzwerk, von denen die größte zweifelsohne die Bank of Credit und Commerce International (BCCI) war.

Die wenigsten Menschen werden schon von Paul Helliwell gehört haben. Selbst einschlägige Bücher über die Verbrechen der CIA, wie z.B. Tim Weiners CIA: Die ganze Geschichte, erwähnen weder ihn, noch seine bedeutsame, mit der CIA in Verbindung stehende Bank, die Castle Bank auf den Bahamas, und nicht einmal die weitaus bedeutendere Nachfolgebank von Castle, die BCCI. In der Flut der CIA-Dokumente, die seit 1992 freigegeben wurden, findet man den Namen Helliwell weder in der Archivkartei des National Archive, noch in der des National Security Archive oder der Federation of American Scientists. In den millionenfachen freigegebenen Seiten, die auf der Homepage der Mary Ferrel Foundation gespeichert und katalogisiert sind, erscheint Helliwells Name genau einmal – und das auf einer Liste von Dokumenten, die 1974 während der CIA-Suche nach Aufzeichnungen zu Watergate (ausgerechnet!) von der Prüfung zurückgehalten worden waren. Dieses Schweigen, selbst in internen CIA-Akten, über den wichtigsten Architekten des CIA-Drogennetzwerks seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg spricht Bände.

Das meiste, das wir über Helliwell wissen, stammt von der Medienreaktion auf den erfolgreichen Versuch der CIA, eine Untersuchung der amerikanischen Bundessteuerbehörde IRS (Internal Revenue Service) zu blockieren. Mit dieser Untersuchung, bekannt als „Operation Tradewinds“, erforschte die IRS in den 1970er Jahren die Geldwäscheverwicklung von Helliwells Banken. Dieser Kampf zwischen Helliwell und der CIA begann 1972, als der IRS-Ermittler Richard Jaffe bei der Erforschung von Konten des kurz zuvor festgenommenen Marijuana- und LSD-Dealers Allan George Palmer feststellte, dass dieser „einen Teil seines Geldes persönlich bei der Perrine-Cutler Ridge Bank im Süden eingezahlt hatte“.

Jaffe erfuhr außerdem, dass das Geld in ein Konto bei einem bahamischen Unternehmen namens Castle Bank eingezahlt worden war. Laut Aussage von Jim Drinkhall im Wall Street Journal wurde diese Bank von Helliwell, der „an der Leitung eines Netzwerkes von geheimen CIA-Operationen und ‚Eigentümern‘ maßgeblich beteiligt war“, „ins Leben gerufen und vornehmlich geleitet“. Drinkhall schrieb, dass die CIA Jaffes Untersuchung über die Castle Bank abgebrochen habe, weil Castle

als Kanal für Millionen-Dollar-Beträge fungierte, die von der CIA für verdeckte Operationen gegen Kuba und für andere Geheimdienstoperationen in Ländern Lateinamerikas und im Fernen Osten vorgesehen waren.

Drinkhall beschrieb außerdem, wofür Helliwell wahrscheinlich am bekanntesten ist (und worüber ich in The War Conspiracy geschrieben habe):

1951 war Mr. Helliwell an der Gründung und Leitung des von der CIA kontrollierten Scheinunternehmens Sea Supply Corp. beteiligt. Über einen Zeitraum von knapp zehn Jahren wurde Sea Supply genutzt, um riesige Mengen an Waffen und Ausrüstung an 10000 Truppen der chinesischen Nationalisten [KMT] in Burma und an die thailändische Polizei zu liefern.

Aber Drinkhall wies nicht auf die Tatsache hin, die heute nicht mehr angezweifelt wird: nämlich dass sowohl die KMT-Truppen in Burma als auch die thailändische Polizei die beiden hauptsächlichen Zweige des CIA-KMT-Burma-Thai Drogennetzwerks waren. Zusammen waren sie an der Verbreitung und am Handel von Opium auf dem Weltmarkt, die USA mit eingeschlossen, beteiligt.

Helliwells Gefälligkeiten für die CIA waren nicht nur auf den Fernen Osten beschränkt. Zusammen mit zwei Partnern aus dem KMT-Burma Drogennetzwerk, Frank Wisner von der CIA und General Claire Chennault von der CIA-Fluglinie CAT, betrieb Helliwell „schon 1953-54 CIA-Operationen in Mittelamerika. Zu der Zeit standen Guatemala und die guatemaltekische Regierung im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit.“

Wie auch Chennault und seine alten Partner aus seiner Zeit in China, Whiting Willauer und William Pawley, unterstützte Helliwell dann 1954 die CIA bei Operationen gegen Guatemala und, nach 1960, gegen Castro. Laut Drinkhall

sagte ein ehemaliger Bundesbeamter, der bei der Untersuchung gegen Castle mitgearbeitet hatte, dass „Castle als einer von mehreren CIA-Geldkanälen für Operationen gegen Kuba fungierte“. Mr. Helliwell soll angeblich einer der Zahlmeister für die unglückselige Schweinebucht-Invasion 1961 gewesen sein, sowie für weitere „aufwändige“ CIA-Operationen in ganz Lateinamerika.

Was den ehemaligen Häftling Wallace Groves und seine Beziehung zur CIA betrifft, wurde eine Anzahl von CIA-Dokumenten freigegeben, die diese Verbindung bestätigen. Aus einem dieser Dokumente geht hervor, dass

der Wallace GROVES, der gemäß Anhang Beziehungen zu Meyer LANSKY und der Firma Mary Carter Point Co./Resorts International, Inc. hatte, identisch ist mit dem Wallace GROVES aus der OS Akte #473 865. Diese Akte spiegelt wider, dass GROVES in der Zeit von April 1966 bis April 1972 für das [CIA] „Office of General Counsel“ von Interesse war. Hierbei ging es um die Verwendung von GROVES als Berater oder eventuellem Funktionär in einer der Einheiten des Projekts . . . (Text geschwärzt). Weitere Informationen in dieser Akte deuten darauf hin, dass GROVES mit Meyer Lansky in Verbindung stand.

Ich vermute, dass diese „Einheiten des Projekts . . . (Text geschwärzt)“ die Verwendung von undokumentierten Geldern vorsahen, die nicht im bewilligten CIA-Etat inbegriffen waren.

Helliwells Verbindung zu undokumentierten Operationen

Seit der Veröffentlichung von Drinkhalls Artikel wird Helliwell in fast jeder Referenz als Zahlmeister der Schweinebucht-Invasion dargestellt, eine Behauptung, der ich skeptisch gegenüber stehe. Aber man kann einen Eindruck des Ausmaßes von Helliwells finanziellen Verwicklungen mit der CIA gewinnen, wenn man sich die Verteilung von 5 Millionen Dollar aus einem anderen, mit Helliwell in Verbindung stehenden, Unternehmen namens Intercontinental Diversified (I.D.C.) anschaut. Dazu noch einmal Drinkhall:

„Obwohl es keinerlei Hinweise auf die CIA in dem SEC-Verfahren gegen Intercontinental gibt, machte ein ehemaliger CIA-Beamter kürzlich in einem Interview eine erstaunliche Aussage. Er gab an, dass zwischen 1970 und 1976 fast 5 Millionen Dollar aus Intercontinental-Geldern für CIA-Zwecke abgeschöpft wurden, ‚weil wir dort Freunde hatten‘. Tatsächlich scheint die CIA bessere Vereinbarungen gehabt zu haben als nur Freundschaft. CIA-Dokumente beweisen, dass Wallace Groves, der Gründer von Intercontinental und Eigentümer von 46 Prozent der Geschäftsanteile (bis er 1978 seine Beteiligung für 33,1 Millionen Dollar verkaufte) in der Zeit von 1965 bis 1972 verdeckt für die CIA arbeitete“.

Sicherlich überweisen Banker nicht Millionen-Dollar-Beträge aus reiner Freundschaft. Eine weitaus wahrscheinlichere Vermutung ist, dass Helliwell der Zahlmeister war – jedoch nicht für offiziell autorisierte Operationen wie die Schweinebucht-Invasion, sondern für die Ausgabe von Geldern aus undokumentierten Operationen, wie der KMT-Drogenausfuhr aus Burma, die von seinen eigenen Einrichtungen, den CIA-Eigentümern Sea Supply und Cat Inc. (später Air America) unterstützt worden sind.

Laut einer kategorischen Aussage von Jonathan Marshall „hat Helliwell CIA-Gelder über die Castle Bank auf den Bahamas gewaschen“. Doch diese Behauptung erfordert ein Klarstellung. I.D.C. war ein Ableger eines asiatischen Unternehmens, Benguet Mining, das von Helliwells Firma vertreten wurde und zu Teilen im Besitz des philippinischen Diktators Ferdinand Marcos war. Es landeten also Zahlungen aus Asien bei der I.D.C. und ich vermute, dass zur Finanzierung von undokumentierten Operationen vielmehr diese undokumentierten Gelder, als die Gelder aus dem vom Kongress autorisierten CIA-Etat von Helliwell genutzt wurden.

Eine dieser undokumentierten Operationen könnten Bestechungszahlungen an Politiker gewesen sein, die zuerst in den Bahamas zum Zuge kamen.

In den frühen 1970er Jahren berichteten IRS-Agenten von Beweisen aus Gesprächsabhörungen, laut derer Intercontinental dem Premierminister der Bahamas, Lyndon O. Pindling, 100 000 Dollar über die Castle Bank zukommen ließ, um der Holding eine zweijährige Verlängerung ihrer [Grand Bahama] Casino-Glücksspiellizenz zu gewähren.

Aber sowohl die CIA als auch das Casino neigten zur Korruption, und Castle war nur ein kleiner Spieler in einem Netzwerk aus Banken und Agenten, das Regierungen auf der ganzen Welt korrumpierte. Auf diese Weise wickelte Castle

auch mysteriöse Geschäfte mit einer Firma auf den Cayman Inseln, ID Corp., ab. Der Alleineigentümer von ID, der Amerikaner Shig Katayama, wurde bekannt durch seine Schlüsselrolle als Vermittler der riesigen Bestechungszahlungen von Lockheed Corp. an japanische Politiker (als Dank für Flugzeugverträge). Ein japanischer Journalist griff Katayama an und schrieb, dass es „sein wahrer Job (in den frühen 1950er Jahren) war, den Rauschgifthandel für den US-Geheimdienst abzuwickeln“.

Seit den 1960er Jahren, wenn nicht schon früher, nutzte die CIA ihr weltweites Netzwerk, um Nicht-Regierungsgelder, beispielsweise in Form von (an internationale Lockheed-Verkaufsverträge angekoppelte) Bestechungszahlungen, zu verteilen, z.B. durch einflussreiche Agenten, wie Adnan Khashoggi und Yoshio Kodama. Im Mai 1965, fünf Monate vor dem Anti-Sukarno-Coup im September 1965, wurden Lockheed-Bestechungsgelder in Indonesien von einem Anhänger Präsident Sukarnos zu einem neuen Mittelsmann umgeleitet, der den Sukarno-Gegner General Suharto unterstützte.

Dies passierte zu einer Zeit, als „der Kongress darüber überein gekommen war, dass amerikanische Finanzleistungen an das indonesische Militär (im Gegensatz zu Hilfszahlungen an andere Länder) als geheime Angelegenheit behandelt werden müssten. Die Kongressprüfungen von Entscheidungen des Präsidenten in Bezug auf die indonesische Hilfe wurden somit auf zwei Senatsausschüsse und den Sprecher des Repräsentantenhauses, die zum diesem Zeitpunkt mit der Aufsicht der CIA befasst waren, begrenzt“. Auf diese Weise wurden Lockheed-Zahlungen (bewerkstelligt durch Mittelsmänner) genutzt, um den ausgesprochenen Willen des US-Senats zu durchkreuzen. Dieser hatte eine Resolution verabschiedet, laut derer jegliche militärische Hilfe an Indonesien ausgesetzt werden sollte.

Helliwells Verbindungen zur Mafia

Aber Helliwells Verbindungen zur Mafia, und im Besonderen zu Meyer Lansky, stehen seinen CIA-Verbindungen in nichts nach. Lansky nutzte vorzugsweise die Bank of Perrine zur Verwahrung seiner Gelder, die auf diesem Wege von der Bank of World Commerce auf den Bahamas – 1961 von Lanskys rechter Hand John Pullman gegründet – die USA erreichten. Alvin Malnik, Lanskys Erbe in Miami Beach, war einer der Direktoren dieser Bank; Ed Levinson, ein Geschäftspartner von Lyndon Johnsons Senatsberater Bobby Baker, war einer der Anteilseigner. Baker wiederum war Schriftführer der Demokraten im US-Senat, bevor er wegen Steuerhinterziehung festgenommen und verurteilt wurde. Helliwell hatte eine zweite Verbindung zu Lansky durch seine Tätigkeit als Rechtsberater für die kleine Miami National Bank, die von Lansky genutzt wurde, um seine ausländischen Gewinne und undeklarierten Einnahmen der Las Vegas Casinos zu waschen.

Obwohl die Bank of World Commerce gewöhnlich als Mafiabank unter Lanskys Kontrolle beschrieben wurde, bot sie dennoch Zugänge zur internationalen Bankenlandschaft, an der die CIA ein Interesse hatte. Sie erhielt Geld von der International Credit Bank in der Schweiz, die von dem israelischen Waffenschmuggler Tibor Rosenbaum gegründet worden war, und agierte

als Banker bei Geschäfts-Jointventures zwischen europäischen Juden und dem israelischen Staat. Aber sie finanzierte auch die Beschaffung und den Transport von Waffen nach Israel und zu seinen Verbündeten, speziell in Afrika und Mittelamerika, und soll in Europa als Zahlmeister für Mossad, den israelischen Geheimdienst, aufgetreten sein.

Nach Aussagen von Alan Block hatte Pullmans Bank eine weitere Tochterbank auf den Bahamas, „die auf undurchsichtige Art und Weise mit der Intra Bank in Beirut, Libanon, vereint war“. Intra besaß das Casino de Liban, „dessen Glücksspiellizenz von Marcel Paul Francisi, Frankreichs vorderstem Heroindealer, kontrolliert wurde. Es gab Ermittler, die davon überzeugt waren, dass Lansky und Francisi im Heroinhandel zusammen arbeiteten, und dass Lansky und seine Partner auch einen Teil des Casinos besaßen“. Francisi tat sich mit dem libanesischen Morphium-Exporteur, Sami El Khoury, zusammen, der wiederum „langjährige Geschäftsbeziehungen“ zu Lucky Luciano, Lanskys Verbündetem in New York aus Vorkriegszeiten und späterem europäischen Hauptdrogenhändler, in Sizilien hatte.

Sami El Khoury genoss den Schutz der libanesischen Polizei, und möglicherweise auch den der CIA. Alfred McCoy hatte Einsicht in offizielle Schriftwechsel des Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), in denen im August 1963 darüber diskutiert wurde, „ob man Sami El Khoury nun, da er aus dem Gefängnis entlassen worden ist, als Informanten nutzen sollte“. Einer der FBN-Briefpartner, Dennis Dayle, berichtete James Mills später, dass El Khoury, „einer der größten Drogenhändler aller Zeiten“, tatsächlich zum Informanten wurde. In den 1990er Jahren berichtete Dennis Dayle, mittlerweile pensionierter Hauptermittler der Drug Enforcement Administration im Nahen Osten, auf einer Anti-Drogen-Konferenz, dass „in den 30 Jahren meiner Tätigkeit bei der Drug Enforcement Administration und verwandten Behörden die Personen im Zielfeld meiner Ermittlungen beinahe ausnahmslos für die CIA arbeiteten“.

Auch die Castle Bank war ein „Mehrzweck-Waschsalon“, der sowohl der CIA als auch der Mafia von Diensten war. Das Interesse der Mafia an Castle wurde in Jim Drinkhalls Artikel aus dem Wall Street Journal nur sehr abgeschwächt dargestellt. Es wurde nur erwähnt, dass aus einer langen Liste von Kontenbesitzern bei Castle „drei Männer dabei waren – Morris Dalitz, Morris Kleinman und Samuel A. Tucker –, die in Dokumenten des Justizministeriums als Personen aus der organisierten Kriminalitätsszene beschrieben wurden“. (Kleinman und Helliwell betrieben gemeinsam zahlreiche Immobilieninvestments zusammen mit Burton Kanter, dem Anwalt aus Chicago, der mit Helliwell Castle Bank organisierte.)

Alan Block deutet an, dass Castle sich zu einer aktiven Bank wandelte, als es notwendig wurde, auf schnelle Weise Gelder von der Mercantile Bank and Trust auf den Bahamas (einer weiteren Helliwell-Bank, die „wie Castle als Kanal für CIA-Geld diente“) umzubuchen, weil diese im Untergang begriffen war. Die Gelder wurden „auf das energische Drängen“ von Kanter transferiert,

weil sich unter den Konten, die in Gefahr waren, eines befand, dass Morris Kleinman gehörte, einer berüchtigten Figur des organisierten Verbrechens aus den Tagen der Prohibition. Auf diese Angelegenheit bezogen behauptete Castles Präsident Sam Pierson, dass der Transfer notwendig geworden war, weil ansonsten „Kanter im Chicago River treibend enden würde“.

Kanter scheint auf Steuerangelegenheiten für die Legalisierung von Mafiavermögen spezialisiert gewesen zu sein. Zusätzlich zur Gründung der Castle Bank mit Helliwell, war er „energisch“ mit der La Costa Grundstückserschließung beschäftigt, an der auch der ehemalige Konsorte aus Cleveland, Moe Dalitz, beteiligt war. „Dalitz war Teilhaber an mehreren Casinos, darunter auch das Desert Inn und das Stardust Hotel“. Block sieht Kanter als das Verbindungsglied, durch welches La Costa hohe Finanzierung aus dem korrupten Pensionfonds Central States der Teamsters-Gewerkschaft erhielt: „Kanters Zugang zum Rentenfonds stammte wahrscheinlich von Allen Dorfman, einem Freund und Geschäftspartner. Dorfman war ein wichtiger Fonds-Funktionär und Ganove. Er wurde 1985 ermordet, um ihn daran zu hindern, über Mafiainvestitionen zu plaudern“.

Die CIA, die Mafia und ihre undokumentierten Operationen

Helliwell war weder das einzige CIA-Verbindungsglied zur Mafia, noch das höchste. 1960 wurden Pläne zur Ermordung Castros durch das CIA-Office of Security und den Verbindungsmann, Robert Maheu, initiiert, dessen unabhängiges Unternehmen mit der Hilfe eines Vorschusses vom Office of Security auf den Weg gebracht worden war. Es war Maheu, der John Roselli die Ermordungspläne von der CIA überbrachte.

Eine länger andauernde Verbindung zur Mafia wurde von James Angleton, dem Stabschef der CIA-Spionageabwehr Counterintelligence (CI), aufrecht erhalten. Auch er nutzte einen Mittelsmann – den New Yorker Anwalt Mario Brod – der, gemäß einem CIA-Memo, von 1952 bis 1971 ein Spionageabwehr-Agent in New York City war. Einer der heiklen CI-Agenten, die in New York unter Brod arbeiteten, war Jay Lovestone. Lovestone war Leiter der Abteilung International Affairs beim Dachverband amerikanischer Gewerkschaften (AFL-CIO). Er ließ Schläger-Gangs in Marseille, die mit korsischen Drogenhändlern verbündet waren, Gelder zukommen. Diese korsischen Drogenhändler wiederum gehörten zum globalen Drogennetzwerk von Lansky und Luciano.

Nach Aussage von Doug Valentine war Lovestones Assistent, Irving Brown, in den europäischen Drogenschmuggel verwickelt. Zur selben Zeit nutzte er CIA-Gelder um

zusammen mit Piere Ferri-Pisani eine „kompatible linke“ Gewerkschaft in Marseille zu gründen. Im Namen von Brown und der CIA heuerte Ferri-Pisani (ein Drogenschmuggler mit Beziehungen zu Antoine Guerini, einem Großkriminellen aus Marseille) Schläger an, die streikende kommunistische Hafenarbeiter endgültig bezwingen sollten.

Lovestone – früherer Kommunist, dann militanter Anti-Kommunist – hatte sich zudem in den 1930er Jahren mit seinem Mentor David Dubinsky von der Gewerkschaft „International Ladies‘ Garment Workers“ gegen die Gründung einer noch militanteren Gewerkschaftsbewegung der CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) und im Besonderen gegen die Gründung der „United Auto Workers“ – der Gewerkschaft von Walter und Victor Reuther – gestemmt. Die Rivalgewerkschaft UAW-AFL, die Lovestone favorisierte, suchte sich die Muskelkraft der Mafia und stellte John Dioguardi, ein Mitglied der Lucchese Mafiafamilie, als Regionaldirektor für New York ein. Dioguardi wurde später von Bundesanwalt Paul Williams beschuldigt, den Journalisten Victor Riesel geblendet zu haben. Des Weiteren beschuldigte er ihn des anschließenden Mordes an dem Mann, der Riesels Gesicht mit Säure überschüttet hat.

CI-Stabsagent Brod, Angletons Verbindungsmann zur Mafia, „betreute“ einen weiteren heiklen Agenten, den russischen Überläufer Anatoliy Golitsyn. Golitsyn wurde von Angleton im Rahmen seiner endlosen Suche nach einem hochrangigen Maulwurf innerhalb der CIA vom regulären CIA-Beamtenapparat abgesondert. Mit Hilfe von dubiosen Informationen von Lovestone und Golitsyn war Angleton laut seinem Biographen Tom Mangold dabei, „in aller Stille eine alternative CIA“ mit eigenem Kommunikationssystem, Archiv und Tresor aufzubauen. Das Herzstück dieser alternativen CIA bildete das „Allerheiligste“ der Spionageabwehr (CI): „die supergeheime Special Investigation Group“ (CI/SIG), wo Akten gesammelt wurden, die beweisen sollten, dass Henry Kissinger und Averell Harriman möglicherweise KGB-Maulwürfe waren.

Ein dritter heikler Agent von Brod war Herbert Itkin, ein kontroverser Doppelagent, der sowohl für die Mafia als auch für CIA und FBI arbeitete. Wie Itkin hatte auch Brod selbst „Kontakte zur Mafia“. 1970 gerat die CIA in Aufruhr als das Justizministerium und das FBI Itkin als Zeugen gegen eine Reihe von Mafiosi mit ehemaligen Beziehungen nach Havanna einsetzten, darunter James Plueri, Ed Lanzieri und Sam Mannarino, die mit der Teamsters-Gewerkschaft Vereinbarungen für illegale Schmiergeldzahlungen getroffen hatten. Der Bundesanwalt rief den Rechtsberater der CIA an, um ihm mitzuteilen, dass Mario Brod auf der Seite der Verteidigung in den Prozess mit eingetreten war. Gemäß den Gerichtsaufzeichnungen „bemühte sich die Verteidigung darum, Brod, der als Itkins Kontakt zur CIA beschrieben wird, als Zeugen aufzurufen. Brod würde aussagen, dass er Itkins Aussage selbst unter Eid nicht glauben würde und dass Itkins Aufrichtigkeit kein Glauben zu schenken sei“. Der CIA-Rechtsbeistand stimmte mit dem Bundesanwalt darin überein, dass man Brod an seiner Aussage hindern müsse. Sein Büro protokollierte Brods Erklärung für sein Verhalten folgendermaßem: „Einer der Angeklagten namens Lenzieri [(sic), d.h. Edward the Buff Lanzieri] war Brods einziger Kontakt innerhalb der Mafia, der ihn warnen würde, wenn er in Gefahr wäre“.

Aber Brod mag nicht nur aus Eigeninteresse gehandelt haben. Denn es gibt Vermutungen, dass einige der Mafia-Angeklagten aus dem Schmiergeldprozess noch tiefere Verbindungen zur CIA hatten, wenn auch nicht dokumentiert. Laut der Aussage von Dan Moldea waren zwei der Angeklagten, John La Rocca und Gabriel Mannarino, mit Hoffa in kubanische Waffenschieberei verwickelt; und er deutet an, dass Hoffa La Rocca und Mannarino zusammen mit zwei anderen Schmiergeld-Angeklagten (Salvatore Granello und James „Jimmy Doyle“ Plumeri) dazu gebracht habe, „mit der CIA zu kooperieren“. Darüber hinaus waren alle Angeklagten des Schmiergeldprozesses, in dem Itkin aussagte und in dem Brod auf Seiten der Verteidigung zu intervenieren versuchte, Mitglieder der so genannten „paper locals“ bei der Gewerkschaft Teamsters (und zuvor bei der UAW-AFL), die von Plumeris Neffen John Dioguardi kontrolliert wurde.

Im Juni 1975, sechs Monate nach dem Durchsickern von Angletons Operation CHAOS, was wiederum zu Angletons Amtsenthebung führte, behauptete das Time Magazin, dass die CIA Brods Mafiakontakte, also Plumeri und Granello, benutzt hatte, „um ein wenig in Kuba zu spionieren, zur Vorbereitung für die Schweinebucht-Invasion“. (Ich habe für diese Behauptung von Time keine Beweise in freigegeben CIA-Dokumenten finden können.)

Wie schon Brod hatte angeblich auch Angleton selbst Kontakte zur Mafia, und intervenierte zumindest bei einer Gelegenheit, um einen anderen Teil der CIA davon abzuhalten, Lanskys Bankgeschäfte aus illegalen Las Vegas-Einnahmen zu näher zu durchleuchten. Ein hochrangiger Beamter in Robert Kennedys Justizministerium bat John Whitten, den ehemaligen Leiter des Mexiko/Panama-Bereichs in der Abteilung Western Hemisphere, Nummernkonten in Panama zu ermitteln. Glücksspieler aus Las Vegas nutzten diese Konten, um Bargeld zu schmuggeln, „das sie von ihren täglichen Einnahmen abschöpften. Unter Nutzung seines Pseudonyms „John Selso“ sagte Whitten dann gegen Angleton vor dem Church Committee aus.

Zu der Zeit waren wir in einer ausgesprochen guten Lage, dies durchzuführen. . . . Ich hielt es für eine großartige Idee. Angleton erfuhr umgehend davon, und wir mussten ihn darüber informieren, und er sagte, Wir werden uns da nicht einmischen. Das ist Sache des FBI. Und zack, Ende des Gesprächs. Wir wurden abgezogen. Ich erzählte Colonel J.C. King, der zu der Zeit Leiter der Western Hemisphere-Abteilung war, von dem Gespräch. Und J.C. King sagte, Naja, du weißt ja, dass Angleton diese Verbindungen zur Mafia hat, und er wird nichts machen, was diese Verbindungen gefährdet. Und ich sagte, Das wusste ich nicht. Darauf er, Ja, das hatte etwas mit Kuba zu tun.

Angletons Verteidigung von Lanskys abgeschöpften Einnahmen sollte nicht abgetrennt von seiner zweiten Funktion in der CIA, als Leiter der Israel-Abteilung, betrachtet werden. Angletons Verbindungen zum Mossad reichten zurück bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, als er mit Unterstützung der jüdischen Untergrundbewegung, angeführt durch Teddy Kollek (dem späteren Bürgermeister von Jerusalem), OSS-Operationen in Italien koordinierte.

Angletons „Alternative CIA“ und ihr Vermächtnis

1963 hat CI/SIG, das „Allerheiligste“ von Angletons „alternativer CIA“, überdies die amerikanische Geschichte bedeutend beeinflusst. Ihre so genannte Akte 201 oder „Persönlichkeitsakte“ über „Lee Henry Oswald“ (der Mann, der der Welt als Lee Harvey Oswald bekannt ist) wurde seit ihrer Eröffnung im Dezember 1960 konstant mit falschen und gefälschten Informationen gefüttert. Und zwei Einträge in der Akte 201 wurden noch einmal im Oktober 1963 so verfälscht, dass sie es ermöglichten, Oswald als glaubwürdigen „designierten Verdächtigen“ für die Ermordung John F. Kennedys einen Monat später festzulegen.

Die Verfälschung von Oswalds Akte 201 mag aus einer legitimen Gegenspionage-Operation hervorgegangen sein. Ich habe dargelegt, dass einzigartig gefälschte Einträge zum Konzept eines so genannten „gezinkte Karte“-Tests oder „Kontrastmittel“-Tests gehörten, der herauszufinden sollte, ob und wo heikle Informationen durchgesickert sind. Dies war eine bekannte Methode und fiel in den Aufgabenbereich der CI/SIG, die für die Akte 201 verantwortlich war.

Aber ab Oktober 1963 gibt es Anzeichen, dass CIA-Telegramme über Oswald manipuliert worden sind, um ihn als vorgesehenen Verdächtigen für die Ermordung von Präsident Kennedy am 22. November nutzbar zu machen. Ein Fernschreiben der CIA an das FBI im Oktober 1963 (erstellt von einem CI/SIG-Beamten) hielt die offensichtlich bedeutende Information zurück, dass Oswald angeblich in Mexiko-Stadt mit einem sowjetischen Vizekonsul, Valeriy Kostikov, zusammengetroffen war. CIA-Beamte nahmen an, dass Kostikov ein Funktionär des KGB war. Die Vorenthaltung dieser Information half sicherzustellen, dass Oswald nicht über dieses angenommene Treffen hinaus unter die Beobachtung des FBI geraten würde. Solch eine Beschattung hätte vermutlich verhindert, dass er durch seine Positionierung an einer besonders heiklen Straßenecke von Kennedys Paradestrecke in Dallas zum vorgesehenen Verdächtigen hätte werden können. Ich habe dargelegt, dass eine ähnliche Vorenthaltungen von Informationen durch die CIA über zwei vermeintliche Kidnapper des 11. September, Nawaz al-Hamzi und Khalid al-Midhar, es gleichermaßen ermöglichte, diese beiden zu Verdächtigen zu machen, indem man auch hier das FBI daran hinderte, Beschattungen durchzuführen.

CIA-Direktor William Colby zwang Angleton in den Nachwehen der Watergate-Affäre Dezember 1974 zum Rücktritt, nachdem bekannt geworden war, dass Angleton in die wahrscheinlich illegale CIA-Operation CHAOS (die Beschattung von Amerikanern in den USA) verwickelt gewesen ist. Dies bedeutete das Aus für Angletons „alternative CIA“ innerhalb der Spionageabwehr. Noch ungefähr ein Jahr danach – ähnlich wie bei der Verbindungen der CIA zu Brods Mafiosi – sickerten immer wieder Informationen durch, die den Morast von CIA-Verbindungen zu exilkubanischen Terroristen und anderen Mitgliedern des globalen Drogennetzwerkes offen legten (und damit halfen, es aufzulösen).

Aber 1976 änderte sich das Klima dramatisch, nachdem Donald Rumsfeld und Dick Cheney im so genannten „Halloween Massaker“ (gesteuert aus dem Weißen Haus unter Präsident Ford) CIA-Direktor Colby durch George H.W. Bush ersetzten und Rumsfeld zum Verteidigungsminister machten. Wenn das Jahr 1975 von den Watergate-Nachwehen mit ihren dramatischen Enthüllungen über CIA-Verbindungen zu Exilkubanern und Mafiosi und deren Attentatsversuchen bestimmt war, so war 1976 das Jahr, in dem mafianahe Exilkubaner und der chilenische Geheimdienst DINA, die beide in den Drogenhandel verwickelt waren, in einer Reihe von terroristischen Tötungen schwelgten. Dazu gehörte das in die Luft sprengen eines zivilen Flugzeugs von Air Cubana und die Ermordung des früheren chilenischen Außenministers Orlando Letelier in Washington.

Die CIA war jedoch nicht mehr der einzige Kontakt oder auch nur der Hauptkontakt zur internationalen Operation CONDOR, die von der DINA gesponsert wurde und vielfache Tötungen durchführte. Robert White, amerikanischer Botschafter in Paraguay und Aufsteiger im Außenministerium, dessen Kritik an den Morden ihm nach der Wahl Reagans seinen Job kostete, erfuhr von dem Kommandanten der paraguayischen Streitkräfte, dass „Geheimdienstleiter aus Brasilien, Argentinien, Chile, Bolivien, Paraguay und Uruguay ein ‚verschlüsseltes System innerhalb des amerikanischen [militärischen] Telekommunikationsnetz[werks]‘ nutzten, das ganz Lateinamerika überzog, um ‚Geheimdienstinformationen zu koordinieren'“.

Henry Kissinger, der 1976 im letzten Jahr seiner Amtszeit als Außenminister war, spielte im Angesicht dieser Welle rechter Gewalt bestenfalls eine mehrdeutige Rolle. Bevor er Chile öffentlich wegen seiner Menschenrechtsverletzungen rügte („Die Menschenrechtslage . . . hat unsere Beziehung zu Chile geschädigt und wird dies auch weiterhin tun“), versicherte Kissinger Pinochet in einer privaten Unterhaltung, dass er durch die amerikanische Politik zu dieser Aussage verpflichtet sei, und dass er vielmehr beunruhigt war, dass der US-Kongress die Hilfe an Chile streichen wolle.

Der amerikanische Schutz bzw. die amerikanische Unterstützung für die Terroristen von 1976 dauert bis heute an. Luis Posada Carriles, der Hauptarchitekt des Bombenanschlags auf Air Cubana „saß seine Zeit für den Cubana-Anschlag im Gefängnis in Venezuela ab“; und „später, in den 1980er Jahren, arbeitete er wieder im Auftrag der CIA in Mittelamerika und half bei der Koordination des Contra Zuliefer-Netzwerks“. Posada wurde festgenommen und 2000 nochmal in Panama für einen Mordanschlag auf Fidel Castro verurteilt, diesmal mit Guillermo Novo, einem von Leteliers Mördern. Beide Männer wurden umgehend von Panamas scheidendem Präsidenten begnadigt. Im Mai 2008 wurde Posada von 500 Amerikanern kubanischer Herkunft bei einer ausverkauften Gala in Miami geehrt, nachdem eine Anklage gegen ihn wegen illegaler Einwanderung in die Vereinigten Staaten von einem Bundesrichter in Texas abgelehnt worden war.

Zudem beförderte CIA-Direktor George Bush Theodore Shackley, der über Jahre hinweg mit den eigenwilligen Exilkubaner in Miami zusammen gearbeitet hatte. Laut Kevin Phillips

nahm Bush Ende 1976 widerspenstige und impulsive CIA-Agenten in Schutz – Veteranen fast jeder Operation von chilenischen Morden zu Vietnams Phoenix-Programm und unzulässiger Überwachung im Inland – damit sie nicht von Präsident Fords Justizministerium angeklagt würden“.

Aber die Stimmung der Zurückhaltung nach Watergate kehrte unter Präsident Carter und seinem CIA-Direktor Admiral Stansfield Turner zurück zur CIA. Dank dem Durchsickern einer Serie von Informationen über seinen Freund Edwin Wilson, verlor Shackley sein Ansehen in der CIA bis er sie 1978 verließ.

William Corson und Joseph Trento argumentieren jedoch, dass der Geist einer alternativen und aktiveren CIA auch mit Shackley im Exil überlebte. Trento schreibt, dass Shackley vom Safari Club des Schahs von Iran (siehe weiter unten) und vom amerikanischen Botschafter in Iran, Richard Helms, unterstützt wurde. Der reguläre CIA-Standortleiter in Iran „beschwerte sich wiederholt, dass Helms seine eigenen Geheimdienstoperationen außerhalb der Botschaft zu leiten schien“ und dass CIA-Veteranen, die unter CIA-Funktionär Theodore Shackley gearbeitet hatten, „den Kader einer privaten Schatten-Spionageorganisation innerhalb des offiziellen amerikanischen Geheimdienstes bildeten“. Anmerkungen => hier

Wir haben uns bisher noch nicht mit den legalen Beziehungen der Castle Bank beschäftigt. Die wohlhabendsten Kontoinhaber der Bank „waren Mitglieder der sagenhaft reichen Pritzker Familie aus Chicago, Klienten der Kanter Firma“. Block merkt an, dass die Pritzkers, zu deren gewaltigem Besitz die Hyatt Hotelkette gehört, auch einen Kredit vom Teamsters Pensionsfonds zur Investition für ein Hotel-Casino in Nevada erhielten, und dass „Jimmy Hoffa und Allen Dorfman persönlich für die Pritzker-Kredite zuständig waren“.

Kanter und Castle Bank planten zudem Bauvorhaben mit anderen Mitgliedern der „Oberwelt“, wie zum Beispiel mit Henry Ford II und seiner Frau Christina. Mercantile, die Vorgängerbank von Castle, vertrat Investitionen von zwei Schifffahrts-Magnaten: vom Milliardär Daniel K. Ludwig und vom äußerst wohlhabenden norwegischen Schiffsbauer Inge Gordon Mosvold, der wohl für Ludwig als Fassade diente.

Mercantile und Castle waren eng mit einer anderen Helliwell Bank auf den Bahamas verzahnt, Underwriters Bank, Limited. Der Mehrheitseigentümer von Underwriters mit 95 Prozent war der amerikanische Versicherungskonzern American International Underwriters Corp. [AIUC], der zuerst Teil des Versicherungsimperiums des ehemaligen OSS-Agenten C.V. Starr war und heute zur gigantischen multinationalen AIG gehört. Block stellt korrekt fest, dass AIUC „ein Versicherungsgroßkonzern war, der vermutlich Verbindungen zur C.I.A. in Südostasien hatte“.

Ich habe anderswo beschrieben, wie die C.V. Starr Gruppe durch Thomas („Tommy the Cork“) Corcoran in Washington vertreten und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg von Corcorans früheren Anwaltspartner William S. Youngman geleitet wurde. Die Gruppe war auf diese Weise mit dem so genannten Chennault-Kreis verzahnt (oder auch Chennaults „Washington-Geschwader“), eine mächtige Verbindung, die sich 1940 mit Roosevelts Segen zusammen getan hatte, um die Bereitstellung von Ausrüstung, Personal und finanzieller Unterstützung von General Claire Chennaults Flying Tigers in China zu ermöglichen.

Corcoran war schon seit den 1930er Jahren eine Schlüsselfigur in Washington, als er noch „Franklin D. Roosevelts informellen Geheimdienst und internationale Spionageoperationen anführte, lange bevor es die OSS gab“. In den 1950er Jahren, als Fortune über ihn schrieb, dass er „den besten Geheimdienst in Washington“ führe, waren seine Lobbying-Aktivitäten eng mit seinem Einfluss auf CIA Geheimoperationen verknüpft:

Die meisten [seiner Klienten] sind Unternehmen mit internationalen Geschäftsinteressen, und er hat eine ausgewählte Klientel in diesem Bereich. Dazu gehören United Fruit Co., American International Underwriters Corp. (als Teil der Interessen C. V. Starrs in Asien und anderswo) und General Claire Chennaults Civil Air Transport, Inc. Ende 1951, um ein Beispiel zu nennen, ließ Corcoran seinen Geheimdienst Überstunden arbeiten, um mit der amerikanischen Politik in Bezug auf Iran Schritt halten zu können – die Handhabung des Außenministerium dieser Affäre sollte später als Vorbild dafür dienen, was es tun würde (oder auch nicht tun würde), um seinen Klienten, United Fruit, davor zu bewahren, aus Guatemala geworfen zu werden.

Helliwell und Corcoran zusammen trugen entscheidend zu Chennaults kontinuierlichen Einfluss in Asien bei: diese beiden Männer überzeugten Frank Wisner von der OPC davon, Chennaults Nachkriegsfluglinie CAT (die spätere CIA-eigene Air America) zu kaufen und zu refinanzieren. Auch William Pawley, eine Schlüsselfigur in Chennaults so genannten „Washington-Geschwader“ während des Zweiten Weltkriegs, hat bei dieser wichtigen Entscheidung eine Rolle gespielt. Zusammen mit Helliwells anderer Schöpfung, Sea Supply Inc., bildete CAT die hauptsächliche logistische Infrastruktur für die Drogenhandeltruppen der KMT in Burma.

Helliwell und die Einflusspolitik

Helliwell und Corcorans Anwaltskanzlei, Corcoran und Rowe, kooperierte auch mit William Donovan und nutzte Thai Geld, um den Kongress zu beeinflussen. Helliwell selbst war der Hauptorganisator für die Republikanische Partei in Florida, wo er 1952 half, den Bundesstaat für Eisenhower zu gewinnen und damit dazu beitrug, das Aufsteigen der Republikaner im Süden zu sichern. (Helliwell wurde später zum guten Bekannten von Nixons Gefährten Bebe Rebozo.)

Corcoran und Rowe waren indessen Demokraten, und Rowe war gut mit dem aufsteigenden texanischen Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson bekannt. Corcoran hatte in den 1940er Jahren die Konten und politischen Geschäfte von Chiang Kai-sheks Schwager T.V. Soong geführt, der durch das Abzweigen von Millionen aus chinesischem Gold in kalifornische Konten zu einem der reichsten Männer der Welt geworden war.

Zusammen mit Soong betrieb Corcoran erfolgreich Lobbypolitik für ein Leih-Pacht-Programm für die chinesischen Nationalisten (KMT) und für die private Firma American Volunteer Group, die Piloten der Streitkräfte für ein privates Unternehmen anheuerte, das von Corcorans Freund William Pawley geleitet wurde. Tatsächlich wurden die Piloten rekrutiert, um in China im Rahmen von Chennaults irregulärer Luftwaffe, für Chiang Kai-shek und die KMT zu kämpfen:

Eigentlich führte Corcoran einen undokumentierten Privatkrieg, in dem ein Privatunternehmen, China Defense Supplies, einen Teil des Wehrmaterials für China an eine Privatarmee, die American Volunteer Group, umleitete.

Nach dem Krieg wurden Soong, Corcoran und Pawley zu starken Unterstützern der pro-KMT China-Lobby. Die Beamten des Außenministeriums, die das Pech hatten, als Eintrag in T.V. Soongs „schwarzen Buch“ zu landen, wurden zur Zielscheibe der politischen Säuberungen von J. Edgar Hoover und später Joseph McCarthy.

Das Schicksal der von Soong gestützten China-Lobby änderte sich 1954 mit dem Niedergang von Joseph McCarthy zum Schlechten. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt kollaborierten Corcoran und Donavan, die schon 1942 bei Chennaults Präventivkauf von Chinas kommerzieller Luftflotte mit Hilfe von CAT zusammen gearbeitet hatten, noch einmal, um den Geldfluss von Asien zur Beeinflussung des Kongresses aufrecht zu erhalten. Die neue Quelle war der thailändische Diktator Phao Sriyanon, ein großer Nutznießer des KMT Drogennetzwerks, das von Helliwell, Sea Supply und CAT gegründet wurde. (Zum Zeitpunkt seines Todes im Schweizer Exil soll Phao „einer der reichsten Männer der Welt“ gewesen sein.)

Nachdem Skandale und Enthüllungsberichte eine Umgestaltung der China-Lobby in Washington notwendig gemacht hatten,

brachte der private Zweig der Thai Lobby seine eigenen Ressourcen zusammen . . . Mit Hilfe von Donovan, [OSS Veteran Willis] Bird [Sea Supplies Einkäufer in Bangkok] oder seinen anderen CIA-Verbindungsmännern hatte Phao zu diesem Zeitpunkt Anwalt Paul Helliwell, zusätzlich zu Donovan, als Lobbyisten eingestellt. Helliwell und Donovan [der angebliche 100 000 Dollar von der thailändischen Regierung erhalten haben soll] teilten den Kongress untereinander auf – Donovan war für die Republikaner zuständig und Helliwell bekam die Demokraten.

Wie schaffte es Helliwell, die Demokraten auf seine Seite zu ziehen? Indem er die Rolle des thailändischen Konsuls in Miami spielte: seine Jahresberichte als Lobbyist für ausländische Firmen zeigen, dass er tausende Dollar im Jahr an James Rowe, von Corcoran und Rowe, abgegeben hat.

Helliwell, Resorts International und ihre Korruptionspolitik

Helliwell und seine Banken verwalteten auch die Sachinvestitionen für den Lansky-Haufen:

Zu den Immobiliengesellschaften in Florida, die von Helliwells Fingerfertigkeit profitierten, gehörte General Development Corporation, ein Unternehmen, das von Louis Chesler, einem in Florida ansässigen Bauträger und Gefährten von Lansky, und „trigger Mike“ Coppola, einem Kumpanen von Lansky, kontrolliert wurde. Chesner war der Partner von Wallace Groves. Chesler und Groves arbeiteten als Partner bei Spekulationen mit Resorts International zusammen, geleitet durch ein Unternehmen aus Grand Bahama, dessen Rechtsbeistand durch die Anwaltskanzlei Helliwell, Melrose und DeWolf geleistet wurde.

Resorts International, ehemals die von James Crosby kontrollierte Mary Carter Paint Company, war der Haupteigentümer eines Urlaubsorts auf den Bahamas, Paradise Island, und hatte Schwierigkeiten eine Lizenz zu bekommen, bis es 1966 Wallace Groves als Partner aufnahm. Die altbekannte Reaktion eines Beamten des amerikanischen Justizministeriums zu diesem Eigentümerwechsel war folgende: „Die Stimmung scheint reif für einen Lansky-Deal“. Noch Jahre später würden „die Anwälte der Abteilung für Glücksspielbekämpfung in New Jersey es ablehnen, Crosby und seinem Unternehmen [Resorts International] eine Glückspiellizenz zu gewähren. Als Gründe hierfür führten sie ‚Verbindungen zu in Misskredit geratenen Personen und Organisationen‘ und besonders ihre Aufzeichnungen über Paradise Island an“.

Wie Helliwell und Groves gehörte also auch Resorts Intenational zum globalen CIA-Mob-Netzwerk. Ein CIA-Bericht aus dem Jahr 1976, der in der Meyer Lansky-Akte enthalten war, stellt folgendes fest:

Resorts International, Inc. ist Gegenstand der OS-Akte 591 722 [Office of Security]. Diese Akte zeigt auf, dass Resorts International, Inc. 1972 und 1973 von Interesse für Cover und die Wirtschaftsabteilung, DDO [Operations Directorate], war.

Wie dieser CIA-Bericht weiterhin klarstellt, passierte dies nachdem 1969 das Buch The Grim Reapers von Ed Reid veröffentlicht worden war. Dieses Buch deckte die Verbindungen des Unternehmens zu Wallace Groves und, durch den Casino-Manager Eddie Cellini, zu „den Glücksspielaktivitäten von Meyer LANSKY, dem Boss des organisierten Verbrechens“ (CIA-Bericht) auf. Mit anderen Worten, Resorts International fungierte als Mittler zwischen der CIA und Eddie Cellini, genauso wie Tony Varona, der Leiter der CIA-Schweinebucht-Invasion, 1960 eine ähnliche Rolle spielte.

1972, das Jahr in dem Resorts für die CIA „interessant“wurde, war auch das Jahr, in dem Meyer Lansky zusammen mit Dino Cellini (Eddies Bruder) in Miami angeklagt wurde. Ein Anklagepunkt war, dass „Lansky 1968 zumindest etwas Kontrolle über lukrative Teile der Operationen mit dem Paradise Island Casino behielt“. Ich werde später darlegen, dass sowohl Resorts International als auch die Lansky-Anklage in diesen zwei Jahren „von Interesse“ waren, weil es in dieser Zeit – als Folge des Watergate-Einbruchs – zur Kraftprobe zwischen Nixon und der CIA kam.

Die CIA mag von den 1972 angebrachten Anschuldigungen, dass Gelder auf geheimem Wege vom Paradise Island-Casino durch einen Casino-Angestellten zu Nixon und seinem Freund Bebe Rebozo überbracht worden waren, gewusst haben. Dieser Angestellte war Seymour (Sy) Alter, der sowohl Partner von Lansky und seinem Mann Eddie Cellini, als auch „seit 1962 Freund von Nixon und Rebozo“ war. Die Gelder kamen von der Paradise Island Bridge Company, einem Unternehmen, das zu Teilen im Besitz eines Vorstandsmitglied von Benguet International war. Benguet International wiederum wurde durch Paul Helliwell vertreten. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass Nixon selbst ein verdecktes Interesse an der Bridge Company hatte. Dies würde auch die Enthüllung durch Operation Tradewinds erklären, die aufzeigte, dass ein „Richard M. Nixon“ (nicht anderweitig kenntlich gemacht) ein Konto bei Helliwells Castle Bank hatte.

CIA, Eddie Cellini, Edward K. Moss und ihre CIA-Mafia Intrigen

Doch es steckt noch mehr hinter der CIA-Resorts-Verbindung. 1967 stellte Resorts (zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch Paradise Island) Eddie Cellini, der vorher Lanskys Casino im Hotel Internacional in Havana geleitet hatte, als Casino-Manager an. 1967 war auch das Jahr, in dem der Generalinspekteur der CIA in seinem „Bericht über CIA-Pläne zur Ermordung Fidel Castros“ bekannt gab, dass Eddie Cellini und sein noch bekannterer Bruder Dino

vermutlich mit [Tony] Varona [einem Mitglied der CIA-Frontgruppe der Schweinebucht-Invasion] in Verbindung standen. . . . Berichten zufolge sollen sie Varona große Summen Geld für seinen Einsatz gegen Castro geboten haben, unter der Voraussetzung, dass sie ‚in einem zukünftigen Kuba‘ bevorzugt behandelt werden würden.

Der Bericht des Generalinspekteurs wurde angefertigt, um auf die Welle von Entrüstung einzugehen, die 1967 durch Jack Andersons spektakuläre Anschuldigung aufgeworfen wurde, dass John F. Kennedy eventuell in Folge eines Attentatskomplotts gegen Castro, „der dann möglicherweise gegen Kennedy selbst zurückgeschlagen ist“, getötet worden ist. Jack Andersons beste Quelle für diese Geschichte war John Roselli, ein Mafiosi, der verärgert darüber war, dass seine Kooperation mit der CIA zu den Attentatsplänen ihn nicht davor bewahrt hatte, verurteilt und möglicherweise abgeschoben zu werden.

Der Wissenschaftler Alan A. Block stellt fest, dass Paradise Island erstaunlich unüberlegt handelte, als sie Eddie Cellini 1967 anstellten, nachdem sie selbst gerade erst einen eigenen Skandal in Sachen organisiertes Verbrechen überstanden hatten. Aber der CIA stand der noch größere Skandal zum organisierten Verbrechen erst noch bevor, den Jack Anderson durch seine Kolumne ausgelöst hatte. Dazu kam der Bericht des Generalinspekteurs, der CIA-Direktor Helms gerade erst davon in Kenntnis gesetzt hatte, dass Cellini bei den Attentatsplänen möglicherweise als Verbindungsmann zwischen den beiden Hauptauftraggebern des Attentats, Varona und Santos Trafficante, agierte. Eine Möglichkeit ist, dass Resorts Cellini angeheuerte, um sicherzustellen, dass er es nicht Roselli nachtun und sich bekennen würde.

Es gibt einen bedeutenden FBI-Bericht (abgedruckt ohne Rechtseinwand in einem CIA-Dokument, das in Lanskys Sicherheitsakte enthalten war), der nahezu frei von jeglichen Referenzen auf Lansky ist, aber durchaus als Akte zu den CIA-Mafia-Plänen beschrieben werden kann. Gemäß diesem FBI-Bericht, war der Kontakt zwischen Varona und den Cellini-Brüdern, die die Mafia vertraten, durch einen Washingtoner Pressereferenten namens Edward K. Moss zustande gekommen:

Verona [sic] hat Edward K. Moss als seinen Assistenten eingestellt, um Geld für Operationen gegen Castro aufzubringen. . . . Julia Cellini ist angeblich die Geliebte von Moss und leitet einen Sekretariatsservice, [der] in Wahrheit eine Fassade für Edward K. Moss‘ Aktivitäten ist. Julia Cellinis Bruder, Dino Cellini und sein Bruder (dessen Vorname nicht bekannt ist), bilden eine aktive Fassade für die beiden größten Casinos, die bis zum Batista-Regime in Kuba betrieben wurden. . . . Es wird angenommen, dass die Cellini-Brüder durch Edward K. Moss in engem Kontakt mit Tony Verona [sic] stehen und angeboten haben, Tony Verona eine beträchtliche Summe Geld (angeblich bis zu zwei Millionen Dollar) durch Edward K. Moss zukommen zu lassen, um Operationen gegen das Castro-Regime zu finanzieren, vorausgesetzt sie würden ein großes Tortenstück vom „zukünftigen Kuba“ abbekommen.

Gemäß diesem CIA-Memo war Moss einer der früheren Präsidenten der Public Relations Society of America. Zur selben Zeit scheint es, laut eines mündlichen Berichts von Dun und Bradstreet an den damaligen CIA-Agenten Edwin P. Wilson, „Moss‘ Aufgabe zu sein, Regierungsaufträge an die Unterwelt zu liefern und möglicherweise Mafiageld durch legitime Geschäftstätigkeiten wieder an die Oberfläche zu bringen“.

Diese ganzen Informationen bilden den Kontext für die Entscheidung, die das CIA-Office of Security am 7. November 1962 traf. Mit dieser Entscheidung sollte sichergestellt werden, dass für Moss ein Covert Security Approval (CSAS) gegeben werden würde, damit er von der Political Action Group innerhalb des Cover Action Stabs der CIA verwendet werden könne. Dies war natürlich über ein Jahr nachdem das FBI der CIA mitgeteilt hatte, dass „die Cellini-Brüder durch Moss angeblich in Kontakt mit Varona stehen und angeboten haben, bis zu zwei Millionen Dollar beizusteuern, um die Anti-Castro-Operationen zu finanzieren“. Außerdem haben FBI-Informationen, die der CIA gesendet wurden, angedeutet, dass Moss‘ Geliebte Julia Cellini und ihr Bruder Dino Cellini die vermeintlichen Vermittler waren, obwohl „die Cellini-Brüder schon seit langem mit den Rauschgift- und Mädchenhandelbanden in Verbindung gebracht werden“. Die CIA selbst hatte das FBI am 16. Dezember 1960 darüber in Kenntnis gesetzt, dass Julia „Cellino“ mitgeteilt hat, dass ihre Brüder „schon seit langem mit den Rauschgift- und Mädchenhandelbanden in Verbindung gebracht werden“.

Noch weitere FBI-Informationen deuteten darauf hin, dass Dino Cellini „in früheren Glücksspielaktivitäten mit Joseph Francis Nesline, einem Top-Ganoven aus Washington, zusammen gearbeitet hat“. Ich habe an anderer Stelle beschrieben, wie Meyer Lansky und Joe Nesline „systematisch Gebrauch von sexueller Erpressung [d.h. durch den Mädchenhandel] machten, um eine Reihe von Leuten in Washington zu kompromittieren, die politischen Einfluss besaßen“.

Die CIA entsann sich, dass Moss ein fragwürdiger Geselle war; ein Memo vom 28. November 1962 verwies auf seine „’skrupellosen und unmoralischen‘ Geschäftspraktiken“. Gemäß dem Bericht des Generalinspekteurs und anderen Notizen konstatiert „ein Memorandum, das 1965 von dem Covert Action Stab angefertigt wurde, dass in den Aufzeichnungen keinerlei Verwendung von Moss zu erkennen ist“; aber diese vorsichtig formulierten Sätze schließen die Möglichkeit nicht gänzlich aus, dass Moss für undokumentierte Aktionen eingesetzt wurde. Tatsächlich bestätigen die Dokumente in Moss‘ Akte, dass die CIA ein Interesse an ihm gezeigt hat. Viele Dokumente darin betreffen Julia, Eddie, Dino und Goffredo Cellini.

Die Aufzeichnungen zu Moss, den Cellinis und Varona sind überaus aufschlussreich. Das FBI hat die CIA auf ihre Verbindungen zueinander und auch auf das Angebot von zwei Millionen Dollar für Varona aufmerksam gemacht, „angesichts der ernstzunehmenden Auswirkungen durch [Mafia]-Unterwanderung dieser, von der CIA gestützten, Aktion [gegen Castro]“. Am 23. Januar 1965 übermittelte das FBI seine Bedenken an den neuen Justizminister Robert Kennedy, der zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch keine Woche im Amt war.

Die Reaktion der CIA hierauf ließ jeglichen Anstand unbeachtet: anstatt, dass sie sich von Moss und seinen Gefährten distanzieren würde, fing die CIA an, sich für sie zu erwärmen. Die CIA arrangierte es so, dass Giftkapseln über die Mafia zu Varona gelangten, der im Februar 1961 zum Vordermann der Castro-Attentatspläne von CIA und Mafia wurde. 1962 wurde Varona ein weiteres Mal auserwählt, als ZRRIFLE-2, um an William Harveys erneuerten Attentatsplänen auf Castro mitzuwirken. Und im selben Jahr leitete die CIA Schritte ein, um Moss selbst einzusetzen, wie wir bereits gesehen haben.

Noch mehr über die CIA, Moss und ihre Korruptionspolitik: Adnan Khashoggi

Die indirekte Verbindung der CIA zu Moss über einen Mittelsmann (Varona) scheint bis in die 1970er Jahre angehalten zu haben. Danach dann wurde diese Position von Adnan Khashoggi eingenommen, der für eine gewisse Zeit (wie schon T.V. Soong und Phao Sriyanon vor ihm) als „der reichste Mann der Welt“ galt. Darüber hinaus wurde Khashoggi im Kerry-Brown BCCI Report als einer der „hauptsächlichen ausländischen Agenten der USA“ geführt. Und irgendwann in den 1970ern engagierte er dann Edward K. Moss als seinen PR-Agenten.

Khashoggi wiederholte die Politik der korrupten Einflussnahme durch Geld und Sex, der wir bereits begegnet sind. Sein Beitrag zu Nixons Wahlkampagnen – einige legal, andere illegal – wurden vom Senatsausschuss zur Watergate-Affäre untersucht. Über Khashoggi wird verlautet, dass er Nixon 1972 auf geheimen Wege eine Million Dollar zukommen ließ, angeblich in einem Aktenkoffer, den er „irrtümlicherweise“ in Nixons Haus in San Clemente zurückgelassen hatte.

Des Weiteren weiß man, dass Khashoggi mehrere Millionen Dollar (manche sagen $200 Millionen) in der Bank von Nixons Freund Bebe Rebozo eingezahlt hat. Dann „hob er alles bis auf 200 000 Dollar in Form von Barschecks ab, die er auf das Sands Hotel in Las Vegas ausstellte“. Es schien so, als nutzte Khashoggi das Sands Hotel als seinen persönlichen Geldwäschesalon. Bekannt als „Las Vegas‘ größter Glücksspieler“, verlor Khashoggi 250 000 Dollar mit nur einem Einsatz.

Das Sands war eines der Casinos, das ursprünglich zu Teilen Meyer Lansky gehörte. Von dort wurden Einnahmen abgeschöpft und (wie wir bereits gesehen haben) in der Miami National Bank eingezahlt. In den 1970er Jahren ging das Sands dann in den Besitz von Howard Hughes über; aber zwei Veteranen der Lansky-Ära, Carl Cohen und Jack Entratter, arbeiteten weiterhin im Casino. Währenddessen involvierte Khashoggi den Manager von Hughes‘ Las Vegas-Besitztümern, F. William Gay, in seine Geschäfte; und als Hughes schließlich schnell und in aller Stille von Las Vegas zu Wallace Groves‘ Resort in Freeport, Bahamas, ausgeflogen wurde, war es Khashoggis Flugzeug, dass ihn dorthin brachte.

Selbst noch in der Hughes-Ära waren die Casinos in Las Vegas der bevorzugte Ort, um Geldwäsche zu betreiben (verdeckt als Glückspielverluste). Diese Praxis hatte sich so sehr eingebürgert, dass der amerikanische Zoll, im Rahmen der Operation Casablanca, am Ende tatsächlich ein simuliertes Casino in der Nähe von Las Vegas errichtete, in dem hochrangige mexikanische Banker zusammen kamen und „eifrig diskutierten, wie man mit der schon vorliegenden halben Million Dollar aus den neuesten Drogeneinnahmen umgehen sollte“. In einem Fall wurden tausende Dollar in Geldumschlägen vom Stardust Casino (siehe oben) in Florida in einem Flugzeug gefunden, das mutmaßlich Drogen geschmuggelt hatte.

Es gibt überdies Berichte, dass Khashoggi, zusätzlich zum Geld, auch „Sex benutzte, um amerikanische Beamte zu bestechen“. Die Rechnung an eine Bordellwirtin, die Massen an Mädchen für seine Yacht im Mittelmeer bereitstellte, belief sich auf hunderttausende Dollar.

Das Interesse der CIA an Khashoggi und Moss war nicht nur auf das Geld beschränkt, das den beiden zugänglich war. In den 1970er Jahren wurde Moss Vorsitzender des Elite-Sarafi Clubs in Kenya, zu dem er Khashoggi als Mehrheitseigentümer einlud. Und wie der frühere saudische Geheimdienstchef Prinz Turki bin Faisal einmal öffentlich preisgab, trafen sich die Geheimdienstleiter mehrerer Länder (Frankreich, Ägypten, Saudi Arabien, Marokko und Iran unter dem Schah) regelmäßig im Safari Club, um geheime Operationen abzuwickeln, die die CIA als Folge des Watergate-Skandals nicht mehr ausführen konnte.

CIA-Funktionäre wie Miles Copeland und James Critchfield gehörten bald zu Khashoggis Milieu. Sie berieten Khashoggi bei diplomatischen Unternehmungen, wie z.B. ein beabsichtigter Mideast Peace Fund, der sowohl Israel als auch Palästina entlohnen sollte, wenn sie sich gegenseitig anerkennen. Khashoggi war in der Lage mit den Israelis zu verhandeln; er soll den Israelis durch den früheren Waffenschmuggler Hank Greenspun, dem politisch einflussreichen Herausgeber der Las Vegas Sun, vorgestellt worden sein.

Im Grunde repräsentierte Khashoggi die Gruppr der Nachkriegsemigranten mit gewaltigem Vermögen und die Macht, die sich hieraus ableitete. Er diente als „Mittelsmann“ oder Repräsentant in einer Anzahl von Operationen, die für jene, die er repräsentierte, verboten waren. Lockheed, um ein Beispiel zu nennen, fehlte bemerkenswerterweise auf der Liste von Militärunternehmen, die 1972 illegalerweise Geld für Nixons Wahlkampagne gespendet haben. Aber es existierte kein Gesetz, das ihrem offiziellen Repräsentanten Khashoggi untersagte, 200 Millionen Dollar durch die Bank von Nixons Freund Bebe Rebozo zu schleusen.

All dies deutet an, dass das CIA-Interesse an Moss – sowie später an Khashoggi, Wallace Groves, an Operation . . . [Text geschwärzt] und an Eddie Cellinis Arbeitgeber bei Resorts International – etwas mit der unregelmäßigen Finanzierung für undokumentierte Geheimoperationen zu tun hatte. Und falls solche Gelder geflossen sind, dann liegt es nahe, dass der Mann, der hierfür herangezogen wurde, Paul Helliwell war; also der Mann, über den das Wall Street Journal schrieb, dass er zwischen 1964 und 1975 an der Finanzierung einer Reihe von geheimen Streifzügen in Kuba „’stark beteiligt‘ gewesen ist“.

Helliwell, Castle Bank, Bruce Rappaport und BCCI

Dieser schnelle Abriss zu Helliwells Banken zeigt, dass Helliwell für die Verbindung zwischen der Geheimdienstwelt, dem organisierten Verbrechen, dem globalen Drogenhandel, politischer Einflussnahme, spekulativen Investitionen (oftmals in Hotelcasinos) und Figuren des legalen öffentlichen Lebens eine zentrale Rolle spielte. Aber diese Verbindung wurde nicht von Helliwell selber eingefädelt; es existierten andere mächtige Leute im Hintergrund, von denen manche diese Verbindung selbst nach Helliwells Tod 1976 aufrecht erhielten (gerade zu dem Zeitpunkt, als Magazine wie Newsweek anfingen, sich für Castle Bank zu interessieren).

Einer der wichtigsten dieser Hintermänner mag der frühere OSS-Chef William Donovan gewesen sein (über den wir noch mehr hören werden). Laut Pete Brewton machte,

einer der Anwälte in dem „Einer flog über Kuckucksnest“-Fall die Aussage, dass Kanter und Helliwell einander durch General William J. „Wild Bill“ Donovan, dem bekannten Leiter der OSS während des Zweiten Weltkriegs und durch Helliwells OSS-Chef, vorgestellt wurde. Kanter wies dies zurück. „Ich habe Bill Donovan nie persönlich getroffen. Es mag sein, dass ich einmal mit ihm telefoniert habe, weil Paul Helliwell mich darum gebeten hat“.

Eine weitere, unmittelbar involvierte, Person der OSS war Helliwells Partner in der Florida Bankholding-Gesellschaft (mit Namen HMT und später Florida Share), zu der die Bank of Perrine und die Bank of Cutler Ridge gehörten. Der Partner war

E.P. Barry, der während des Zweiten Weltkriegs als amerikanischer Geheimdienstfunktionär des Militärs im Office of Strategic Services (OSS) gewesen war. Bei Ende des Kriegs war er zum Kopf der amerikanischen Gegenspionage (X-2) in Wien aufgestiegen . . . . Barry . . . war laut eines Castle Bank-Funktionärs ein langjähriger Gefährte von [CIA-Direktor] William Casey.

Barry war gleichzeitig Hauptanteilseigner von Florida Shares und von der Inter Maritime Bank von Bruce Rappaport, einem engen Freund und Geschäftspartner von William Casey. Rappaport, ein Unternehmer und Makler der Ölbranche „mit vermuteten Kontakten zum amerikanischen und israelischen Geheimdienst“, hatte zahlreiche Verbindungen zur weltgrößten Geheimdienst-Drogen-„Waschküche“ – der Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Die Reederei-Familie Gokal aus Pakistan, führende BCCI-Investoren, die später zum BCCI-Bankrott beitrugen, war des Weiteren zusammen mit Rappaport und Barry Anteilseigner der Inter Maritime Bank. Alfred Hartmann, ein Vorstandsmitglied von BCCI, war sowohl stellvertretender Vorsitzender von Rappaports Schweizer Bank, der Bank of New York-Intermaritime, als auch Leiter der Schweizer Tochterbank, der Banque de Commerce et de Placements (BCP).

Und laut Block und Weaver „bearbeitete Rappaport die National Bank of Oman (ein BCCI/Bank of America-Jointventure) und trug dazu bei, dass Millionenbeträge aus CIA und Saudi-Geldern nach Pakistan zu den afghanischen Rebellen während des Kriegs mit den Sowjets in den 1980er Jahren gelangten“. Rappaports Schlüsselmann in Oman war Jerry Townsend, angeblich ein früherer CIA-Agent, der jetzt Colonial Shipping Co. in Atlanta leitete. Von dort kannte er den BCCI-Mitarbeiter Bert Lance.

BCCI und ein israelischer Geheimdienstagent waren außerdem involviert in Medellin Waffenverkäufe, durch eine „Melonenplantage“ in Antigua, die teilweise von William Caseys Freund Bruce Rappaport mitfinanziert wurde.

Bruce Rappaport . . . gehörte das Stück Land, auf dem Maurice Sarfati, ein früherer israelischer Geheimdienstfunktionär, seine Melonenplantage errichtete. Und einer von Rappaports Banken in Antigua gab Sarfati einen großen Kredit – der niemals zurückgezahlt wurde. Sarfati (der auch einem von der OPIC, der amerikanischen Versicherungsgesellschaft der Regierung, garantierten Kredit aus dem Weg ging) nahm diesen Kredit. Zuerst pflegte er damit die Freundschaft zu Regierungsangehörigen und dann ebnete er damit den Weg zu ihren Büros für seinen Landsmann Yair Klein.

Klein arbeitete in Kolumbien, wo seine in Israel lizensierte „Sicherheitsfirma“, Spearhead Ltd., die die Killerkommandos des Medellin Kokainkartells in Ermordungs- und Sprengtechniken ausbildete, anfing, unliebsames Interesse zu erregen . . . . 1988 war Klein in Antigua, wo er nach einem neuen Weg für die Waffenlieferung an seinen Medellin Klienten, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha suchte.

Rappaports offensichtliche Verbindungen zum Mossad werfen die Frage auf, ob Helliwells Verbindungen zu Lanskys Bank of World Commerce und Tibor Rosenbaum nicht auch eine Verbindung zum Mossad waren. Dieselbe Frage wird von Helliwells Prozessvertretung von der Eastern Development Company aufgeworfen (laut des Martindale-Hubbell Rechtsregisters): denn eine Firma dieses Namens kooperierte mit Lansky, Hank Greenspun und anderen für Waffenlieferungen an den in der Entstehung begriffenen Staat Israel.

Es ist klar, dass Juden, wie viele anderen Minderheiten, ein Bestandteil des weltweiten Drogennetzwerks waren. Darüber hinaus formten sie einen wichtigen Teil in der finanziellen Infrastruktur dieses Netzwerks – aber selbst auf dieser Ebene arbeiteten sie nicht allein. Das globale Drogennetzwerk verband jüdische Banken in Florida und der Schweiz mit Banken unterschiedlicher Chinesen in Südostasien und Hong Kong, den Muslimen der Bank Intra und späteren BCCI im Nahen Osten. Dazu kamen noch italienische Banken, wie jene von Michele Sindona und Roberto Calvi, beides Mitglieder der mit dem Geheimdienst verbundenen Masonic Lodge P-2 und beide ermordet, nachdem ihre Banken durch Mafia-Verwicklungen gescheitert waren. Mein Eindruck ist, dass keine dieser ethnischen Minderheiten jemals die Dominanz solcher Mainstream-Leute wie Donovan und Helliwell übertreffen konnten.

(Als ein Mensch, der sehr stark für Gewaltverzicht eintritt, muss ich einräumen, dass die Gewalt der ethnischen Gruppen im weltweiten Drogennetzwerk seinen Ursprung in entschädigender Gewalt gegen ein System nahm, das vor allem von europäischen und amerikanischen Interessen dominiert wird.)

Einer dieser Mainstream-Leute war der mysteriöse E.P. Barry, ein Investor von Helliwell und Rappaport. Eines der wenigen Dinge, die über Barry bekannt sind, ist, dass er während des Zweiten Weltkriegs bei der OSS war und dass er gegen Ende des Kriegs von Donovan zum Leiter der OSS Spionageabwehr (X-2) in Wien ernannt wurde.

OSS-X-2, oder Spionageabwehr, war der geheimnisvollste und geheimste Zweig der OSS und derjenige, dessen präzise Mission es war, den Deutschen Sicherheitsdienst [SD] zu durchdringen. Gemäß eines OSS-Berichts aus dem Jahr 1946 „war eine ebenso interessante X-2-Aktivität die Untersuchung der Finanzgeschäfte des Reichssicherheitshauptamts. Im Verlauf dieser Untersuchungen, schickte die amerikanische Dritte Armee einen Major des Sicherheitsdienstes auf „mehrere Trips nach Italien und Österreich und, als Ergebnis dieser Vor-Treffen wurden mehr als 500 000 Dollar in Gold und dazu noch Juwelen gerettet.“ Einiges von diesem Nazi-Gold, das unter Barrys Aufsicht beschafft wurde, wurde danach genutzt, um amerikanische Geheimdienstoperationen in Deutschland in den unmittelbaren Nachkriegsjahren zu finanzieren.

Barry steht, mit seinem faszinierenden Hintergrund, für die Kontinuität zwischen dem Helliwell Geheimdienst-Drogen-Netzwerk, das bis 1972 florierte (dem Jahr, in dem die amerikanische Bundessteuerbehörde mit ihrer Operation Tradewinds anfing, die Bank of Perrine zu untersuchen) und dem BCCI Geheimdienst-Drogen-Netzwerk, das nach 1972 florierte (also das Jahr, in dem BCCI gegründet wurde).

Wie schon Khashoggi vorher, hatte die BCCI die Möglichkeit, sowohl arabisch-israelisch-chinesische Waffengeschäfte als auch Kontakte zu westlichen Geheimdiensten und Politikern zu vermitteln. In der Tat scheint die Bank einen Großteil von Khashoggis Funktion als Einflussnehmer im Nahen Osten und anderswo übernommen zu haben, nachdem die Vereinigten Staaten mit dem Corrupt Federal Practices Act von 1978 alle direkten Zahlungen von amerikanischen Unternehmen an ausländische Einzelpersonen verboten hatten. Die BCCI erbte auch – und erweiterte – Khashoggis Praxis der Geldverwendung, um amerikanische Politiker zu beeinflussen und zu korrumpieren. BCCIs pakistanischer Präsident Agha Hasan Abedi rettete Jimmy Carters Finanzminister Bert Lance vor dem Bankrott und konnte dadurch auch eine Beziehung zu Carter selbst entwickeln.

Ein Senatsbericht zur BCCI fasste zusammen, dass

die BCCI systematisch auf Beziehungen zu, und falls notwendig auch Zahlungen an, prominente Politiker in fast allen der 73 Länder, in denen die BCCI agierte, beruhte. . . . Das Resultat waren Beziehungen, die die BCCI zu Funktionären aus Ländern auf der ganzen Welt unterhielt, welche von fragwürdig, über unzulässig bis hin zu völlig korrupt reichten. Dazu gehörten Länder wie Argentinien, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brasilien, Kamerun, China, Kolumbien, Kongo, Ghana, Guatemala, Elfenbeinküste, Indien, Jamaika, Kuwait, Libanon, Mauritius, Marokko, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Saudi-Arabien, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Tunesien, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, USA, Sambia und Simbabwe.

Und durch zwei sehr gut recherchierte Bücher, herausgegeben von Journalisten des Time Magazins und des Wall Street Journal, konnten wir erfahren, dass unter den später einflussreichen Empfängern dieser Freigiebigkeiten der BCCI, ihren Eigentümern und ihren Zweigfirmen auch James Baker war, Ronald Reagans Finanzminister, der sich weigerte, gegen die BCCI zu ermitteln. Außerdem profitierten die Senatoren Joseph Biden (Demokrat) und Orrin Hatch (Republikaner) von der Großzügigkeit der BCCI, beides hochrangige Mitglieder des Senats-Rechtsausschusses, der sich ebensfalls weigerte, gegen die BCCI zu ermitteln.

Die CIA, BCCI und die „lange Tradition der zwielichtigen Banken“

Aber Barry ist nicht die einzige Verbindung zwischen den Drogenbanken von Helliwell und der BCCI. Eine zentralere Gestalt ist General George Olmsted, Leiter der Washington Bankholdinggesellschaft, die unter dem Namen International Bank bekannt war. Im März 1976 wies Olmsted die International Bank (die „den Ruf einer CIA-Bank hatte“) an, 66 Prozent des Aktienkapitals der scheiternden Mercantile Bank auf den Bahamas (Castles Vorgängerbank) aufzukaufen, obwohl „die Leute von International Kenntnis von Mercantiles kränkelndem finanziellen Zustand hatten“. Ab 1977 fing International an, seine Aktien in Financial General Bankaktien (später bekannt als First American) zu verkaufen, eine bedeutende amerikanische Bankholdinggesellschaft, für BCCI Strohmänner, die später für die BCCI First American übernahmen.

Die verbreitetste Erklärung ist, dass die CIA die Bank nicht nur benutzte, sondern auch dabei half, sie aufzubauen. Die Journalisten Peter Truell und Larry Gurwin, die Autoren des ultimativen Buchs über die BCCI, vermuteten, dass die Verbindung der CIA zu dem Gründer von BCCI, Agha Hasan Abedi, womöglich schon auf die Zeit vor BCCIs Gründung im Jahr 1972 zurückgeht. Sie stellten auch fest, dass die BCCI nur der letzte Fall in einer sich überlappenden Serie von Geldwäsche-Banken war, die der CIA Dienste erwiesen hatten – Deak & Company, Castle Bank & Trust und Nugan Hand.

Das weltweite Netzwerk und das Rauschgift

Eine dieser miteinander verflochtenen Banken, die World Finance Corporation in Florida, wurde zur Zielscheibe der „wahrscheinlich größten Rauschgiftermittlung des Jahrzehnts“. Aber die Untersuchung, „in der eine große Anzahl von Bundesbeamten und Beamten der einzelnen Bundesstaaten beteiligt waren, musste nach einem Jahr verworfen werden, weil die CIA sich beim Justizministerium beschwerte, dass ein Dutzend hochrangiger Krimineller für sie ‚von Interesse‘ sind“.

Eine weitere Bank mit Drogenverwicklungen war die australische Nugan Hand Bank, die sich 1976 für die Wirtschaftsprüfung das Unternehmen Price Waterhouse auf den Bahamas auswählte, also in dem Jahr, als sowohl Castle als auch Mercantile zusammenbrachen. Nach ihrem spektakulären Zusammenbruch im Jahr 1980 folgerten australische Ermittler, dass Nugan Hand in der Finanzierung von bedeutenden Drogengeschäften involviert gewesen sein und auch Profite gewaschen haben muss: zwei offizielle Ermittlungen „sahen Nugan Hand in der entscheidenden Position, durch die Drogeneinkünfte heimlich ins Ausland geschafft wurden, wo sie offensichtlich wieder in illegale Drogen investiert werden konnten“.

Bei Nugan Hand sammelte sich eine eindrucksvolle Zahl an früheren CIA-Mitarbeitern, darunter der „mysteriöse Strippenzieher“ Bernie Houghton, der in den 1950er Jahren Helliwells Position in Bangkok übernommen haben soll, und der frühere CIA-Direktor William Colby. Von besonderem Interesse ist die Verbindung von Nugan Hand und Thomas Clines, einem CIA-Funktionär in Laos unter Theodore Shackley, der später kündigte, um im ausgegliederten Geheimdienstnetzwerk von Edwin Wilson tätig zu werden. Als die Nugan Bank 1980 auf spektakuläre Weise zusammenbrach (mit dem Selbstmord oder Mord von Frank Nugan), war es Thomas Clines, der dabei half, Houghton still und leise aus Australien verschwinden zu lassen. Die beiden Männer beteiligten sich daraufhin, zusammen mit Edwin Wilson, Theodore Shackley und BCCI, an undokumentierten Operationen gegen die Sowjets in Afghanistan, wobei sie nicht für die CIA, sondern für den Safari Club arbeiten.

Die CIA in Chiang Mai hatte zu der Zeit, als das Hauptgeschäft der Stadt der Opiumhandel war, auf derselben Etage ihre Zweigstelle wie die örtliche Dienststelle von DEA. Laut Jonathan Kwitny, „nahm die Rezeption von DEA die Anrufe und Nachrichten für Nugan Hand entgegen, wenn die Bankvertreter nicht im Hause waren“. Der Nugan Hand Vertreter in Chiang Mai, Neil Evans

sagte aus, dass er zugegen war, als Michael Hand und Ron Pulger-Frame – der frühere Deak & Company Kurier, der dann bei Nugan Hand anheuerte – über die Sendung von CIA-Geldern in den Nahen Osten, Saudi-Arabien und Panama verhandelten. Evans erklärte, dass Nugan Hand zu einem Zeitpunkt 50 bis 60 Millionen Dollar für die CIA bewegte, und dass Nugan darüber hinaus in Waffengeschäfte mit der Dritten Welt verwickelt war.

Des Weiteren erzählte er dem australischen Fernsehen, dass die Millionenbeträge, für die er zuständig war, aus dem „Drogenverkehr der Region angesammelt wurden. Die Bank, so Evans schonungslose Aussage, war eine ‚Wäscherei‘ für Meo [Hmong] Stammesmänner und andere Mohnanbauer“.

In meinem Buch The Road to 9/11 beschreibe ich, wie Caseys Vertrauen zur BCCI mit Bezug auf die amerikanischen Unterstützung der gegen die Russen kämpfenden afghanischen Mujahedin dazu führte, dass die Splittergruppe von Gulbuddin Hekmatyar die meiste Hilfe erhielt. Heymatyar war der führende Drogenhändler in Afghanistan, der bald (dank der Hilfe aus den USA und Pakistan) wahrscheinlich zum führenden Heroinhändler der Welt wurde.

Dieses Muster eines Drogennetzwerks wiederholte sich in den 1990er Jahren, nachdem sich die UdSSR aus Afghanistan zurückgezogen hatte und die BCCI kurz danach zusammengebrochen war. In Aserbaidschan (unter dem Deckmantel einer Ölfirma) gründeten Veteranen von CIA-Operationen, die ehemals von Shackley und Clines in Laos geleitet wurden, wie z.B. Richard Secord, Heinie Aderholt und Ed Dearborn, eine Fluglinie auf der Grundlage des Air America-Modells. Diese Fluglinie war schon bald dabei „hunderte von Mujahedin-Söldnern aus Afghanistan abzuholen“. Die arabisch-afghanischen Azeri-Operationen wurde auch mit Geld aus dem afghanischen Heroinhandel finanziert.

Loretta Napoleoni hat dargelegt, dass es eine islamistische Drogenroute von Verbündeten von Al Qaida gibt, die sich quer über Nord- und Mittelasien erstreckt, von Tadschikistan und Usbekistan durch Aserbaidschan und Tschetschenien bis nach Kosovo. Dies führt uns zu der paradoxen Tatsache, dass Clinton 1998 in die Lage geriet, die von al Qaida gedeckte Befreiungsarmee des Kosovo (UÇK) zu unterstützen. Er verfolgte dies, obwohl „das amerikanische Außenministerium die UÇK ab 1998 . . . als eine internationale terroristische Organisation listete. Das Außenministerium stellte fest, dass die UÇK ihre Operationen mit Einnahmen aus dem internationalen Heroinhandel und mit Krediten von bekannten Terroristen wie Osama bin Laden finanziert hatte“.

Schließlich soll, wenn man der früheren FBI-Übersetzerin Sibel Edmonds Glauben schenken kann, der gleiche Heroinfluss auch die Korruption des Kongresses unter George W. Bush finanziert haben. Edmonds wurde 2002 vom FBI gefeuert, nachdem sie einem Kollegen vorgeworfen hatte, eine Gefahr für die Sicherheit zu sein. Seitdem kämpft sie gegen ihre Entlassung in einem „Whistleblower“-Verfahren, das die Regierung mit einer Sperre belegt hat und sich dabei auf das Staatsgeheimnis-Privileg beruft. Es wurde ihr weiterhin verboten, in der Öffentlichkeit über ihren Fall zu sprechen.

Laut Daniel Ellsberg geht es Edmonds um die al Qaida-Verbindung, die auch von Napoleoni beschrieben wurde:

Sie legte dem Kongress dar, dass al Qaida, laut dieser Interviews, zu 95 Prozent durch Geld aus dem Drogenhandel finanziert wird – Drogenhandel, bei dem die amerikanische Regierung ein Auge zudrückt und den sie wissentlich ignoriert, weil er in starkem Maße mit unseren Verbündeten und unseren Vorteilen verknüpft ist, also mit Länder wie der Türkei, Kirgisistan, Tadschikistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan – alle „Stans“.

Es ist ein Drogenhandel, für den das Opium aus Afghanistan stammt, in der Türkei aufbereitet wird und nach Europa geliefert wird, wo es 96 Prozent von Europas Heroinbedarf deckt, durch Albaner, entweder in Albanien oder Kosovo – albanische Muslime in Kosovo – also im Grunde die UÇK, die Befreiungsarmee des Kosovo, die wir zu dieser Zeit gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts stark unterstützten . . . Sibel sagt, dass dem Sprecher des Repräsentantenhauses, Dennis Hastert, Koffer mit Bargeld direkt in sein Haus in Chicago geliefert wurden, so türkische Quellen, mit dem Wissen, dass viel von diesem Geld aus dem Drogenhandel stammt.

2005 wurden die Anschuldigungen von Sibel Edmonds teilweise in Vanity Fair dargelegt. Dort wurde aufgedeckt, dass sie Zugang zu von FBI-Wanzen aufgezeichneten Gesprächen zwischen Mitgliedern des American-Turkish Council (ATC) hatte, in denen es um die Bestechung von gewählten amerikanischen Beamten ging. Außerdem soll es um Aussagen, „die sich nach Hinweisen auf groß angelegte Drogenlieferungen und andere Verbrechen anhörten“ gegangen sein.

Fazit: Eine fortwährende Serie von drogenbezogenen Tiefenereignissen

Mafias und Herrschaftsimperien haben bestimmte Grundsätze gemein. Beide können als systematische gewaltsame Herrschafts-Auferlegung in Gebieten mit wenig Staatsführung verstanden werden. Beide gebrauchen Gewalt, um ihre Ziele zu erreichen; aber beide werden oftmals insoweit toleriert, dass das Ergebnis ihrer kontrollierten Gewalt eine Minderung der unkontrollierten Gewalt darstellt. (Ich möchte einen zaghaften Vorschlag für einen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen Mafias und Herschaftsimperien machen: nämlich den, dass Mafias mit der Zeit immer mehr mit der Zivilgesellschaft, deren Regeln sie ehemals missachteten, verwachsen, während Herrschaftsimperien dazu neigen, immer mehr mit der Gesellschaft, die sie ehemals kontrollierten, in unüberbrückbaren Konflikt zu treten.)

In diesem Buch haben wir eine Überlagerung der Infrastrukturen von amerikanischer Mafia und dem indirekten amerikanischen Herrschaftsimperium kennengelernt. Und in diesem Kapitel habe ich versucht, das Epizentrum dieser Überlagerung in einem Milieu zu beschreiben, das sich an seinen äußeren Grenzen zu einem globalen Nexus vergrößert, welchen ich als das weltweite Drogennetzwerk bezeichnet habe. Dieses Netzwerk hat enge Verbindungen zur amerikanischen Unterwelt, aber auch zur amerikanischen „Oberwelt“. Dieser Nexus verbindet den amerikanischen Geheimdienst mit den Geheimdiensten vieler anderer Länder, darunter Taiwan, Israel, Italien und Chile. Er betreut zudem die finanziellen Zuwendungen an führende Politiker vieler Länder, inklusive beider Parteien in den Vereinigten Staaten.

Alle wesentlichen Tiefenereignisse der jüngsten amerikanischen Geschichte und alle wesentlichen Ausweitungen indirekter amerikanischer Herrschaft seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg können mit diesem weltweiten Drogennetzwerk in Verbindung gebracht werden:

— Der erste Fall amerikanischer Präsenz in Ostasien wurde in Verbindung mit der von Drogengeld finanzierten KMT in Taiwan errichtet.

— Die amerikanische Präsenz in Südostasien begann mit der Unterstützung der KMT-Drogenhändler durch Sea Supply in Ost-Burma und erweiterte sich dann Mitte der 1950er Jahre mit der drogenfinanzierte PARU-Macht in Laos, während die CIA Saigon sicherte, indem sie dort den Drogenabsatz kontrollierte.

— Die verwickelte Finanzgesellschaft, gegründet von OSS-Veteran Nicholas Deak, „wurde angeblich von der CIA genutzt, um Geheimoperationen zu finanzieren, darunter auch der Sturz des demokratisch gewählten iranischen Premierministers Mohammed Mossadeq 1953.

— Der Sturz des demokratisch gewählten guatemaltekischen Präsidenten Jacobo Arbenz wurde teilweise mit der Unterstützung des nicaraguanischen Diktators Anastasio Somoza erreicht, einer Hauptfigur in Lanskys Waffenpipeline nach Israel in den 1940er Jahren, dessen Guardia Nacional hiernach tief mit dem karibischen Drogenhandel verbunden war.

— Das Einsetzen von CIA-Geheimtruppen in Laos im Jahre 1960, die letzten Endes zu einer drogenfinanzierten irregulären Armee mit tausenden Personen anwuchs, wurde durch eine Kraft erreicht, die aus der Sea Supply Operation in Thailand hervor gegangen war. Der Privatkrieg der CIA in Laos, den Präsident Kennedy vergeblich einzudämmen versuchte, war der tatsächliche Beginn des amerikanischen Kriegs in Vietnam.

— Angletons „alternative CIA“, CI/SIG, manipulierte und fälschte ihre „Geheimdienstinformation“ über Lee Harvey Oswald auf solch eine Weise, dass er zum Verdächtigen für das Attentat auf John F. Kennedy in Frage kommen würde.

— Der Sturz des demokratisch gewählten indonesischen Präsidenten Sukarno im Jahr 1965 wurde zum einen mit geheimer Unterstützung durch Bestechungsgelder der Lockheed Corporation erreicht, zum anderen mit der Intervention von Sasakawa Ryoichi, einem CIA-Agenten von Einfluss, und seinem Freund Kodama Yoshio, einem Mitglied der Yakuza in Japan. Sasakawa und Kodama waren außerdem die Empfänger von Lockheed Bestechungsgeldern, die durch Deak & Company ermöglicht wurden. Sie erschienen auch teilweise auf der Bühne von Shig Katayama, dessen ID Corp. auf den Cayman Inseln mysteriöse Geschäfte mit Helliwells Castle Bank machte.

— Die BCCI stellte die ursprüngliche Infrastruktur für die CIA-Intervention in Afghanistan im Jahr 1979 und der darauf folgenden Allianz mit dem Hauptdrogenhändler Gulbeddin Hekmatyar zur Verfügung. Pakistans Präsident Zia ermöglichte Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carters Nationalen Sicherheitsberater, die Zusammenarbeit mit Generalleutnant Fazle Haq; obwohl ein BCCI-Informant den amerikanischen Behörden erzählte, dass Fazle Haq „stark mit dem Rauschgifthandel in Verbindung steht und das Heroingeld durch die Bank [BCCI] schleusen“ würde.

— 1970 wurde ein CIA-Beamter mit dem Pseudonym Henry J. Sloman, der zudem ein „risikoreicher Schmuggler mit direkten Verbindungen zur Mafia“ war, nach Chile entsandt, wo er bei den Attentatsplanungen zur Ermordung von General René Schneider, dem Oberbefehlshaber des chilenischen Militärs, mitmischte.

— Im September 1976 wurde Orlando Letelier in Washington von einer Gruppe ermordet, der auch exilkubanische Drogenhändler angehörten, die wiederum für den drogenfinanzierten chilenischen Geheimdienst DINA arbeiteten. Obwohl die US-Regierung bereits von DINAs Operation CONDOR für diese Morde im Ausland in Kenntnis gesetzt worden war, entschied sich CIA-Direktor Bush dafür, öffentlich den Verdacht von der DINA abzulenken.

— Laut Robert Parry arrangierte Safari Club-Mitglied Alexandre de Marenches im Juli und Oktober 1980 ein Treffen zwischen William Casey (wie de Marenches auch ein Malteserritter) und iranischen bzw. israelischen Vertretern in Paris, wo Casey Iran erforderliche Waffenlieferungen im Tausch gegen ein Herauszögern der Freilassung der amerikanischen Geiseln in Iran versprach. (Dies war die so genannte republikanische „October Counter-surprise“. Parry vermutet, dass die BCCI sowohl bei der Finanzierung der Bestechungsgelder für den geheimen Deal, als auch für die darauf folgenden Lieferungen israelischer Waffen nach Iran beteiligt war.

— 1981 versuchte Mehmet Ali Agça, ein Mitglied der mit Drogen handelnden türkischen Grauen Wölfe, Papst Johannes Paul II. zu ermorden. Le Monde diplomatique berichtete später, dass der Attentatsversuch von Abdullah Çatli auf Gesuch des türkischen Mafiachefs Bekir Celenk organisiert wurde. Çatli, auch Mitglied der Grauen Wölfe, fungierte als Leiter von Todeskommandos für den türkischen Geheimdienst. Le Monde diplomatique fügte hinzu, dass Çatli ein Jahr später zusammen mit dem berüchtigten Killer der Operation CONDOR, Stefano delle Chiaie, nach Miami kam.

— Shackley, Khashoggi und die BCCI wirkten bei der Gründung des illegalen Iran-Contra-Netzwerks von 1985/86 mit, das Gelder von Waffengeschäften mit Iran auf die Seite schaffte, um die Contras in Honduras und Costa Rica zu unterstützen.
Mafia,
— Während der Plünderung Russlands zur Zeit der Jelzin-Ära in den 1990er Jahren wurden Gelder durch Rappaports Inter Maritime Bank an die Bank of New York geleitet, an der Rappaport auch grundlegend, wenn nicht sogar kontrollierend, beteiligt war.

— 1991 gründete Shackleys Kollege Richard Secord eine Fluggesellschaft in Aserbaidschan, die hunderte Mujahedin aus Afghanistan, rekrutiert durch Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, einflog.

— 1998 führte der amerikanische Rückhalt für die UÇK, eine von al Qaida unterstützte und teilweise durch Drogen finanzierte Gruppe, zu Enthüllungen, die besagten, dass einer der UÇK-Führer seit mehreren Jahren schon gute Beziehungen zur privaten Militärfirma MPRI unterhielt. (Erst 1997 war die UÇK von den Vereinigten Staaten als terroristische Gruppe mit Unterstützung des Heroinhandels eingestuft worden.)

(Diese Liste könnte unendlich lange weiter geführt werden. Zum Beispiel kann die Wandlung Australiens zu einem verlässlichen amerikanischen Bündnispartner auf das Jahr 1975 und den Sturz des demokratisch gewählten Labor Premierministers Gough Whitlam zurückdatiert werden; ein Ereignis, in dem Penny Lernoux und andere die versteckte Beteiligung der Nugan Hand Bank gesehen haben.)

Diese starke Kontinuität, die der amerikanischen Ausdehnung seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zu Grunde liegt, hilft dabei, das verblüffende Phänomen glaubhaft zu machen, das in unserem letzten Kapitel beschrieben wurde – nämlich, dass es bei solchen Tiefenereignissen wie der Ermordung Kennedys und dem 11. September 2001 eine Verbindung gibt bzw. dass sie nicht das Ergebnis von Kräften sind, die die USA von außen angegriffen haben. Vielmehr, zumindest teilweise, stammen diese Ereignisse aus einem tiefen Netzwerk, wie es in diesem Kapitel beschrieben wurde, und werden daraus ins öffentliche Bewusstsein befördert. Es ist dies ein zeitlich stabiles Netzwerk, das aber so gut wie unbeachtet ist.

Fazit II: Die zunehmende Bedrohung stabiler Demokratien

Aber wenn man diese Liste an geheimen Interventionen und Tiefenereignissen synoptisch betrachtet, erkennt man ein Muster von zunehmenden Abweichungen von den Grundsätzen des öffentlichen Staates. Mit Hilfe des weltweiten Netzwerks wurden mit den CIA-Interventionen in Iran (1953) und Guatemala (1954) Operationen unterstützt, die vorher vom Nationalen Sicherheitsrat (und davor vom Rat für auswärtige Beziehungen) sanktioniert worden waren.

Aber die drogenfinanzierte Evolution einer von der CIA ausgebildeten thailändischen Truppe zu einer offensiven Streitmacht, die in Laos einmarschieren konnte, war eine Operation, die explizit nicht vom Nationalen Sicherheitsrat autorisiert worden war. Wie Daniel Fineman feststellte, wurde

im September [1953] der NSC [Nationalen Sicherheitsrat] durch die Präferenz der JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] für direkte Unterstützung der französischen Streitkräfte dazu gezwungen, nur die Durchführung von Phase eins zu autorisieren [„die Stärkung von Thailands Willen und Widerstandsfähigkeit“]. Damit wurde die Ausführung der Vorkehrungen von Phase zwei auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben, in der der psychologische Krieg in benachbarte Länder getragen werden sollte.

Und die Fälschung von Oswalds Akte durch Angletons CI/SIG, selbst wenn sie ursprünglich als ein berechtigtes Instrument bei der Suche nach einem angeblichen Maulwurf innerhalb der CIA autorisiert worden sein mag, ermöglichte am Ende die erfolgreiche Ermordung von John F. Kennedy und der darauf folgenden Vertuschung. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt war das weltweite Netzwerk nicht mehr nur eine Kraft, die zur Unterstützung des öffentlichen amerikanischen Staates handelte; es hatte Beziehungen hergestellt mit Kräften, die den öffentlichen Staat angreifen.

Dieses Muster der zunehmenden Abweichung können wir nutzen, um unsere Auffassung vom amerikanischen Tiefenstaat („deep state“) weiter zu entwickeln. Zunächst kann der Tiefenstaat mit dem Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in Verbindung gebracht werden, also der (zu der Zeit verborgenen) Schöpfung des Nationalen Sicherheitsrats, die die ursprüngliche Helliwell-CIA-Mafia-Verbindung ermöglichte. Mit der Aufnahme der OPC in die CIA 1953 verlor der amerikanische Tiefenstaat für viele Jahre die relativ kohärente und disziplinierte Konzentration von Autorität, die man in Tiefenstaaten wie der Türkei oder Italien oder Kolumbien, oder zu bestimmten Zeitpunkten in Chile und Argentinien, erkennen kann. In dieser Phase war der amerikanische Tiefenstaat durch die Drogenwirtschaft vereint, aber nicht durch viel mehr. Seine nebulöse Verbindung zur legitimen Macht schrumpfte auf Angletons „alternative CIA“ zurück, und selbst diese fand ein Ende, als Angleton im Dezember 1974 gefeuert wurde.

Aber laut Aussage von Josepf Trento wurde die Verbindung indirekt wieder hergestellt durch eine „Schatten-CIA“, die für den Safari Club und den saudischen Geheimdienst arbeitete; spätestens in den 1980er Jahren arbeitete diese Schatten-CIA „nicht mehr nur für die Israelis, sondern engagierte sich auch in geheimen Operationen von Mittelamerika bis Iran“. Es gilt als sicher, dass mit Caseys Segen – der seine eigenen direkten Kontakte zu Rappaport, der BCCI und dem globalen Drogennetzwerk hatte – Shackley, Khashoggi und ihre Kontakte am Ende zur Iran-Contra-Affäre geführt haben. Mindestens ein Mitglied von Shackleys Gruppe, Richard Secord, gründete dann eine Fluggesellschaft, die islamistische Mujahedin nach Afghanistan brachte. Ein anderer, Neocon Michael Ledeen, wirkte nicht nur bei Iran-Contra mit. Mit Donald Rumsfeld und Dick Cheney zusammen trug er zur Gründung des Project for the New American Century (PNAC) bei.

In der Tat kann William Caseys Entscheidung, mit dem weltweiten Netzwerk, und speziell mit der BCCI und Theodore Shackleys Kontakten der Iran-Contra-Affäre, zusammen zu arbeiten, nicht vollständig verstanden werden, wenn man sich allein auf die Entstehungsgeschichte des weltweiten Drogennetzwerks konzentriert. Caseys Handlungen müssen in dem Kontext gesehen werden, den Irving Kristol als „intellektuelle Gegenrevolution“ der 1970er Jahre bezeichnete, also die erfolgreiche Umstoßung von Kissingers und Carters Vorstößen für eine Détente mit der Sowjetunion und von den post-Watergate Reformen, die von Senator Frank Church und anderen eingebracht wurden. Wie ich an anderer Stelle beschrieben habe, war einer der Schlüsselmomente das so genannte Halloween-Massaker von 1975, in dem unter anderem Angletons Nemesis William Colby gefeuert, Rumsfeld zum Verteidigungsminister ernannt und Kissingers lange Amtszeit als Nationaler Sicherheitsberater beendet wurde.

1976 hatte dann die intellektuelle Gegenrevolution eine neue Anti-Kissinger Koalition konsolidiert, die aus a) Cheney und Rumsfeld innerhalb der Ford-Administration, b) dem Committee on the Present Danger als Lobby für einen erheblich erhöhten Verteidigungsetat und c) Neokonservativen wie Richard Perle und Paul Wolfowitz bestand. Perles und Wolfowitz‘ Ziel war es, gegen Kissingers SALT-Abkommen anzugehen und (mit Hilfe des neuen CIA-Direktors George H.W. Bush) die Einschätzung der CIA zur sowjetischen Bedrohung radikal zu übertreiben. Casey spielte eine bedeutende Rolle in dieser anti-sowjetischen Koalition und trat 1976 der CPD bei, zusammen mit langjährigen Mitgliedern des weltweiten Drogennetzwerks wie Ray Cline (Helliwells altem OSS-Kollege aus Kunming), Jay Lovestone und George Olmsted.

Die Anti-Regierungstendenz der neuen neokonservativen Rechten hat sich zu einer regelrechten Abneigung gegen die CIA ausgewachsen, die mittlerweile mehr als Feind, als als Verbündeter angesehen wird. Aber selbst die neuen ausgegliederten Gewaltkräfte in privaten Sicherheitsfirmen (PSCs), wie zum Beispiel Blackwater, rekrutieren aus den gewalttätigen Reihen des weltweiten Drogennetzwerks – genauer gesagt, in Blackwaters Fall, aus den paramilitärischen Truppen in Ländern wie Kolumbien.

Kurz gesagt wurde der Rückgriff auf die illegale Gewalt des weltweiten Drogenhandels, die in den panischen frühen Jahren des Kalten Kriegs begann, seitdem beständig fortgeführt. Sie ist immer weiter gewachsen und metastasiert, bis sie nun zu einer zunehmenden Bedrohung der konstitutionellen Demokratie geworden ist. Für die meisten Menschen ist dies nicht leicht zu verstehen. Auf kurze Sicht erzeugt diese illegale Gewalt eine brutale Gegenwehr, durch die ihre Existenz erst gerechtfertigt werden soll – so dass heute die PSCs in Irak und Afghanistan Millionen-Dollar-Verträge erhalten, um den Widerstand zu bekämpfen, den sie selbst provoziert haben.

Aber das neue System eines indirekten Weltreichs scheint kein stabiles zu sein: wenn es momentan ein Nachlassen der Kämpfe in Irak gibt, so ist dies nur der Fall, weil gegnerische Kader es als ergiebiger ansehen, in Afghanistan zu kämpfen. Ein indirektes Herrschaftsimperium ist vielmehr ein gewalttätiger Ersatz für Politik – um Situationen zu bewältigen, die jedoch nur die Politik verbessern kann.

Wenn dieses Land dem Problem des Terrorismus mit Ernsthaftigkeit begegnen wollte, würde es versuchen, die Gegengewalt hervorrufende Unterdrückung in Afghanistan, Irak, Tschetschenien, Kaschmir, Libanon und Palästina zu vermindern statt zu erhöhen. Der jetzige Kurs wird den schlechter werdenden Status quo eher noch verschlimmern. Dazu kommt, dass er das Schwinden amerikanischer Ressourcen, amerikanischen Einflusses und Wohlwollen, selbst unter unseren Verbündeten, beschleunigen wird.

Ist der Gedanke utopisch, dass der gegenwärtige Kurs korrigiert werden kann? Wahrscheinlich ja, so lange die meisten Amerikaner glauben, dass 9/11 ein Angriff war, der allein von einer Gruppe bösartiger Araber durchgeführt wurde. Aber wenn gezeigt werden würde (wie Sibel Edmonds angedeutet hat), dass der 11. September ein Tiefenereignis war, in dem Leute des weltweiten Drogennetzwerks der USA verwickelt waren, könnte dies eine vernünftigere Politik zur Folge haben.

Was ich als weltweites Drogennetzwerk der USA bezeichnet habe war in der Vergangenheit für weltweite terroristische Aktivitäten wie Operation Condor verantwortlich, und auch für die Stärkung von Drogennetzwerken als so genannte Parallelregierungen in Ländern wie Laos, Pakistan, Libanon, Türkei und Kolumbien. Über Jahrzehnte verschloss dieses Land die Augen vor der Beteiligung der USA an dieser Lage und projizierte stattdessen die Verantwortlichkeit für den Terrorismus auf die Sowjetunion („das Reich des Bösen“) und in letzter Zeit auf Irak und Iran („die Achse des Bösen“).

Es wird nicht einfach sein, diese Jahrzehnte des Leugnens zu überwinden. Aber es ist ein notwendiger Schritt, der getan werden muss, um den Terrorismus einzudämmen und zu einer gesünderen Welt zurückzukehren.

Drug economics in Burma’s new political order

The regime’s biggest threat for the past half-century, besides Aung San Suu Kyi, has been rebel armies from various ethnic groups. For decades the regime has worked to increase its presence in these rural areas by building paramilitary allies in hostile regions. The local militias suppress rebel activities in exchange for the freedom to produce and transport drugs with full military co-operation. As the military brokered more deals, its obsession with power quickly took precedence over its war on drugs. Now the regime is more powerful than ever, due to a survival strategy that is largely subsidised by Burma’s multi-billion-dollar drug trade. Perry Santanachote examines that trade, the people who benefit from it and cover it up, the victims and those caught in between.

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MYANMAR, LWE SAN SONE RANGE : A Myanmar soldier, holding his machine gun, displays to foreign journalists opium poppies 15 January 2000 during the destruction of an opium field near the notorious Golden Triangle. Fifty thousands villagers will be uprooted from their homes in this lucrative opium area to be relocated in an unprecedented mass migration project designed to crippled heroin production. (ELECTRONIC IMAGE) AFP PHOTO/Emmanuel DUNAND

Welcome to Shan State: land of the drug lords

Aung Min, like many in Rangoon, grew up poor. He enlisted in the Burmese army in 1999 at the age of 18 with ambitions that he would one day join the ranks of his commanding officers. By 2003 he was a second lieutenant stationed in Laukkaing Township in Shan State and led a group of 20 men – his pockets filled reliably with drug money.

Opium production has been an economical lynchpin in eastern Shan State since the late 1940s when military leaders refused to honour the Panglong Agreement that granted autonomy to ethnic states. Rebel armies grew as their drug trade took over the region, and then the world. Shan warlord Khun Sa dominated Southeast Asia’s infamous Golden Triangle with his heroin enterprise through the 1980s and 1990s. By 1995, the Golden Triangle, the mountainous region where Burma, Laos and Thailand meet, became the world’s leader in opium production. His 30-year revolutionary war ended in 1996 but heroin continues to flow out of the state, albeit at a lower rate, with a new breed of drug lords.

Despite acknowledgement by the US State Department that poppy cultivation in Burma today is less than 20 per cent of what it was in the mid-1990s, it’s still an annual multi-billion-dollar business. Burma remains the world’s second-largest opium producer after Afghanistan, and processed 330 metric tonnes, or 17 per cent, of last year’s world supply, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2010 World Drug Report. Poppy cultivation has also been on a steady incline for the past three years.

Other pages in the report show that Burma is also Asia’s largest producer of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), which include methamphetamine, distributed in the form of the cheap and chemically dirty pills, most commonly known in Thailand and the region as ya baa (crazy drug); and the more expensive and cleaner crystalline form known as Ice. Burmese production of methamphetamine coincided with reduced opium production, but producers did not necessarily switch over.

“There has been more production last year when it comes to stimulants because of the increased involvement by the junta-backed militia groups,” Khun Seng, an editor at the independent media and research group Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), said. “When the militia groups support the political aspirations of the junta they are also supported by the junta in their drug activities.”

“And if you’re the drug boss,” he added. “You’ll do anything that’ll bring in money. If I’m producing more meth it is because of the market – the buyers. Right now, for two years in a row, opium production has been down so there is less production of heroin than in other years, that’s all. They are not intentionally switching from heroin production to meth production.”

Pornthep Eamprapai, director of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board in Chiang Mai, said heroin and opium production was down because of climatic conditions and drought, not because of eradication. “Meth” quickly filled that gap in recent years, he said, because consumer demand in Thailand is high due to economic and social instability. Thais are becoming addicted to ya baa at an alarming rate, while they were never too keen on heroin.

“Making meth is so much easier too,” Pornthep said. “Cooking up meth or Ice doesn’t require any crop.”

Another big difference between today’s drug trade and that of the Khun Sa era, is that it is now increasingly controlled by the government. Former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt engineered a series of ceasefires with major drug-producing militias in 2003-2004 and incorporated them into the economy and constitutional process, creating an environment conducive to drug production and collusion between military personnel and drug traffickers. The regime has been suspected of involvement in the drug trade in the past but never at the level seen today.

In the past decade, the military regime has prioritised keeping it under wraps and making it appear as though it has waged a war on drugs. In 1999 the military inducted a 15-year drug-eradication programme, made lofty promises to the international community to crack down on trafficking, publicised some token drug busts and even opened an anti-drug museum. But these acts were all sleight of hand – an illusion to placate the international community. Although, they may have worked.

The UNODC commended the junta for its “considerable decrease in the area under cultivation and a strong decline in potential opium production” in its Opium Poppy Cultivation Report last year and budgeted US$7.7 million for the eradication programme between 2004 to 2007.

“It’s just another attempt to get the international community to pay for ordinary development programmes instead of using the state budget for that purpose,” said Chiang Mai-based author Bertil Lintner, who chronicled the history of Burma’s heroin warlords in his book, Burma In Revolt, and more recently the multi-billion-dollar methamphetamine trade in Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle.

“And most of the UNODC’s programmes are just that – ordinary development programmes that have little or nothing to do with drug eradication,” Lintner said.

Pornthep says the Thai government gives Burma 20 million baht (US$625,000) annually every year for opium eradication.

“Their [Burma’s] government isn’t doing enough because they don’t have the resources,” he said. “Therefore they need co-operation and aid from other countries.”

Eleven years later, drug lords continue to operate with impunity and the Burmese Army remains closely involved in the lucrative opium economy, using it as leverage against ceasefire armies. As its deadline approaches, Burma is nowhere near being a drug-free nation. Only 13 townships of the targeted 51 can claim to be poppy-free, while the others are still growing, according to the 2009 Shan Drug Watch Report.

Military culture: a paradigm shift

In 2003 Aung Min was riding high on drug “taxes” collected from traffickers that crossed into his command area, but one day he arrested and executed 15 traffickers, seized their heroin and sold it on the Chinese black market for 200 million Kyats (US $200,000), 20 times more than he would make in a year of tax collecting.

drug-burma2
MYANMAR, LOWI SOI : A poppy sticks out among others in this poppy-field outside the village of Lowi Soi, in Myanmar’s Northern Shan state, close to the Chinese border, 26 February. This is in one of the few opium growing settlements in the region which the government says has escaped its anti-drug campaign. Myanmar authorities took some delegates from the Interpol Fourth International Heroin Conference and journalists to see the results of its anti-opium campaign which won an endorsement from the world police body. (ELECTRONIC IMAGE) AFP PHOTO/Emmanuel DUNAND …

Military intelligence investigated Aung Min shortly after the incident when his foot soldiers were seen suddenly adorned in gold jewellery and he had made a considerable transaction to his mother in the middle of Burma’s banking crisis that had left several banks bankrupt and the Kyat inflated beyond repair. That red flag landed him 15 years in prison. However, the crime he committed was not really the problem; it was the spectacle that got him in trouble.

“Military officers’ involvement in drug trafficking is very common, particularly in Shan State. Even the killing,” said an ex-army captain and friend of Aung Min. “It’s rare that they are arrested. Aung Min was inexperienced so he didn’t know how to be low-profile.”

The former officer divulged Aung Min’s story on condition of anonymity. He left the army last year after 10 years of service and now lives across the border in northern Thailand. He went through three years of officer intake with Aung Min and said they were close friends. The last time they saw each other was on October 7, 2002.

“He was very honest – a simple man,” he said. “I was surprised when I found out. I think it was due to the environment because he was assigned to this area and this kind of bribing, taking money, dealing drugs – this might have changed him.”

Many Burmese soldiers survive on revenues collected from extortion fees because their salaries are meagre and the government has cut off their rations. Today, a private earns about 16,000 Kyats a month, a sergeant earns 35,000 to 40,000 Kyats, while a major general earns 800,000 Kyats.

“The army capacity is also declining: the fighting capacity, military capacity, administration capacity, organising capacity. It’s all due to mismanagement,” he said. “While at the top level they’re getting more benefits and becoming wealthier.”
The ex-army captain explained that battalions had been cut down, but they still had the same amount of work. Faced with the challenge, they had to get creative and make deals with traffickers instead of trying to fight them.

“We can’t fight Karen rebels with 120 soldiers. It’s like 120 people with the duties of 500,” he said.

In 2005, headquarters ordered him to set fire to 180 homes in a Karen village in Kanasoepin Village, Thandaung Township.

“My superiors asked the villagers to forcibly relocate to a designated area. They wanted to control them and destroy the village so they couldn’t communicate with rebels,” he said. “I had to get an agreement with the village head to set up three houses only, document and report to regional command. This way it’d be win-win.”

In this incidence, “win-win” was not bribery, it was security. He only had 18 soldiers with him that day, in an area he referred to as “the black area” where Karen rebels are active.

“If we burned down the village, the Karen rebels would have attacked us,” he said. At that point, he realised he wanted out of the army. “I didn’t want to live with that stress anymore – to deal with that anymore.”

He said there were no official orders to bribe opium farmers or traffickers, but that it had become a major component of military culture. Everyone takes bribes and the money goes all the way up the chain until it eventually reaches Senior General Than Shwe. Officers stress that discretion is key because of the military’s appearance of reform. If a soldier’s actions threaten to expose their role in the drug trade, he will suffer the same fate as Aung Min.

Aung Min’s story illustrates the military’s deep involvement in the drug trade – a complete contradiction to the image it has projected to the world.

Appearances deceptive

A favoured tactic of the regime in its delusive fight against drugs is the highly publicised heroin eradication programme, which the ex-officer explained is set up.

There would be orders from the regional command centre to cut off poppy at a plantation, he said. The authorities would call the farmers and village leader before heading out and telling them to prepare the crop. Upon arrival the farmers would show the soldiers the unusable poppy plants, made so by the plants’ inability to produce the seeds required to make heroin. The soldiers would slash these and leave the good ones intact. Then they would document the eradication with photographs and bonfires. Afterwards, the soldiers collect 10 million Kyats from the village head. This process is repeated every three months.

The Palaung Women’s Organisation (PWO), an NGO based in Mae Sot, Thailand, found in its 2009 report, Poisoned Hills, that only 11 per cent of poppy fields had been destroyed the previous season, mostly in areas visible to the UN’s satellite monitors. The police reports they obtained claimed that 25 per cent of fields were destroyed.

More “taxes” are collected in the trafficking process too. The ex-army captain explained that regional commanders communicate with ceasefire group leaders and issue passes to place on the narcotics cargo trucks so that they are exempt from searches at checkpoints. There are 13 regional commanders throughout the state. About three of them: the Eastern, the Northeastern and Triangle commanders are active in the drug trade. Prime Minister Thein Sein is a prime example of the power these regional commanders hold, as he was the Triangle Regional Commander in 2001 and dealt with Shan warlords on a regular basis before his promotion in 2007.

‘Politically correct’ drug trade

“In my 10 years in the army there’s been an increase in drugs, trafficking, bribes and this kind of involvement,” said the ex-army captain.
The escalation in drug activities is partly caused by the growing number of militia and ceasefire groups.

“Before the army got an agreement with the ceasefire groups they fought against the rebels and weren’t involved in drug trafficking because they were not friends, they were enemies,” said the former captain. “After the ceasefire they had to get money from them for sustainability.”

Today there is an estimated 17 ceasefire agreements with the country’s ethnic rebel groups. The number of active militia groups is unknown, but the SHAN received junta documents that revealed 396 in the Northeastern command alone. In the run up to this year’s election, the military has increased pressure on ceasefire groups to join its Border Guard Force. Those that concede and support the junta’s political ambitions are awarded with military support in their drug activities. SHAN editor Khun Seng said that the junta party needs canvassers that have influence in their respective communities.

“Those who are most influential are involved in the drug trade, especially the militia leaders,” he said. “These people will take advantage of the situation.”

Khun Seng said that as an extra incentive, each militia group was now assigned an operational area where they could do whatever they want without disruption.

“If you are ‘politically correct’, you can do anything in Burma,” he said.

As an example he described this year’s Armed Forces Day in Burma.

“The commander [Colonel Khin Maung Soe] in Tachilek spoke on the sidelines to the militia leaders, ‘This is your golden opportunity. My only advice is that you send your products across the border, but not on this [Burma’s] side’,” Khun Seng said.

PWO’s investigation corroborated SHAN’s accounts that more drugs were indeed coming out of militia-run areas. It reported that opium cultivation increased over 200 per cent in Mantong and Namkham townships in Shan State, both areas controlled by the government. During the 2008-2009 season, the acreage found by PWO for only these two townships, out of the total 23 townships in Northern Shan State, was nearly three times (4,545 hectares) the total recorded by UNODC for all 23 townships combined. The UNODC reported a 100 per cent increase in that same time period in all of Northern Shan State, from 800 hectares to 1,600 hectares.

Both SHAN and PWO have criticised the UNODC’s methodology, which relies on data reported by the junta’s (State Peace and Development Council, SPDC) eradication reports and satellite imagery without proper verification.

The ONCB in Thailand also acquires its Burma drug data from the SPDC.

“For the most part we exchange data with them with good communication and understanding,” Pornthep said. “There has been no lying on their part and their data can be backed up. For instance, the figures for poppy cultivation are the same as the UNODC, the US and China.

“We never meet with the NGOs in Burma,” he added. “We only communicate with the government and narcotic police.”

Seizures mean little

Khun Seng also disputed a statement in the UNODC World Drug Report that attributed the increase in methamphetimine production to ethnic insurgencies in Shan State readying to fight the SPDC by selling more drugs to purchase arms.

“The Kokang and Wa are producing at the normal rate, no more, no less. The increase is due to the involvement of the militia groups, he said. “Now with the Wa and Kokang, these people can produce but they can’t transport without the co-operation of the militia groups. If they do it by themselves they are caught.”

drug-burma3
MYANMAR, LWE SAN SONE RANGE : A Myanmar soldier walks in between two poppy flowers while destroying opium poppies 15 January 2000 during a narcotics crop destruction in Lwe San Sone Range. Myanmar soldiers and tribes people destroyed acres of poppy plantations in Shan State, one of the world’s largest opium growing area, as part of a broader campaign by Myanmar authorities to eradicate the narcotics trade in their country. (ELECTRONIC IMAGE) AFP PHOTO/Emmanuel DUNAND

Which explains the number of seized drugs in Burma. UNODC Regional Representative Gary Lewis stated at the release of the 2010 World Drug Report in Bangkok, that 23 million methamphetamine pills were seized in Burma last year, from one million in 2008. Lewis said the numbers likely reflect a surge in production, rather than crime prevention.

Khun Seng agreed that more seizures meant more production, but said that was only part of the picture. The military was particular about where the seizures came from. That is, when the seizures were not fabricated. Militia-produced drugs almost always made it across the border, he said.

The Kokang, a ceasefire group well known for drug production and trafficking along the Sino-Burmese border, were recently attacked by the SPDC for their refusal to join the Border Guard Force and all their drugs were seized. The regime long turned a blind eye to the Kokang’s drug operations and even publicised the area as a “drug-free zone” after its eradication campaign, but in August last year, this all changed and the regime announced a massive seizure of drugs in the Kokang area, while driving more than 37,000 refugees into China.

Several large shipments of methamphetamine, believed to have originated from the United Wa State Army (UWSA), were also recently seized in Tachilek near the Thailand border.

“Seizures are irrelevant and are made only when the authorities want to put pressure on, for instance, the UWSA, for political and security reasons,” Lintner said.

The UWSA, armed with 30,000 soldiers, is the largest ceasefire group to reject the junta’s proposal to become part of the Border Guard Force and the military has turned up the heat as the election approaches. Much of the seized drugs last year are believed to have come from the Kokang and Wa – seizures that would never have happened in the past.

“Proceeds from the drug trade were always a major source of income for several rebel armies in Burma, before and after the ceasefires,” Lintner said. “But the Burmese government and the UNODC chose to turn a blind eye to the traffic as long as the ceasefire groups were on good terms with the government. Now, when some of the ceasefire armies are resisting the government’s demands that they transform their respective armies into Border Guard Forces, they are suddenly being accused of trading in drugs, which they have always done.”

Even with the drastic surge in methamphetamine seizures, the World Drug Report noted that seizures continued to remain very low in Burma. Despite being the second-largest producer of heroin in the world, only one per cent of worldwide heroin interception was seized in Burma in 2008. Similarly, of the 32 million tablets seized in East and Southeast Asia in 2008, only about three per cent, or 1.1 million, were seized in Burma.

The report also states that the number of tablets and the amount precursor chemicals seized in Burma jumped last year, when the SPDC entered by force parts of north and eastern Shan State not under their control.

The new political order

The new drug economy that the SPDC has built in Burma will only worsen as the regime’s crusade for power and control intensifies in the run-up to the election. Lintner anticipates the drug trade will eclipse what was seen in the 1990s.

“In 1990, only opium was produced, and the derivative heroin,” he said. “The production increased dramatically in the 1990s, and now is back to what it was 20 years ago. Plus methamphetamines, which were unknown in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle 20 years ago.”

In 1997, then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright knew all too well where Burma’s drug trade would lead when she aptly stated, “Drug traffickers who once spent their days leading mule trains down jungle tracks are now leading lights in Burma’s new market economy and leading figures in its new political order.”

source: http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/4218-drug-economics-in-burmas-new-political-order.html

For more than 20 years, local heroin addicts have relied on a collection of needle exchanges for clean works. But in recent months, crack users too have quietly found an outlet in the city.

In a nondescript alley in the University District, users can pick up clean crack pipes, pipe filters and ascorbic acid for injecting crack. Heroin users can also pick up a drug that reverses a heroin overdose — an apparent first for a city needle exchange.

„We take a different philosophy approach than most government institutions or public health departments. They have a budget, and have to pick and choose who they’re going to help,“ said Shilo Murphy, executive director of the non-profit People’s Harm Reduction Alliance, which runs the U-District needle exchange.

„We say this is our community, this is our neighborhood, and we should decide what we have at the table.“

The exchange, which celebrated 20 years in the neighborhood this week, has come a long way from its roots — when a man named Bob walked the Ave. and dispensed sterile needles from his backpack.
These days, the largely volunteer-driven exchange, which serves 400 to 600 people a month, is better known for branching ahead of its peers in the harm reduction world.

Public health officials know of no other local program that gives out crack kits or Naloxone, the heroin-overdose reversal drug. But they see the potential benefits.

Just as sterile syringes reduce the spread of HIV and other diseases, new and unbroken glass pipes are believed to prevent lip cuts and the spread of hepatitis strains. Rubber tips and new filters ward off mouth burns. Ascorbic acid helps prevent users from using lemon juice to dissolve cocaine rocks into an injectable liquid — a common practice that can lead to fungal infections.

„Our program is primarily an HIV prevention program,“ said Michael Hanrahan, manager of education and prevention services of the HIV/STD program with Public Health — Seattle & King County. The agency, which runs four exchange programs, has watched the demand for clean needles surge from 1.8 million in 2006 to nearly 3.4 million last year.
Hanrahan said research has documented HIV transmission from dirty needles, but he wasn’t aware of rigorous studies showing disease spread via crack sores.

„But it’s certainly theoretically plausible,“ he said.
Last year, the Legislature passed a law allowing lay people to legally administer Naloxone, which counters the effects of an opioid overdose. Hanrahan said Public Health is interested in giving the drug to users, but because it is a prescription drug, the agency first needs to work on protocols with the state Board of Pharmacy.

At the People’s Harm Reduction Alliance – partially comprised of former users who run a table at Northeast 43rd Street and University Avenue Northeast – there is less need to follow protocols and studies.
The program began giving out crack kits a few months ago, after staffers felt the need to support crack users, who still make up a major local drug trend, according to a recent University of Washington study.
And the exchange began giving out Naloxone soon after the new law took effect in June.

Murphy estimated his program gives out two million needles a year and 10 pipes a day. This month, it handed out 25 vials of Naloxone.
„We don’t have clients, we just have community members. I make it clear to everyone that everyone is family here,“ Murphy said.
„We believe all drug users should have the right to not get diseases and have the ability to prevent diseases.“

Friday, August 6, 2010
By VANESSA HO
SEATTLEPI.COM STAFF

source: http://www.seattlepi.com/local/42462…ml?source=mypi

Abstract
Following the establishment of the so-called “New British System” (based on the
recommendations of the Rolleston Committee in 1926), numbers of recorded opiate and
cocaine addicts fell significantly in the early 1930s and remained stable and at a relatively
low level for the next two decades. It was in the latter part of the 1950s that reports of a
new drug “epidemic” began to circulate. Concerns centred on the use of drugs by ethnic
minorities, notably black West Indians and Africans in ‘blues clubs’ and visiting black
American musicians in jazz clubs.

Once again the drugs epidemic was associated with jazz
(“jungle”) music and colour. By the end of the 1960s, young white teenagers had become
involved too and the world had seen the student riots in Paris; the birth of Swinging London
with its attendant Merseybeat; the hippy revolution in San Francisco; and a growing youth
protest, both in the USA and Britain, over western military involvement in Vietnam.
Politicians and journalists invariably associated these events with the use of drugs by young
people. Over the last four decades of the 20th Century, the use of drugs by young people
(and the attendant treatment industry) has grown exponentially and the focus has moved
from individual treatment to public health and infection control to the current
preoccupation with drugs/crime connection.

This brief history attempts to summarise
these developments in a short article chronicling the major milestones and events.

Absolute Beginners
Despite the unimaginable cost – both economic and in terms of human life – of World War
Two, post-war Britain of the 1950s was an extraordinary period of self-confidence and
optimism. Even the instinctively austere new Labour administration of Clement Atlee was
prepared to spend huge sums on the mounting of a Festival of Britain with its vision of a
future Britain of stainless steel and formica.
To some extent, the 1950s resembled the 1920s. Both decades began with a flurry of
interest amongst the young, in new music and new fashions; in dress and language. In both
decades, jazz was an important precursor to the development of new musical forms.
Perhaps the essential difference between the two decades was that the depression years of
the 1930s had proved to be a great leveller. Whereas the 1920s of the flappers was almost
entirely the preserve of the rich, the new leisure/fashion/music phenomenon of the 1950s
had an impact upon all classes.

The radio (and in the 1960s, the television) brought music
into thousands of working-class homes. No longer was new music and dance the exclusive
preserve of an Edwardian elite. Furthermore, the abolition of restrictions on hire purchase
in 1958 added further impetus to the burgeoning youth industry. By the early 1960s, it was
quite common for clothes, musical instruments (particularly guitars and drum kits) and
household electrical items (particularly record-players for teenagers’ bedrooms) to be
purchased “on tick” (Yates, 1998).
Throughout the decade, the official addiction figures climbed steadily upwards with most of
the increases being of young heroin users. The increase in young heroin users – and the
increasing reporting of it – should be set against a growing unease in Britain about the
‘teenage problem’. James Dean had become a youth cult hero overnight with the film Rebel
Without a Cause. The Wild Ones, starring Marlon Brando, another youth cult hero, was
banned in British cinemas (Thomson, 1994).

The Blackboard Jungle, an otherwise
unmemorable film featured the song Rock Around the Clock. The singer, Bill Haley, an
aging, overweight bandleader, was an unlikely hero, but the song caught the imagination of
the Teddy boys; an emerging youth movement. The filmmakers hastily produced a second
film entitled Rock Around the Clock as a vehicle for Bill Haley and his Comets (Clayson,
1995). When the film was premiered at the Troccadero in London’s Elephant and Castle,
the Teddy boys went wild and destroyed much of the interior of the cinema. Rock ‘n’ Roll
was born in Britain (Yates 1999).
From the beginning of the 1950s there were some limited indications that the existing
pattern of middle-class morphine addicts ministered to by largely sympathetic medical
practitioners was beginning to change. In May 1951 a young drug user broke into a hospital
dispensary just outside London and stole large quantities of morphine, cocaine and heroin.
Much of the morphine was recovered; which perhaps indicates that already the opiate of
choice – at least amongst the young – had become heroin. It would certainly suggest that the
young man and his acquaintances had little social contact with the established addict group.
By the end of the decade, over sixty heroin users in the London area who traced their drug
using career back to this one episode had been identified (Spear, 1994).
Many were jazz musicians or regular visitors to jazz clubs where heroin, cocaine and
cannabis were regularly used. These newer, younger addicts were increasingly gravitating
to the West End of London where a small number of general practitioners were becoming
known as ‘junky doctors’ as a result of their willingness to prescribe.
Of this small group of London doctors – some genuine in their belief that they could help;
some weak (and occasionally corrupt); some simply gullible – Lady I. M. Frankau is
perhaps most notorious; though not necessarily best remembered. Lady Frankau, a
Wimpole Street psychiatrist claimed to have treated approximately 500 addicts between
1958 and 1964: an astonishing number given that Home Office notifications in 1964, for the
UK as a whole, were 753. The figures for the period were 1959, 454; 1960,437; 1961, 470;
1962, 532; 1963, 635; 1964, 753. In comparison to the stability of the figures for the
previous quarter of a century, this five-year increase represents a quite unprecedented
upward spiral (Glatt, Pittman, Gillespie & Hills, 1967).
Public opinion, steered by the media and quoted by them with great authority, was ripe for
reaction to the flood of drugs epidemic stories which began to appear with increasing
frequency in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the 1920s it had been the dilettante rich and
the louche, now it was wayward youth. Youth was out of control.

They wore different
clothes; they listened to “jungle music” and they scorned the attitudes and ideals of their
elders. The “generation gap” had been identified and, probably, no-one expressed it better
than Colin MacInnes:
“No-one could sit on our faces no more because we’d loot to spend
and our world was to be our world, the one we wanted”

(MacInnes, 1980).
Despite this growing public unease, the report of the first Government committee to
consider drugs and addiction in thirty years was a model of complacency – superficial in its
consideration of the evidence and almost totally without vision. The emergence of new
drugs such as methadone (physeptone) and the discovery that some tranquillisers (at that
time thought to be non-addictive) could be used in the management of withdrawal prompted
the government in 1958, to establish the Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction
“to review……the advice given by the Rolleston Committee in 1926 including the possible
application of any new suggestions to other addictive or habit-forming drugs; and to advise
on any possible need for additional special treatment facilities or administrative measures”
(HM Government, 1961).
Their report (usually called the First Brain Report after its chairman Lord Brain) was
published in 1961. It found that there was little need to make any radical change. There
was, they said, no significant increase in numbers (there is some suggestion that the Home
Office failed to provide the Committee with adequate evidence) and the small post-war
increase was mainly the result of increased vigilance (Spear, 1994).
Members of the Committee who attended the annual symposium of the Society for the
Study of Addiction later that year were embarrassed to hear a London pharmacist point out
that he himself was dispensing heroin and cocaine to more patients than those identified in
the Committee’s report (Glatt et al, 1967).
Over the next few years, newspaper reports of the heroin ‘scene’ in London’s West End and
of the ‘purple hearts’ (drinamyl) craze in Soho dance clubs increased the pressure and in
1964 the government reconvened the Committee. At Lord Brain’s insistence, the terms of
reference were narrowed to: “review the advice they gave in 1961 in relation to the
prescribing of addictive drugs by doctors” (HM Government, 1964).

This seems to have
been mainly because annual reports by the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate appeared to
have already identified the problem: the over-prescribing of heroin and cocaine by a small
group of doctors in London (Spear, 1994). But the net effect of this narrowing of the focus
meant that the Second Brain Report virtually ignored the emerging patterns of drug use
outside London and the widepread use of amphetamines.
The Second Brain Report was published in 1965. It was a further two-and-a-half years
before the recommendations of the report were implemented within the provisions of the
Dangerous Drugs Act 1967. Most of the major recommendations of the Second Brain
Committee were implemented. In the future, although the basic tenets of the Rolleston
model were to be retained, prescribing of heroin and cocaine would require a special license
to be issued by the Home Office. Licenses would normally only be granted to psychiatrists
working in specialist treatment units (based upon a model pioneered at All Saints Hospital,
Birmingham) which were to be established across England at Regional Health Authority
level.

These were to be called Drug Dependency Units (DDUs) although almost every drug
user subsequently referred to them simply as ‘the Clinics’. No parallel provision was
envisaged for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland where there was not thought to be a
problem (Yates, 1981).
The establishment of the DDUs was paralleled with the growth of a significant and often
influential range of drug services in the voluntary sector. By the mid 1970s the vast
majority of beds available for rehabilitation (though not for detoxification) were managed
within the voluntary sector (Rawlings & Yates, 2001). Non-residential services were also
provided by the voluntary sector although most of these were London-based (Yates, 1992;
Turner, 1994).

Many commentators, particularly American commentators (Schurr, 1963; Schur, 1964; and
Trebach, 1982) have pinpointed this moment as the time when Britain abandoned the ‘New
British System’ and opted instead for a US-style penal policy. This is however, a
misreading of the facts. Although it is true that the Dangerous Drugs Act 1967, in line with
the recommendations of the Brain Committee, extended the powers of the police, this was
not at the expense of the old Rolleston model of substitute prescribing which was left intact
though it was restricted (in theory, though perhaps not in practice).
Firstly, Britain did not abandon the Rolleston principles though it did restrict the prescribers
who were eligible to carry them out. The fact that this was not resisted by doctors is further
indication that most doctors were unwilling anyway to treat this kind of patient. In other
words, the restriction in numbers of prescribers may have been in theory only. Kenneth
Leech, then curate at St. Annes in Soho was of the opinion that there were only around 12
doctors in London prepared to treat addict patients – the new arrangements saw the
establishment of fifteen specialist treatment units (Spear, 1994).
Secondly, by the time these changes were introduced in 1968, the numbers of users –
particularly those under thirty – had already begun to spiral out of control and a
blackmarket was already established; in London at least. In other words, the new
arrangements in 1968 did not cause the changes in the drug-subculture; rather, they were an
early response to those changes.
Thirdly, the analysis fails entirely to take account of the establishment of a National Health
Service with treatment (and medication) free at the point of delivery. It seems hardly
surprising that the majority of addicts in the 1930s and 40s were middle-class professionals
when we take into account that at that time, they would have had to pay for their supplies.
Finally, the analysis also fails to take into account the enormous cultural upheavals –
particularly amongst the younger generation – that were taking place in Western society at
that time. These were often changes with which drug use became associated (although the
use of drugs was not necessarily fundamental to them) (Yates, 1994).
There seems little doubt that a blackmarket in drugs would, sooner or later, have become
established in the UK but there is some truth in identifying this time as its genesis. In
London, the uncertainty, both of doctors and of their addict patients, during the interval
between the publication of the Brain Report and the enactment of the recommendations may
have been the reason for a significant increase in the use of blackmarket Chinese heroin;
often by drug users who had been struck off their doctor’s list as soon as the report was
published (Yates 1992).
Outside London, where the impact of the DDUs was less significant, users turned to the use
of barbiturates and mandrax, opioids such as palfium and diconal and pharmaceutical heroin
or morphine diverted from pharmacy burglaries (Yates, 1981).
Throughout the 1970s, the numbers continued to grow. The punk revolution in the mid-70s
caused an outbreak of concern about the sniffing of volatile solvents. It seems clear that the
punks deliberately chose glue-sniffing (often combined with lager and cider) since this was
perhaps the most visibly distasteful substance they could use. When the dramatic expansion
of the heroin blackmarket began in 1979, the punks were among the earliest recruits
(Savage, 1992).
Smack City, UK
The arrival of heroin in 1979 in cities throughout the UK took most observers by surprise.
Most of the new heroin flooding into the UK was Middle-Eastern smoking heroin which
was unsuitable for injection without being first changed into a heroin salt by the application
of lemon juice, acetic acid etc. (Griffiths, Gossop & Strang, 1994).

This fact, coupled with
the existence of a large population of Iranian students apparently able and willing, both to
sell heroin and to induct novitiates into the art of heroin smoking, resulted in a huge
increase in heroin users. Many potential users who had been deterred by the thought of
injection were attracted to this apparently painless method. For some time, there was an
unshakeable belief in some drug-using circles that heroin was ‘non-addictive’ if smoked
(Yates, 1999).
To some extent, heroin smoking became most prevalent in areas where there was a tradition
of non-injecting drug use. Where injecting was part of the culture, the new heroin was
mainly injected and lemon juice or citric acid became simply another item on the drug
injector’s shopping list. But the expansion, like the existing drug subculture was patchy and
unpredictable.

Most of the new heroin went to those areas where there was an existing drug
using culture of some kind. It was some time before it broke into completely ‘clean’ areas.
Even in those cities and towns where there was a well established drug-using tradition,
prevalence could change dramatically from district to district (Power, 1994).
In 1982, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) published their report:
Treatment and Rehabilitation (ACMD, 1982). The ACMD was a body set up within the
provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971; an Act which was introduced to rationalise and
consolidate an untidy bundle of UK laws on dangerous drugs. The ACMD was charged
with the responsibility of advising the government on “measures….which….ought to be
taken for preventing the misuse of drugs or dealing with social problems connected with
their misuse” (Shiels, 1991).
Previous ACMD reports, throughout the 1970s, had received little attention from the
government. But by 1982, the issue of heroin addiction in inner-city housing schemes had
become a serious political issue. Ironically, the main impetus for this had not been the press
or right-wing backbench MPs but the deputy leader of the Labour Group on the Liverpool
City Council. Contemporary reports would seem to indicate that it was Derek Hatton who
deliberately orchestrated media coverage of Liverpool as ‘smack city’ in order to highlight
the plight of the inner-cities and the failure of the Thatcher Government to address the
needs of the young, unemployed, urban poor (Parry, 1991).
Almost overnight, the media spotlight was turned onto the growing heroin problem in the
UK’s inner-city areas. By the time the ACMD was due to publish its report in the late
summer of 1982, ‘heroin in Britain’ had become almost constant headline news. The
publication of the report was held back until December when it was announced in the House
of Commons by the Secretary of State for Health that not only had the Government
accepted all the reports major recommendations, but that it was providing a substantial sum
of central money to ‘pump-prime’ an expanded network of treatment services. The initial
sum announced was £2 million but over the course of the next two years, the fund was
increased for a variety of reasons and ultimately reached a total of just under £18 million
(Yates, 1983; MacGregor, 1989).
In Scotland, similar central funding was made available under the usual 10% formula and a
smaller fund was established in Wales. No provision was made for Northern Ireland which
was adjudged not to have a drugs problem at that time. Outside England (and even within
England in many areas), this effectively meant the establishment of a completely new
network of treatment services since virtually no dedicated services had existed prior to that.
The net result of this activity was a dramatic expansion of treatment services.

Most of the
new money went into community-based services with almost 60% going to new community
services (voluntary and statutory) and a further 10% going to existing voluntary agencies;
most of which were also community-based. The extent to which the DDUs had been
marginalised by the rapid expansion of the blackmarket can been seen by the fact that they
secured less than 15% of the allocation (MacGregor, 1994).
However, the role of the DDUs and in particular, the consultant psychiatrist (the prescriber),
remained crucial. The report had recommended that each Regional Health Authority Area
(the report failed to recognise the distinctive nature of the Scottish NHS structure – perhaps
not surprising since the Committee had no Scottish representation) should establish a
Regional Drug Problem Team (RDPT) with District Drug Advisory Committees at the local
level. The ACMD made no specific recommendation for service provision at the local level
but this soon began to emerge with the development of a blueprint in North West England
for multi-disciplinary Community Drug Teams as local specialist providers (Strang,
Donmall & Webster, 1991).
The proposed new RDPTs were, in effect, revamped DDUs and in many areas, little else
changed for a number of years. But the central funding initiative did usher in a new period
where specialist drug treatment provision was overwhelmingly community-based and
largely non-medical.
The Public Health Imperative
From the middle of the 1980s however, the emergence of HIV/AIDS began to bring about a
fundamental change in direction. The concern that those who continued to inject drugs (and
therefore, by implication, continued to share injecting equipment) might be instrumental in
spreading the infection led to a change in agency priorities (Berridge, 1994).
In 1988 the ACMD published its report AIDS & Drug Misuse Part 1 (ACMD, 1988). Once
again, the ACMD had produced a highly significant and influential document. The reports
conclusion that: “HIV is a greater threat to public and individual health than drug misuse”
has since become firmly established in the lexicon of drug field mantras. Few practitioners
and planners refer to the remainder of that recommendation.
AIDS & Drug Misuse Part 1 was not, as some have claimed, a u-turn in British drug policy
legitimising ‘low threshold’ maintenance prescribing. It was in many respects, a restating
of the central tenets of Rolleston for a modern era. The recommendation goes on to say:
“…..The first goal of work with drug misusers must therefore be to prevent them
from acquiring or transmitting the virus. In some cases this will be achieved
through abstinence. In others, abstinence will not be achievable for the time
being and efforts will have to focus on risk-reduction. Abstinence remains the
ultimate goal but efforts to bring it about in individual cases must not jeopardise
any reduction in HIV risk behaviour which has already been achieved” (HM
Government, 1982), (my italics).
The implication here is clear. There was no sanction for prescribing forever. (There was no
such sanction in Rolleston either). The goal is abstinence. Achieving this goal can
legitimately be delayed in two circumstances: where circumstances dictate that it cannot be
immediately achieved and where to attempt an abstinence intervention may undermine risk
reduction initiatives already underway These are significant caveats which have often since
been lost or distorted in the retelling.
Prior to the emergence of HIV/AIDS, most treatment agencies had seen their customer base
consisting primarily of those who had decided to modify, or abandon altogether, their use of
drugs; with a smaller number who had not yet reached that decision being offered soupkitchen,
day shelter and detached work provision. Now the priority was to be making and
maintaining contact with those drug users (often deeply suspicious of specialist drug
services) who were at greatest risk of continuing to share needles. In other words, those
who had no intention of stopping.
In order to encourage these drug users into services, community-based agencies were
provided with a prescribing capability. Methadone became more readily available with
many agencies also offering an injection equipment exchange service. In fact, in South
Wales, one GP group practice had been quietly offering this facility since the early 1970s in
response to a local hepatitis outbreak whilst some voluntary sector services had originally
offered this facility in the late 1960s (Turner, 1994).
The move towards the prescribing of methadone as a central plank in drug treatment
services has brought general practitioners back into the field although to some extent they
have continued to show the same reluctance to be involved as was the case in the early
1960s.
Much of the service development and planning throughout the 1980s was led by the
National Health Service with local authorities merely providing background support in most
areas. This came about mainly as a result of the channeling of the additional central
government funding through the NHS. Both the new network (CFI) money and funding to
develop HIV/AIDS services later in the decade was allocated through the health service.
However, in recent years, a number of trends have conspired to increase the relative
importance of the local authority contribution. Firstly, with the implementation of
Community Care, local government has been allocated a central gate-keeping role in the
allocation of resources; mainly, though not exclusively, access to residential rehabilitation.
Secondly, as HIV/AIDS-related health concerns have receded, the twin issues of
community safety and crime prevention have increased in importance and there are signs
that these imperatives may be significantly altering the directional flow of policy away from
the public health priorities of the previous decade (Stimson, 2000). Thirdly, as the age
range within the drug-using community becomes more reflective of that within the wider
community, there are increasingly more drug-using parents the care of whose children is, by
definition, an issue for local authorities.
The Re-emergence of Psychedelia
In the late 1980s, the UK experienced an almost totally unprecedented and unexpected wave
of drug-taking which centred on the use of ecstasy in dance venues or ‘raves’. The sheer
scale of this development was staggering. By 1995, the Home Office’s own estimates were
that 1.5 million ecstasy tablets were being used every weekend. Moreover, the apparently
distinctive nature of the development (there were little or no links with the pre-existing
injecting drug scene and users saw themselves as quite different to injecting drug users
whom they generally disparaged) made existing drug treatment services almost irrelevant.
To some extent, this development had its roots both in the continuing interest in the use of
stimulants (particularly in conjunction with dance events) (Yates, 1999) and in experiments
(in psychiatry and amongst the lay population) with the use of hallucinogenic or
psychedelic drugs to unlock the unconscious (Melechi, 1997).
Interest in the possibility of “unlocking” the unconcious through psychoactive drugs had
been heralded by both Jung and Freud (Stevens, 1993). By the 1950s the use of drugs in
mental health was widespread and a number of forward-thinking practitioners were
experimenting with a new drug called Delysid (LSD 25) both as a psychotomimetic, to
mimic (and thus explore the origins of) schizophrenia in selected study groups (including
doctors themselves) and as an aid to psychtherapeutic intervention.
In the UK, Dr. Ronald Sandison was conducting experiments in LSD therapy at Powick
Hospital using a combination of group and individual therapy, coupled with dramatherapy
techniques and the administration of LSD (Sandison, 1997). The Scottish psychiatrist R. D.
Laing and other collaborators in the Philadelphia Group were conducting similar studies in
London. In Canada, Humphrey Osmond who in the early 1950s had introduced Aldous
Huxley to mescaline, was claiming to have achieved extraordinary rates of success in using
LSD in the treatment of alcoholics (Stevens, 1993).
This relatively uncontrolled experimentation with a powerful new hallucinogenic led
inexorably to the promotion of LSD (by Ken Kesey, Timothy Leary, Michael Hollinshead
and others) as the central ingredient of a mass youth experiment characterised by new,
introspective forms of music, Eastern mysticism, pacifism and a return to nature (Reynolds,
1997). However, the interest in psychedelic (a term coined by Osmond) drugs was shortlived.
The demonisation of LSD by the popular press effectively stifled the interest within
psychiatry (Melechi, 1997) and within youth culture, the interest in psychedelia was largely
confined to a middle-class intelligentsia which proved incapable of sustaining popular
interest (Yates, 1999). By the mid-1970s, LSD had all but disappeared from UK streets
(Yates, 1992). There was a resurgence of interest in the 1980s, but this was largely
swamped in the media by the spiraling interest in ecstasy.
In the summer of 1987, young British holidaymakers on the island of Ibiza discovered the
combination of ecstasy and ‘acid house’ music. ‘Acid house’, or ‘Balearic beat’ was an
amalgam of British ‘indie’ music of the time with American ‘hip-hop’ and the new ‘house’
music emerging out of the gay dance-club scene in Chicago (Yates, 1999).
By the summer of 1988, afficionados of rave culture were proclaiming the ‘second summer
of love’. But once more, the innocence and euphoria were short-lived. Exponents of the
new heroin distribution system had already branched out into cocaine and rock cocaine
(crack) in the early 1990s. By the middle of the decade, they had muscled into the
distribution of ecstasy too. Raves became more tense as dancers were increasingly
subjected to assaults, knifings and shootings (Champion, 1997).
Specialist treatment services have struggled top respond to this new phenomenon. In most
cases, the new drug users have been reluctant to make use of services which they perceive
as services for ‘junkies’. Some established services have managed to make and maintain
meaningful contact through the production of information leaflets. Others have organised
detached work services offering on-site advice and information. Many of these new services
are finding that they are also being called upon to offer advice and information about the
increasing use of alcohol by young people (Calafat et al., 1998).
However, the use of ecstasy and other stimulants appears to be leveling out – particularly
amongst teenagers – and alcohol has returned as a major mood-altering substance amongst
this age group (Alcohol Concern, 2000; Drugscope, 2000).
Into a New Millenium
The final decade of the 20th Century has seen dramatic changes in policy. The expansion of
the treatment service network and the subsequent changes in operational focus as a result of
the concerns around HIV infection in the early 1980s marked the opening of a period of
some instability within the field.
The response to the emergence of HIV/AIDS saw treatment agencies move into the public
health arena as part of the vanguard of infection control policy (Berridge, 1996). For many
agencies, the concern over the use of ‘dance drugs’ further consolidated this change through
the development of their emergent health promotion capacities.
But it is in the area of designing, commissioning and evaluating services that Government
policy has seen the most dramatic upheavals.
In the last years of the Conservative administration, the Leader of the House was given the
job of co-ordinating Government policy on drugs and overriding the territorial concerns and
traditional rivalries of the ministries responsible (mainly the Home Office and the
Department of Health). This central co-ordinating unit was further strengthened by the
incoming Labour administration in 1997 with the creation of the post of UK Anti Drugs Coordinator.
The framework for a national strategy for the constituent parts of the UK had already been
established (HM Government, 1995; Ministerial Drugs Task Force, 1994) in a somewhat
loose format. The new UK Anti-drugs Co-ordinator – almost universally described as the
“drugs czar” – set about the task of drawing these together into a single UK-wide policy
(HM Government, 1998).
The new UK policy is significant particularly since it signals a change in government
attitude to drugs. For the first time in two decades, there is a recognition of the role played
by social exclusion and other environmental factors in fostering drug problems in deprived
communities. In some respects this is merely an official government echo of the findings of
the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) in their report: Drug Misuse and the
Environment (1998). Published in the spring of 1998, the report was quickly overshadowed
by the publication of the government’s own strategic document.
Some commentators (Stimson, 2000) have detected in these developments the tightening of
the policy reins by a government reluctant to allow dissenting voices in the war against
drugs. Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain, when discussing the role of the ACMD
notes:
“Its composition and focus of work need to be harnessed as closely as possible
to the thrust of this long-term strategy and to the work of the Coordinator, and
its future work priorities will evolve in that context”.

Many commentators have suggested that this might indicated a determination on the part of
the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordinator to stifle the traditionally independent voice of the Council.
Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain also signals a change in the role of DATs in
Scotland from a co-ordinating and planning role to one of directly commissioning and
evaluating the quality and value for money of the drug response (both treatment and other)
at the local level. It is by no means clear how DATs will adapt to this new challenge
incorporating as it does, a responsibility for resource transfer and open „cross-disciplinary“
evaluation which runs directly counter to the budget protectionist inclinations of most, if not
all, of the partner organisations.
Finally, within the past few months has come the news of an apparent downgrading of the
role of the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordinator and a transfer of the levers of power to the Home
Office. Whatever else may happen in the 21st Century, it seems clear that the issue of drug
misuse is now a critical policy issue which, at least for the time being, is seen as
inextricably linked to crime.

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Thanks to http://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/articles/global-drug.htm

this is a brilliant piece of Paper, with more than Dynamite inside!

(I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance in the preparation of this essay from N, a Russian who for the time being prefers to remain anonymous.)

Tajik authorities have claimed repeatedly that neither the US nor NATO exerts any pressure on the drug warlords inside Afghanistan. „There’s absolutely no threat to the labs inside Afghanistan,“ said Avaz Yuldashov of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency. „Our intelligence shows there are 400 labs making heroin there, and 80 of them are situated right along our border … Drug trafficking from Afghanistan is the main source of support for international terrorism now,“ Yuldashov pointed out last year.[1]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

  1. The Meta-Group, the Russian 9/11, and Kosovo
    • Violence and the Political Requirements of the Global Drug Traffic
    • A Digression: Drugs, Meta-Groups and the Compradorial Revolution
    • The „Russian 9/11“ in 1999: Bombings and Plans for War
    • The Meeting in Khashoggi’s Villa, July 1999
    • Khashoggi’s Interest in Chechnya
    • Dunlop’s Redactions of His Source Yasenev
    • The Khashoggi Villa Meeting, Drugs, and Kosovo
  2. The Meta-Group, Drugs, Salafist Islam, and America
    • The Role of Anton Surikov: The Dunlop and Yasenev Versions
    • Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking
    • Allegations of Drug-Trafficking and Far West, Ltd
    • Far West, Ltd, Halliburton, Diligence LLC, New Bridge, and Neil Bush
    • The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic
    • How the U.S. Restored Narco-Barons to Power in Afghanistan, 2001
  3. The Meta-Group, the War on Terror, and 9/11
    • U.S. Geostrategic Goals and Chechnya
    • The Meta-Group’s Geostrategic Goal: Maintain the War of Terror
    • Concluding Question: The Meta-Group and the United States Government
    • The False Dilemmas of 9/11 Theories

I. The Meta-Group, the Russian 9/11, and Kosovo

Violence and the Political Requirements of the Global Drug Traffic

In the last three decades, three important facts have emerged about the international drug traffic. The first is that it is both huge and growing.

Narcotics are estimated to be worth between $500 billion and $1 trillion a year, an amount, according to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in remarks to a United Nations General Assembly session in June 2003, that is greater than the global oil and gas industry, and twice as large as the overall automobile industry.[2]

The second is that it is both worldwide and above all „highly integrated.“[3] At global drug summits such as the one in Armenia in 1993, representatives of the Sicilian Mafia, the Brighton Beach Organizatsiya, and Colombian drug lords, have worked out a common modus operandi, with the laundering of dirty money entrusted chiefly to the lawless Russian banks.[4]

The third important fact, undeniable since the 1980 U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, is that governments with global pretensions will avail themselves, in pursuit of their own political ends, of the resources, both financial and political, of the drug traffic. It was striking in the 1980s that the CIA, in its choice of Afghan mujahedin leaders to back against the Soviet Union, passed over those with indigenous support in favor of those, notably Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who dominated the heroin trade. The result was to enhance Hekmatyar’s power until he became a leading heroin trafficker, not just in Afghanistan but in the world.[5]

Three more important features of the global drug traffic have been less noticed; thus although I regard them as facts I shall refer to them not as facts but as propositions to be tested against evidence. The first proposition is that the highly integrated drug traffic industry, in addition to serving the political ends of world powers, has its own political as well as economic objectives. It requires that in major growing areas there must be limited state control, a condition most easily reached by fostering regional rebellion and warfare, often fought by its own private armies. This is the on-going situation of designed violence in every major growing area, from Lebanon to Myanmar, Colombia to Afghanistan.

Once the local power of drug armies was enough in itself to neutralize the imposition of state authority. But today there are increasing signs that those at the highest level of the drug traffic will plot with the leaders of major states to ensure, or even to stage, violence that serves the power of the state and the industry alike.

Thanks to extensive research in Russia, we now have initial evidence of a second and even more significant proposition: There exists on the global level a drug meta-group, able to manipulate the resources of the drug traffic for its own political and business ends, without being at risk for actual trafficking. These ends include the creation of designed violence to serve the purposes of cabals in political power – most conspicuously in the case of the Yeltsin „family“ in the Kremlin, but allegedly, according to Russian sources, also for those currently in power in the United States.

One piece of evidence for this consists in a meeting which took place in July 1999 in southern France near Nice, at the villa in Beaulieu of Adnan Khashoggi, once called „the richest man in the world.“ Those at the meeting included a member of the Yeltsin cabal in the Kremlin and four representatives from the meta-group, with passports from Venezuela, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Germany. Between them they allegedly enjoyed excellent relations with:

1) Ayman al-Zawahiri, the acknowledged mastermind of 9/11 and senior mentor to Osama bin Laden.

2) Soviet military intelligence.

3) the FARC, the Colombian revolutionary group that has become increasingly involved in the drug traffic.

4) the Kosovo Liberation Army, a similarly involved group.

5) (according to a well-informed Russian source) the CIA.

The third important proposition is that a meta-group of this scale does not just help government agencies make history. I hope to show that it, and its predecessors, are powerful enough to help make history themselves. However they do not do so overtly, but as a hidden Force X whose presence is not normally acknowledged in the polite discourse of academic political scientists. On the contrary, as we shall see, references to it are usually suppressed.

A Digression: Drugs, Meta-Groups and the Compradorial Revolution

The question arises whether this is the only such meta-group in the international drug milieu. My tentative answer is that there are indeed other focal nodes for organized international drug trafficking, often above the reach of the law. (The remnants of the dissident Hekmatyar drug network in Afghanistan would be a prime example.) What is special about this meta-group is its global reach, which makes it of especial interest to the CIA and other pro-American agencies committed to globalization.

A drug meta-group with such broad connections is not unprecedented. A clear predecessor was the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), a drug-laundering bank which was of use to CIA Director William Casey precisely because of its corrupt global reach. As a Washington insider said to two Time reporters covering BCCI,

They were the only way we could talk to certain folks, and they were the only vehicle available for some transactions. Who else could wire something together to Saudi Arabia, China, Israel, and the U.S.?[6]

It is worthy of note that Khashoggi has enjoyed intimate connections to both, as well as to western intelligence and wePeter Dale Scott, Deep Politicsdstern politicians.

The „wiring together“ effected by drugs has helped give a significant boost to the global banking network, particularly in Russia and southeast Asia. In these areas it has also fostered trade and investment, bringing businessmen from previous diverse commercial areas into increasing contact with each other. From this perspective globalization can be seen as a compradorial revolution: compradorial classes have moved into positions of power, and in some cases their international networks have been more than a match for local state power.[6a]

There are three different ways in which this compradorial revolution has proceeded, and it could be shown that drugs have often helped supply a base for all three:

1) In some countries (as in Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and to some extent Indonesia) these classes have displaced military regimes. Drug-based fortunes clearly played a major role in the compradorial revolution of Thailand.

2) In some countries compradorial elements have succeeding in converting (or, depending on your point of view, corrupting) the cadres of socialist governments. Drugs have played a significant role in the compradorial embourgeoisement of China, Laos, and Cambodia, and may have played an indirect role in the case of Vietnam.

3) Recently – as in the „color revolutions“ of eastern Europe and central Asia – compradorial elements have helped to oust the remnants of the former Soviet governing apparatus. I hope in this essay to give preliminary evidence that the global drug meta-group I have described has played a role in the „color revolutions“ as well.

As to how many drug meta-groups exist in the world, I believe there are at least two. A second, which we will not examine here, oversees the new drug highway from north Myanmar (Burma) through the entrepreneurial zones of south China, and manages the international connections necessary to arrange for the smuggling of heroin and people into Australia and the eastern and western United States.

The relation of the west to this second or eastern meta-group is unknown, and in all probability it is highly complex and ambiguous. It is probably safe to say however that the global reach of the second meta-group, overseeing the much smaller flow of drugs east from Myanmar, is less than the first or western meta-group we shall discuss here, overseeing the far greater flow of drugs west from Afghanistan. (It has been estimated that by now Afghanistan supplies from 80 to 90 percent of the global heroin trade.)[7]

The west, and particularly the United States, have not concealed their interest in the success of globalization and the „color revolutions.“ Unfortunately those who sing the praises of both neglect the terrible social costs of the drug traffic, and the Force X which so often is the underpinning of the compradorial revolution. Because the drug economy is often not integrated into the legal one, it tends to foster superwealth and income disparity. The benefits tend not to be enjoyed by a society as a whole, or even its middle class. This is even more true when the masters of the drug-traffic are not indigenous but alien (as is conspicuously the case in eastern Myanmar).[8]

There is an undeniable western face to the dominant meta-group. One member of the meta-group at the 1999 meeting, Anton Surikov, had spent time at the London Centre for Defence Studies; and in addition Surikov had had contacts with at least one senior CIA representative.[9] (Another member of the meta-group, former Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius, was with Surikov at the London Centre.) We shall see that a third member, Ruslan Saidov, is said to have been paid as a CIA contract agent.

One of the alleged purposes of the meeting at the villa – but not the only one – was to give the Yeltsin „family“ what it supposedly needed: a Russian 9/11.

The „Russian 9/11“ in 1999: Bombings and Plans for War

Russia has been familiar for some time with charges that the bombings in Moscow in 1999, and an accompanying invasion of Russian Dagestan that rekindled the ongoing war in neighboring Chechnya, were both planned by representatives of the Islamist element in the Chechen resistance, in collusion with a representative of the Russian Kremlin.

Read synoptically, these stories indicate that the well-connected drug-trafficking meta-group, with connections to both the Kremlin and the CIA, arranged in advance for the bombings and invasion at the meeting in July 1999, at a French villa owned by the superrich arms merchant Adnan Khashoggi. The group allegedly operated with support from Saudi Arabia and organized global drug trafficking, some of it probably through Kosovo.

The group’s business front, Far West, Ltd., is said to have CIA-approved contractual dealings with Halliburton for geopolitical purposes in the Caucasus, as well as dealings in Iraq with Diligence LLC, a group with connections to Joe Allbaugh (the FEMA chief in 2001) and to the President’s younger brother Neil Bush. The head of Far West recently told a Russian outlet that „a well-known American corporation… is a co-founder of our agency.“[10]

The evidence for this western face of the group is laid out in an article by a so-called Yuri Yasenev, which is clearly a compilation of extracts from intelligence reports, on a Russian website.[11] The article is cited – very selectively – as authoritative by a reputable Hoover Institution scholar, John B. Dunlop.[12] But Dunlop completely ignores, one might say, suppresses, Yasenev’s case as I have summarized it above. He uses the article instead to document a more familiar case: that in 1999 the Yeltsin „family“ in the Kremlin dealt with this same group to create what might be called the „Russian 9/11.“

When I say that Dunlop suppresses certain details, I do not mean to suggest that he does so conspiratorially, or even consciously. My notion of deep politics, which I have developed elsewhere, posits that in every culture and society there are facts which tend to be suppressed collectively, because of the social and psychological costs of not doing so.[13] Like all other observers, I too have involuntarily suppressed facts and even memories about the drug traffic that were too provocative to be retained with equanimity.[14]

The drug traffic is often the beneficiary of this suppression, which leaves it more free to act without interference. In Deep Politics I referred to the pervasive influence of a U.S. government-drug collaboration which I called „Operation X,“ looking at it from the perspective of a parapolitical manipulation of the traffic by the government.[15] I wish now that I had written of a „Force X,“ a force which was no longer under total government control, and indeed could influence government behavior for its own ends.[16]

Dunlop’s thesis is in itself an alarming one. It is that men of influence in the Kremlin, building on the connections established by the wealthy oligarch Boris Berezovskii, were able to arrange for staged violence, in order to reinforce support for an unpopular Russian government. This staged violence took the form of lethal bombings in the capital and an agreed-upon incursion by Chechens into Russian Dagestan.

This credible thesis is even more alarming when we consider that both Khashoggi and Berezovskii have purchased significant political influence in the West as well. In 2003 Khashoggi was negotiating with Richard Perle, a member of the Cheney-Rumsfeld clique who at the time was still Chairman of the U.S. Defense Policy Board, to invest considerable Saudi money in Perle’s company Trireme.[17] Berezovskii is a shareholder in the software company, Ignite, of President Bush’s delinquent brother Neil Bush.[18]

More significantly, Khashoggi and his connections have shown in the past their ability to influence, even distort, U.S. foreign policy, to the detriment of the latter. An important example was the ill-fated so-called Ghorbanifar initiative during Iran-Contra, to sell arms to the mullahs in Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages:

Ghorbanifar was not acting alone. Although he led us to believe he was using Iranian money, his forward purchases and bridge deposits were actually being bankrolled by Adnan Khashoggi [and BCCI]….Khashoggi had an on-and-off relationship with Israel for many years and evidently had been in the loop as Ghorbanifar’s backer from the very beginning.[19]

Ghorbanifar could never have caused such embarrassment to the Reagan Administration if he had not been backed by deeper, hidden forces.

By the „Russian 9/11“ I mean the bombings of Russian apartment buildings in 1999,

accompanied by the pre-arranged (and partly staged) second Russian invasion of Chechnya. For some time the West has heard versions of the claim that both events were planned at the time by Russian intelligence. For example Patrick Cockburn reported as follows in the Independent:

Boris Kagarlitsky, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Comparative Politics, writing in the weekly Novaya Gazeta, says that the bombings in Moscow and elsewhere were arranged by the GRU (the Russian military intelligence service). He says they used members of a group controlled by Shirvani Basayev, brother of the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, to plant the bombs. These killed 300 people in Buikask, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September.[20]

Cockburn’s source, Boris Kagarlitskii, also accused Russian intelligence agents of planting at least one of the bombs.

Boris Kagarlitsky, a member of the Russian Institute for Comparative Politics, stated: „FSB officers were caught red-handed while planting the bomb. They were arrested by the police and they tried to save themselves by showing FSB identity cards.“ The first man to enter the basement, Police Inspector Andrei Chernyshev, related: „It was about 10 in the evening. There were some strangers who were seen leaving the basement. We were told about the men who came out from the basement and left the car with a licence number which was covered with paper. I went down to the basement. This block of flats had a very deep basement which was completely covered with water. We could see sacks of sugar and in them some electronic device, a few wires and a clock. We were shocked. We ran out of the basement and I stayed on watch by the entrance and my officers went to evacuate the people.“ Despite the arrest of the FSB officers by the police, they were quietly released when the secret service’s Moscow headquarters intervened. The Observer reports that the next day, in an attempt to cover-up the discovery, „the FSB in Moscow announced that there had never been a bomb, only a training exercise.“[21]

Western scholarly analyses have seen the bombings and war as part of a stratagem to boost the popularity of the Kremlin, and particularly the little-known new Prime Minister Putin, for the coming presidential elections in November 1999. The most thorough study, by John Dunlop of the Hoover Institution, blames the plotting on three protégés of the Russian oligarch Boris Berezovskii – Valentin Yumashev, Alexander Voloshin, and Roman Abramovich – who at this point were members of Yeltsin’s „Family“ in the Kremlin.[22] (As for Berezovskii himself, Dunlop writes that by mid-1999 „all of his real but beginning-to-dwindle political influence was obtained through the intercession of D’yachenko [Yeltsin’s daughter] and Yumashev.“)[23]

The Meeting in Khashoggi’s Villa, July 1999

A crucial piece of evidence for this thesis of Kremlin-structured violence is the meeting in July 1999, when Alexander Voloshin met in southern France with the Chechen warlord Shamil Basaev. In Dunlop’s words,

On the day following the initial incursion of rebel forces into the Dagestani highlands in early August of 1999, the investigative weekly Versiya published a path-breaking report claiming that the head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, had met secretly with the most wanted man in Russia, Shamil‘ Basaev, through the good offices of a retired officer in the GRU, Anton Surikov, at a villa belonging to international arms merchant Adnan

Khashoggi located between Nice and Monaco.109 A source in French intelligence was credited by Versiya with supplying this information. The article stirred major interest in the Russian media, but at the time documentary confirmation was lacking.

By July of 2000, Versiya, in an effort of persistent journalistic digging, had unearthed what it regarded as the full story of what had occurred, with an acknowledged assist from French and Israeli intelligence. „The meeting [of Voloshin and Basaev],“ the weekly related, „which supposedly took place at the dacha of the international arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi in the small town of Beaulieu near Nice, occurred on 4 July 1999.[24] Sources in the French special services had earlier communicated that information, in particular a certain professor of political science, a specialist in issues of Russian defense, security,

and organized crime. He is well known for his contract work for French government establishments, including French counter-intelligence.“110….

The investigative weekly then went on to summarize what it had learned from French and Israeli intelligence, as well as from its own journalistic digging: „A luxurious villa in the French city of Beaulieu, located between Nice and the principality of Monaco. This villa, according to the French special services, belongs to the international arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi. He is an Arab from Saudi Arabia, a billionaire with a complicated reputation. According to the French special services, and also to the French press, in June of 1999 there took up residence at the villa a Venezuelan banker named Alfonso Davidovich.111

In the Latin American press, he is said to be responsible for laundering the funds of the Columbian left insurrection organization FARC, which carries out an armed struggle with the official authorities, supported by the narcotics business.“

110 Petr Pryanishnikov, „Voloshin I Basaev na lazurnom beregu: foto na pamyat‘,“ Versiya, 4 July 2000. The article, accompanied by a photo, can be found at: http:www.compromat.ru/main/voloshin/basaev.htm

111 The article „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya,“ compromat.ru, 17 December 2004 reports that Davidovich lives in Munich and enjoys both German and Venezuelan citizenship. He is also said to be personally acquainted with international arms dealer Khashoggi.[25]

Dunlop’s massively documented essay is 52 pages long, with 142 footnotes. But having thus provocatively included references to both Khashoggi and narcotics, Dunlop does not mention either again. The failure to discuss Khashoggi is particularly surprising. If indeed the meeting took place at his villa, the proceedings were not only likely to be recorded, one would think that they were intended to be recorded.

One would also expect the participants to be confident that the recordings would reach western intelligence, as apparently they promply did. „In France and in the ranks of Israeli intelligence, Versiya wrote, it had been reported that `there exists a video-tape of the meeting at the villa in Beaulieu.'“[26] One would have expected that this video-tape might reach, not just the French and Mossad, but Khashoggi’s long-time associates in U.S. intelligence as well.[27]

Khashoggi’s Interest in Chechnya

Just as Berezovskii was at one point the richest man in Russia, so Khashoggi was once (according to his American biographer) „The Richest Man in the World.“ At one point indeed Khashoggi had an influence in American politics analogous to Berezovskii’s in Russia. For example, Khashoggi attended both Nixon inaugurals and contributed money to his electoral campaigns. He admitted to giving $58,000 in 1968, but allegedly told Pierre Salinger he gave $1 million in 1972.[28] He also arranged a fund-raising event for Jimmy Carter’s Center in Plains, Georgia, an event which probably originated in both men’s connections to the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).[29]

Khashoggi is usually thought of as an arms salesman. Although he has never been directly linked to the drug traffic, he was intimately involved in the affairs of the drug-laundering bank BCCI, with which he arranged an arms shipment as part of Oliver North’s dealings in Iran-Contra.[30] He also became notorious for flying into Las Vegas from abroad and then rapidly losing vast sums of cash at the casino tables – a traditional form of money-laundering.[31] His name has surfaced in connection with a number of other scandals, from the illicit real estate ventures of the Marcos family in New York to a major defrauding of a Thai bank in 1998, which was followed by the Asian financial crisis of that year.

Khashoggi had had a financial interest in Chechnya, and connections with its leaders, since 1996, from his participation in a consortium called Caucasian Common Market AO. This was designed to raise $3 billion in the West and Japan for investment in Chechnya.[32] A principal organizer was former Chechen First Deputy Premier Khozh-Akhmed Nukhaev, in conjunction with Lord McAlpine of the Goldsmith family interests in London, and also American capital.[33] But according to the late Paul Klebnikov, Nukhaev had a background in Chechen organized crime, before developing „a radical ideology in line with the one espoused by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network.“[34]

Despite this background, Nukhaev found support and financing in Washington for his Caucasian-American Chamber of Commerce. According to once source, in 1997 Khashoggi introduced Nukhaev to former Secretary of State James Baker.[35]

However Dunlop’s inquiry is focused, not on Khashoggi, but on Berezovskii and his representative Voloshin in the Kremlin:

In March of 2002 Interfax reported that, through his long-time business partner Badri Patarkatsishvili, Berezovskii had „supplied Chechen figures Kazbek Makhashev and Movladi Udugov with money to purchase the raid against Dagestan. According to witnesses, Berezovskii contributed 30 million rubles

for the purpose.“120 This payment, amounting to more than $1 million, if it occurred, may have been only one of several intended to underwrite a „short victorious war“ in Dagestan.

120 „Berezovskii Sponsored Dagestan Raid, Top Policeman’s Abduction — Prosecutors,“ Interfax, 5 March 2002. A well-known journalist for RFE-RL, Andrei Babitskii, who frequently visited Chechnya during this period and was acquainted with a number of leading separatists, writes that he can confirm that Berezovskii did indeed speak by telephone with both Basaev and Movladi Udugov at this juncture. See Andrei Babibitskii, „Na voine,“ hro.org, 2 March 2004.

Dunlop is not alone in suspecting the hand of Berezovskii behind Voloshin’s meeting with Basaev. So does Cockburn’s source Boris Kagarlitskii (about whom we shall have more to say).[36] The Russian observer Lilia Shevtsova reports a rumor at this time that Berezovskii himself, along with his agent Alexander Voloshin, had met in France with Bazayev in the summer of 1999, just before the Dagestan invasion of August 2.[37]

Dunlop’s Redactions of His Source Yasenev

Though he says nothing more about Khashoggi or drugs, Dunlop does however make one more reference to the alleged drug-money launderer Alfonso Davidovich:

„It soon emerged,“ Versiya continued, „that a very frequent visitor to Davidovich was a certain French businessman of Israeli-Soviet origin, a native of Sokhumi [Abkhazia], 53-year-old Yakov Kosman. 112 Soon Kosman brought with him six persons who arrived via Austria carrying Turkish passports.[38] In one of the passports the French [authorities] identified a certain Tsveiba, who is accused by the Tbilisi authorities of having committed genocide during the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict.“ All of the visitors settled into the villa for a three weeks‘ stay.

„Soon,“ the account continues, „the special services succeeded in establishing that

Kosman and Tsveiba went to the Nice airport, where they met two men who had arrived from Paris. Judging from their documents, one of those who arrived was Sultan Sosnaliev, who in the years of the Georgian-Abkhaz war served as the minister of defense of Abkhazia.113 Second there emerged from the airport one more native of Sokhumi — Anton Surikov. According to rumors, during the years of the war in Abkhazia, he was subordinated to Sosnaliev and was responsible for questions of the organization of sabotage and was friendly with field commander Shamil‘ Basaev, who at that time headed the Chechen battalion.“

The next arrival came by sea: „According to the precise information of the French and the Israelis, on 3 July at the port of Beaulieu a private English yacht ‚Magiya‘ [Magic] arrived from Malta. From it to the shore came two passengers. If one is to believe the passport information, one of the ‚Englishmen‘ was a certain Turk, in the past an advisor to the Islamicist premier of Turkey, [Necmettin] Erbakan, a rather influential figure in the Wahhabi circles of Turkey, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.114 From sources in the Russian special services we learned that Mekhmet is also a close friend of the not unknown Khattab.“

„The second person,“ the account goes on, „to the surprise of the intelligence officers, was the Chechen field commander Shamil‘ Basaev.

112 Kosman is reported in the same 17 December 2004 issue of compromat.ru, to live in Nice and to possess German and, possibly, Israeli citizenship.

113 On Sosnaliev as Abkhazia’s defense minister, see RFE-RL Newsline, 2 November 1993.

114 On Erbakan, see Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 365.

Dunlop’s cited source for information about both Davidovich and Kosman is an article by Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), on a Russian website, ru.compromat.[39] But Dunlop has significantly edited, one must even say censored, what Yasenev wrote.

In footnote 111 Dunlop says

The article „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya,“ compromat.ru, 17 December 2004 reports that Davidovich lives in Munich and enjoys both German and Venezuelan citizenship. He is also said to be personally acquainted with international arms dealer Khashoggi.

radically curtailing Yasenev’s description of Davidovich:

Alfonso Davidovich – (1948), Venezuelan, lives in Munich. Has German and Venezuelan citizenship.

Speaks Spanish, English, French, German, and Russian fluently. In the 1970s went through special training in the USSR (Privol’noe, Nikolaevskaya oblast) and East Germany.

Owns companies and banks in Barbados, the Caymans and other off-shores.

Has friendly relations with Hugo Chavez, and is acquainted with Fidel Castro, Marcus Wolf and Adnan Khashoggi. Has many contacts in Colombia, including FARC. In 1999 Davidovich was alleged to have engaged in arms trafficking for guerillas in Chiapas, Mexico and in money laundering for the Colombian drug mafia. Finances antiglobalization movement in Europe and Latin America.“[40]

With respect to Yakov Kosman, Dunlap says: „Kosman is reported in the same 17 December 2004 issue of compromat.ru, to live in Nice and to possess German and, possibly, Israeli citizenship.“

Compare this with what Yasenev wrote:

Yakov Abramovich Kosman (b. 1946), resides in Nice, France. Has German and, possibly, Israeli citizenship. Involved in real estate operations and banking. Has contacts with Kosovo Albanian criminal societies in European countries. In 1997-2000 he served as financial consultant to Hashim Thaçi, the chief commander of KLA.“[41]

Consider that „In 1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA – formally known as the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, or UCK – as an international terrorist organization, saying it had bankrolled its operations with proceeds from the international heroin trade and from loans from known terrorists like Osama bin Laden.“[42]

The Khashoggi Villa Meeting, Drugs, and Kosovo

It would appear that Davidovich and Kosman were in Khashoggi’s villa to talk about more than just Chechnya, but that Dunlop did not wish to explore this possibility. For example, he acknowledges the presence of no less than four men of Abkhazian origin and/or influence at the meeting – Kosman, Tsveiba, Sosnaliev, and Surikov — and yet offers no explanation whatsoever for their presence. (A glance at a map will show that Abkhazia is irrelevant to the subsequent events in Dagestan and Chechnya.)

It seems likely that a drug-route was discussed involving Abkhazia, which now „has become a key heroin transiting point.“[43] Its drug-trafficking importance is noted by none other than Surikov himself:

In general then, the Chechen [drug-trafficking] group has allotted a very important place to Abkhazia in its plans. This is due firstly to the strong position of local field commanders after the end of the Georgian/Abkhazian conflict….Secondly…a large number of `volunteers‘ [notably Basaev] came from Chechnia and other North Caucasian republics….Amongst these people were a number of criminals whose presence facilitated later contacts with local undesirables….As a result of these developments Abkhazia today is one of the most criminalised areas of the former Soviet Union.[44]

Note that in this passage Surikov makes no reference to his own Abkhazian origin, his involvement as a GRU officer in the Russian-backed Abkhazian insurrection, and his friendship there with Basaev (referred to by Dunlop). Here and elsewhere in his text it would appear that the „Chechen group“ he describes is one overseen by his own meta-group.

Russian observers have pointed out that the meeting(s) in France, which took place in June and/or July 1999, came shortly after the unexpected entry of Russian troops into Kosovo.

On June 11, 1999, 200 Russian troops in SFOR drove from Bosnia to Prishtina and secured Slatina airport. Gen Wesley Clark then ordered [UK] Gen. Sir Mike Jackson (who on June 9 had signed technical agreement for withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo) „to seize the airport. Jackson responded, famously, that he would not start World War Three for him“[45]

Following two days of talks directly between Clinton and Yeltsin, the crisis was averted.

Instead there followed weeks of „protracted negotiations on Russia’s role in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission.“[46] In the end, under circumstances still not fully understood, the United States and NATO agreed that the Russians could stay.

The Russian troops finally withdrew from the airport in July 2003.[47] Significantly, a chart of Russian drug-trafficking prepared by one of Surikov’s partners, Sergei Petrov, indicates that in 2003 Kosovo ceased to be a main point of export for Russian drugs, its place being taken by the Black Sea oil port of Novorossiysk.[48]

Within a year of the troops‘ arrival, by 2000, according to DEA statistics, Afghan heroin accounted for almost 20 percent of the heroin seized in the United States – nearly double the percentage taken four years earlier. Much of it was now distributed in America by Kosovar Albanians.[49]

It is significant therefore that

The `Pristina dash‘ by Russian parachutists in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis (the purpose of the `dash‘ was to force NATO to guarantee for Russia a separate sector of responsibility in Kosovo) was organized by the head of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, and his deputy, Leonid Ivashov, without the knowledge of minister of defense Igor Sergeyev and most likely without Yeltsin’s knowledge.[50]

Yasenev says nothing about this, but does assert that Kvashnin was the Russian Army connection of two leading drug traffickers (Vladimir Filin andAlexey Likhvintsev) in the Saidov-Surikov group.

II. The Meta-Group, Drugs, Salafist Islam, and America

The Role of Anton Surikov: The Dunlop and Yasenev Versions

As we have seen, Dunlop describes Anton Surikov, the organizer of the Beaulieu meeting between Voloshin and Basaev, as „a retired officer in the GRU.“ He fails to quote from his source Yasenev’s description of Surikov:

Anton Victorovich Surikov (b. 1961). Presents himself as political scientist. Responsible for informational and political projects. Actively publishes in press. Some of his publications resemble ciphered directives to the elements in Russian special services disloyal [emphasis added] to President Vladimir Putin. His other articles contain political messages intended for abroad. Surikov has contacts with F[ritz] Ermarth, former leading CIA analyst of the USSR and Russia, now in the Nixon Foundation….[51]

Surikov has close relations with Alexander Prokhanov and Alexander Nagorny [respectively, chief editor and assistant chief editor of newspaper „Zavtra“], Anatoly Baranov [chief editor of Pravda.info and KPRF.ru], Mikhail Delyagin,[52] former advisor to Mikhail Kasyanov[53], Alexei Kondaurov (head of YUKOS security department, former general of KGB and FSB, State Duma deputy from CPRF), Ilya Ponomarev (former YUKOS CEO, CPRF).

In 2002-03, together with Kondaurov–who represented Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Leonid Nevzlin–Surikov, with the help of Victor Vidmanov, organized financing of CPRF by YUKOS shareholders and the individuals associated with OPS [the organized criminal society] (Yakov Kosman, Nikolai Lugovskoi) to the tune of $15 million.

Boris Kagarlitskii’s essay and Yasenev’s memo, taken from intelligence files, talk about Surikov, but from opposing perspectives. Kagarlitskii, a longtime dissident and foe of Putin, saw the Beaulieu meeting as the venue for Kremlin-instigated violence, designed to restore the Kremlin’s popularity before the coming election. Yasenev’s memo sees Surikov as part of an on-going effort to destabilize Russia, and weaken the Kremlin.

Kagarlitskii (and after him Dunlop) say almost nothing about Surikov, other than to refer to his past years with Russian military intelligence, the GRU. To quote Dunlop,

Kagarlitskii also notes: „During Primakov’s time, Surikov worked on the staff of the government of the Russian Federation. Despite this fact, he also developed regular work relations with Voloshin’s people.“ It seems therefore quite likely that Surikov and Voloshin were personally acquainted.[54]

However Yasenev’s memo in December 2004 links Surikov, not to the government or Kremlin, but (through Kondaurov) to the sphere of the man who by that time had emerged as America’s best friend and Putin’s most powerful enemy in Russia, the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii. (The Kondaurov-Khodorkovskii connection is abundantly documented: both men freely admit it.)

Forbes magazine, which underwrote Klebnikov’s damning accounts of both Berezovskii and Nukhaev, wrote on March 18, 2002 that Khodorkovskii appeared „to be the West’s best friend“ in Russia. According to PBS in 2003, Khodorkovskii’s firm Menatep shared business interests with the western investment firms Global Asset Management, the Blackstone Group, the Carlyle Group and AIG Capital Partners. In addition

He frequently travels to the United States. He reportedly dined with Condoleezza Rice last year and recently was a guest at Herb Allen’s Idaho ranch, along with Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and other luminaries, for an annual telecommunications executives meeting.[55]

Quoting from an anti-Yeltsin essay of May 1999 by Surikov in Versiya, the American right-wing Jamestown Foundation agrees with Yasenev (against Kagarlitskii) that „Surikov is clearly in the camp of Yeltsin’s opponents.“[56] More recently Surikov has also shown himself to be anti-Putin, criticizing Putin’s „obvious inability … to struggle against terrorism effectively.“[57]

Furthermore Surikov clearly had western support in his opposition to government corruption under Yeltsin. We need only look to the following description of a Surikov book published in London:

Crime in Russia: the international implications Anton Surikov London Defence Studies.Examines (1) the growth of organized crime in post-Soviet Russia (2) the extraordinary extent to which the Colombian cartel has targeted Russia as a conduit for its penetration of the world market (3) the scale of drug-trafficking in Russia, predominantly by the ‚Chechen group‘ controlled by the Dudayev regime.[58] The author’s interesting career details are set out on a prelim page. The monograph is introduced by Jonathan Aves (lecturer in Russian studies at the University of Sussex) ‚Introduction‘ pp1-6, 12 refs, detailing both the scale of the problem and Surikov’s background expertise. This expertise has to be assumed by the reader, as the monograph contains no literature references of its own.[59]

According to his webpage at the IPROG website, Surikov spent the year 1994 at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London.[60] (Audrius Butkevicius is said to have spent the year there as well.)

As for Yasenev’s allegations that „Surikov has contacts with F. Ermarth,“ Surikov when questioned about this admitted it frankly: „I am personally acquainted with Mr. Ermarth as political scientist since 1996. It’s well known by many people and we never hid this fact.“[61] In saying this, Surikov was admitting to a CIA connection: Ermarth, a senior officer who twice served on the National Security Council, did not retire from the CIA until 1998. The two men had met in April 1996 at a Global International Security Seminar in Virginia.[62]

Above all, Kagarlitskii is silent about the charge which has since aroused controversy in the Russian media: Surikov’s supposed involvement with „a group of renegade Soviet secret service officers who are allegedly involved in international drug trafficking and have ties with Western and Saudi security apparatus.“[63]

It would be interesting to learn at what point Kagarlitskii first met Surikov, and whether Surikov was in fact the source for Kagarlitskii’s article about the meeting in southern France. Today the two men are close, and serve together at the Moscow Institute for the Study of Globalization (IPROG).[64]

Saidov, Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking

The most conspicuous clue to Dunlop’s selectivity in his use of the Yasenev memo is his failure to identify „Mekhmet,“ the „certain Turk, in the past an advisor to the Islamicist premier of Turkey, [Necmettin] Erbakan.“[65] Yasenev identifies Mekhmet, linking him not only to Erbakan but also to the CIA, to Saudi intelligence, and to al-Qaeda:

In 2003 the Turkish citizen Mehmet whose real name is Ruslan Saidov, persuaded the President of the Chechen Republic, Ahmed Kadyrov, that he could be of use with Kadyrov’s policy of „national reconciliation.“ Saidov took part in organizing Kadyrov’s visit to Saudi Arabia. There Kadyrov made an agreement with the head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Naif Ibn Abdel-Aziz, that the Arab militants under the Lieutenant Colonel Aziz ben Said ben Ali al Hamdi (alias Abu al Walid al-Hamadi), Prince Naif’s subordinate, would be removed from Chechnya by May 2004. The agreement stipulated that Kadyrov guaranteed safe passage to Abu al-Walid. Playing a double game and intending to set up both parties, Saidov (probably together with Abu al-Walid himself) gave this information to the CIA. Apparently the CIA was concerned that having left Chechnya the Arab militants would resurface in Iraq and join the terrorist group of the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that belongs to the al-Qaida network.

Trying to prevent this, and besides, wanting to discredit Kadyrov in the eyes of Prince Naif, the CIA gave Saidov an „assignment“. On April 13 in the Nozhai-Yurt district of Chechnya, Russian troops killed Abu al-Walid (or alleged having done so). Saidov paid $300,000 to those who carried out this operation. Their bosses in Moscow received $500,000. How much the CIA paid Saidov is unknown….

Yasenev describes Saidov as both a drug trafficker and an arms trafficker, involved with the supply of Russian arms to the Saudi-backed secessionists from Yemen in Aden. This was at a time when Russia had officially ceased support to the one-time Marxist country in favor of supporting Yemeni unity:[66]

In May-June 1994, Saidov together with Usman Imaev and Khozh-Ahmed Nukhaev and under an agreement with Pavel Grachev and Dzhohar Dudaev, organized twenty-two flights to airlift arms and ammunition via the Chechen airport Sheikh Mansur to the airport Aden in Yemen.[67]

In the spring of 1995 Saidov began to cooperate with the organized society, led by Vladimir Filin and Alexei Likhvintsev [see below] in handling [narcotics] traffic through the port of Novorossiysk.

Saidov is described by Yasenev as having good relations not only with the CIA, but also with both Turkish Islamists and even with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the man often described as both the „mastermind“ behind 9/11 and the senior partner in al Qaeda with the younger bin Laden:[68]

Since August 1995 Saidov resides in Turkey.

In December 1995 he published an extremist book in Turkish The Muslims of the Caucasus in the 19th century: Genocide by Russia. The leader of the Welfare Party and the future Turkish Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, gave a good review of this book. In July 1996 Saidov became his advisor.[69]

In December 1996 Ayman al-Zawahiri was arrested in Dagestan for illegal entry.[70] He carried a false Sudanese passport. When he was arrested Saidov went to Makhachkala [the capital of Dagestan]. There he organized a petition to the authorities in support of Zawahiri. It was signed by twenty-six Muslim clergymen and the Russian State Duma deputy, Nadirshakh Khachilaev.[71] Saidov managed to obtain a court decision, condemning Zawahiri to a six-month prison term, which had actually expired by that time….

Since the middle of the nineties, Saidov formed stable relations with the Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi, Prince Turki al-Faisal (then head of the Saudi intelligence and at present, Saudi Ambassador to Great Britain) and Prince Naif.[72]

In addition Yasenev made it clear that Saidov was not pro-Putin, but a Muslim activist who was passionately anti-Putin and indeed anti-Russian:

In September 2003, Saidov participated in the congress of the extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami in Jordan. At this congress he announced that Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was an organization effectively acting in the underground throughout Russia, Central Asia and the Crimea….[73]

On December 8, 2004 Saidov addressed Muslim youth in Moscow. In his words, „following Ukraine, the Orange Revolution is coming to Russia.“ „Our liberals say that in 2008 the situation in Moscow will be like the one in Kiev.“ However, everything will be different, and not in 2008, but earlier.“ „Amirs and mudjahideen will soon make the Kremlin shudder with horror.“ In 2005, „they will throw into hell the servant of Satan,“ i.e., President Putin, who is allegedly „wanted by the International Tribunal at The Hague.“

The same goal of Muslim liberation was attributed by Yasenev to the organizer of the meeting in France, Anton Surikov:

On December 13 2004, in Adygeia, Surikov had a meeting with a group of Sufi believers and said this: „In the past we were against ahl-ad-dalala (those who gone astray) with their Arab money. We used to say that one should not separate from Russia. But now „Russia is on the brink of collapse and chaos.“ So „we’ll be separating [from Russia] with all Muslims of the Caucasus.“ A new state will be created on our historical lands from Psou and the Black Sea to Laba and Kuban.“

(The goal of splitting up Russia attributed here to Surikov is that which, in an earlier text co-authored by Surikov, is attributed by Russian „radicals“ to the United States:

The radicals believe that the US actively utilizes Turkish and Muslim elements….From Azerbaijan, radicals foresee a strategic penetration which would irrevocably split the Federation. US influence would be distributed to the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, to Chechnya and the other North Caucasus Muslim autonomous republics of T[at]arstan and Bashkortostan. As a result Russian territorial integrity would be irreparably compromised.)[74]

Yasenev claims also that, in the summer of 2004, the meta-group

started a project in the Near-Volgian Federal District to train cadres for Volga-Urals chapter of the international extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in 2003. The project is financed by private philanthropic foundations of the Arabic Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

In this context we can further question Dunlop’s assumption that the 1999 meeting organized by Surikov in southern France was called to promote the intentions of the Yeltsin „family.“ In the light of the Yasenev essay, it is more likely to have served the purposes of militant Islam and the drug traffic.

The portraits of Saidov’s and Surikov’s connections with al-Zawahiri, Erbakan, and Hizb ut-Tahrir confirm the criticism, by the Indian analyst B. Raman and others, that American studies of Islamist jihadism err in their restrictive focus on al-Qaeda.[75] The full range of Islamic jihadism is far more complex.

In my conclusion I shall return to the possibility that U.S. government might share common goals with Hizb ut-Tahrir and the meta-group in Russia, even while combating the Islamist terrorism of al-Qaeda in the Middle East and the West.

III. Allegations of Drug-Trafficking and Far West, Ltd

Yasenev links Saidov, Surikov, and others to their former service in a drug-interception group in Afghanistan, under a Leonid Kosyakov who now headed a company called Far West, Ltd.:

Leonid Leonidovich Kosyakov, b. 1955, Ukrainian citizen. Until 2005 resided in Arab Emirates and Switzerland. Citizen of Ukraine. Retired from the service in May 1993. Presently the president of Far West Ltd. In 1983-85 Kosyakov was in command of a special group in Shindand (Afghanistan), assigned to intercept caravans with drugs. In different times under his direct command served Filin, Lunev, Likhvintsev, Surikov, Petrov, as well as Saidov[76]

Yasenev also presents testimony that this group developed into what the Russians call an OPS (an Organized Criminal Society) responsible for massive drug-trafficking:

These accusations were made by the former officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine Sergei Petrov (alias Serge Rodin, French citizen).

According to his testimony:

„The OPS [organized criminal society] was involved in drug trafficking since the beginning of 1990s:

-from 1995 the OPS transports heroin (produced in Afghanistan) from Tajikistan to European countries via Russia with the assistance of the Russian Defense Ministry.

– from 2000 the OPS is involved in smuggling Colombian cocaine to Russia through the seaports of Novorossiysk and St. Petersburg under the disguise of import shipments from Latin America.

Among the OPS contacts in Novorossyisk is Saidov; in St. Petersburg it used to be Roman Tsepov.

Received profits are used for personal enrichment of the OPS leaders, the officials at the Ministry of Defense who provide them with „the roof“ [protection], and for financing extremist activities.“

In November of 2003, Rodin contacted the law enforcement agencies of Germany and France. Their investigation did not result in any actions against Filin, Likhvintsev, and their partners.

In January 2004, Rodin was blown up in his car in South Africa.

Yasenev’s charge of a military organized crime group under Filin had been reported a year earlier by Russian journalist Nikita Kaledin:

There is a powerful military organized crime community which from 1992 through to the present has controlled substantial drug flows from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe and is also involved in laundering „dirty“ money and is actively involved in Russia’s political life. The community is controlled by former intelligence officers, Afghan war veterans, and now drugs barons Vova Filin and Lesha Pribalt. The former lives in Switzerland, the latter in London. Both make quite frequent trips to Moscow, Dushanbe, Nazran, and Khankala….

Filin and Pribalt literally flooded Russia with heroin. The Kremlin could not tolerate this abomination any longer and ordered a mighty „Chekist raid“ [i.e., ordered the FSB to shut down the operation] against the narcobarons. However, it is rumored that the raid has ended up with the agreement that the latter would 1) share their profits; 2) help in the facilitating the peaceful referendum on the constitution in Chechnya; 3) bring some order to the drug market by liquidating the leaders of ethnic criminal groups.“[77]

As if in fulfillment of the third point, Surikov in 2001 denounced the leaders of an influential Tajik heroin cartel, including the mayor of the Tajik capital, Dushanbe.[78] (Tajiks until then had been one of the ethnic mafias who most dominated the trafficking of Afghan heroin through Russia.)

Far West, Ltd, Halliburton, Diligence LLC, New Bridge, and Neil Bush

The connection to Far West, Ltd, of Filin, Likhvinsky, Surikov, and Saidov (along with Alfonso Davidovich) has since been stunningly corroborated by a news story on the Pravda-info website about Far West, Ltd, and Kosyakov’s resignation from it.

At a meeting of its stockholders on 2 May in the Hotel Ritz Carlton in Dubai „Far West Ltd.“ accepted the retirement of the president of the Agency Leonid Kosiakov, who moved to government service in Ukraine. Vladimir Filin, member of the Editorial Board of „Pravda-info,“ was elected the new president, at the same time retaining his previous position as executive director. The meeting of stockholders, in accordance with its charter, selected new members of the board of directors of „Far West Ltd.,“ which will now contain 9 members. Besides Vladimir Filin, Anatolii Baranov and Anton Surikov, it will include four more members if the Editorial Board of „Pravda-info“: Audrius Butkevicius, Aleksei Likhvintsev, Natal’ia Roeva, and Ruslan Saidov, and also Valerii Lunev,[79] a veteran of the Armed Forces, and Alfonso Davidovich, a political scientist from Venezuela.

Far West, the story said,

specializes in consulting work on questions of security in conducting business in regions of the world with unstable environments and hiring personnel for foreign private military companies [last three words in English]. Its head office is located in Switzerland. In addition, the Agency has a network of representatives in OAE [United Arab Emirates], Afghanistan, Colombia, the autonomous region of Kosovo, the autonomous republic of Crimea, Georgia, and the Volga Federal District of the RF [Russian Federation].[80]

Recently Filin gave Pravda.info some details about Far West’s work, and revealed that the firm had been co-founded by „a sub-division of a well-known American corporation.“ He said that the company’s new contract is

connected with the secured transport of commercial shipments from Afghanistan, where we have an office, to ports on the Black Sea. In Afghanistan there is a well-known U.S. air base in Bagram. It is connected by an aerial bridge with a number of other US air bases. For example, with the largest base in Frankfurt-on-Main, that’s in Germany, with an intermediary landing in Chkalovsk, in the Moscow area. But the most commercially attractive route seems to be that from Bagram to the US air base in Magas, in Kyrgyzstan. By the way, it is quite near the Russian air base in Kant. A significant flow of shipments passes through Magas, there is a niche there for commercial shipments too. This is very profitable. It is much more profitable than routing commercial shipments from Afghanistan through Tajikistan. Therefore last year we completely withdrew from all shipping through Tajikistan and closed our office in that country.Who are your partners?

Who our partners are is a commercial secret. I can say that they are four private firms from three countries, Turkey, Russia, and the USA,which engage among other things in shipping. One of these firms is a sub-division of a well-known American corporation. This firm is a co-founder of our agency.[81]

We can assume that Pravda.info is an inside source for information about Far West, for the two organizations seem in fact to be two different manifestations of the same group. Among the directors of Far West on the masthead of Pravda.info we find first of all Anton Surikov, followed by Anatolii Baranov, Aleksei Likhvintsev, Ruslan Saidov, Vladimir Filin, Natal’ia Roeva, and Audrius Butkevicius.[82]

Also on the Pravda.info masthead is Boris Kagarlitskii, who as we saw at the outset is a main source for the Western accounts of the meeting in southern France, by Patrick Cockburn, Nafeez Ahmed, and John Dunlop.[83] Many of the Far West directors, notably Anton Surikov, are or have been also associated with Kagarlitskii at the Russian Institute for Globalization Studies (IPROG).[84]

Although Filin and Pravda.info did not identify the foreign private military companies with which it worked, another source did:

Filin and Likhvintsev do business with foreign private military companies (PMCs):

– «Meteoric Tactical Solutions» (South Africa) – in Angola;

– «Kellogg, Brown &Root» (KBR Halliburton) – in Colombia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Georgia, and Iraq.

– «Diligence Iraq LLC» (controlled by the Kuwaiti Mohammed as-Sagar) – in Iraq.“

Their cooperation with these companies began in the end of 1994 in Angola on the initiative of Victor Bout, who was involved in the shipments of Soviet-made arms to the antigovernment group UNITA in exchange to raw diamonds.[85] Apparently, Bout became interested in Likhvintsev’s contacts (L. worked in Angola in 1986-87). Later, in October of 1998, Filin, Likhvintsev’s wife Liudmila Rozkina (b. 1966) and Anton Surikov (at that time he worked in the Russian government) established the company Far West Ltd., with the office in Lausanne, which officially does security consulting for business ventures in countries with unstable regimes. De facto, this is a legalized form of recruiting mercenaries for PMCs.[86]

Furthermore Yasenev claims that some of Far West’s work with Halliburton is apparently approved by the CIA for geopolitical purposes:

In 2003-2004, Filin and Likhvintsev worked on the Georgian project, financed by KBR Halliburton, apparently, with the approval of the CIA. The project had the goal of weakening the competitors of Halliburton in the oil business and, in a broader context, of facilitating the geopolitical objectives of the United States in the Caucasus. The OPS man in Georgia is Audrius Butkevicius, former Lithuanian minister of defense, presently advisor to Badri Patarkatsishvili.[87]

Some of Yasenev’s information about Diligence Iraq is corroborated by a Press Release from Diligence itself.[88]

Diligence LLC, a private military company (PMC), could be described as a CIA spin-off:

Diligence was founded by William Webster, the only man to head both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mike Baker, its chief executive officer, spent 14 years at the CIA as a covert field operations officer specializing in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. Whitley Bruner, its chief operating officer in Baghdad, was once the CIA station chief in Iraq.[89]

Its partner in Diligence Middle East (DME) is New Bridge Strategies, whose political clout was described by the Financial Times:

New Bridge was established in May [2003] and came to public attention because of the Republican heavyweights on its board – most linked to one or other Bush administration [officials] or to the family itself. Those include Joe Allbaugh, George W. Bush’s presidential campaign manager, and Ed Rogers and Lanny Griffith, former George H.W. Bush aids.[90]

Joe Allbaugh, the co-chairman of the company, was also head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), on the day of the 9/11 attacks, and indeed until March 2003, the month that the U.S. invaded Iraq.

The Financial Times wrote that the success of New Bridge in securing contracts had to do with their relationship to Neil Bush, the President’s brother:

Two businessmen instrumental in setting up New Bridge Strategies, a well-connected Washington firm designed to help clients win contracts in Iraq, have previously used an association with the younger brother of President George W. Bush to seek business in the Middle East, an FT investigation has found.

John Howland, the company president, and Jamal Daniel, a principal, have maintained an important business relationship with Neil Bush stretching back several years. In Mr Daniel’s case, the relationship spans more than a decade, with his French office arranging a trip for Mr Bush’s family to Disneyland Paris in 1992, while his father, George H.W.Bush, was president.

On several occasions, the two have attempted to exploit their association with the president’s brother to help win business and investors.

Three people contacted by the FT have seen letters written by Neil Bush recommending business ventures promoted by Mr Howland, Mr Daniel and his family in the Middle East. Mr Daniel has also had his photograph taken with the elder Mr Bush. Such letters and photographs can be valuable props when doing business in the Middle East.

Mr Daniel’s Houston investment fund, Crest Investment Corporation, employs Neil Bush as co-chairman. Crest Investment also helped fund Neil Bush’s Ignite!, an educational software company. Mr Daniel sometimes introduces himself as a founding backer of Mr Bush’s company, a Middle-Eastern businessman who has met him said, and has persuaded the families of prominent leaders in the region to invest.[91]

Until recently, news stories about the international backers for Neil Bush’s firm ignite have focused on Taiwanese businessmen, and Middle East billionaires, such as Defense Minister and Crown Prince of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum.[92] But it was a surprise to learn in September 2005 that „Exiled Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky was in Riga along with Neil Bush, the brother of the U.S. president, to discuss an educational project with Latvian businessmen.“[93] In an interview with Interfax, „Berezovsky pointed out that he is one of the shareholders of Ignite! Inc., an educational software company. U.S. President George W. Bush’s brother Neil Bush is the company’s chairman and chief executive.“[94]

The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic

Much remains to be learned about Far West, Ltd., its personnel, and the American firm which co-founded it. Reportedly it was founded in 1998; and already had Surikov and Saidov as directors when they attended the meeting in Khashoggi’s villa in July 1999.

I suspect myself that the meeting did indeed have to do with destabilizing Russia, as Dunlop claimed. But I believe also that the group at the meeting was more concerned with facilitating drug-trafficking than with strengthening the Kremlin. I believe further that they also discussed the Russian presence in Kosovo, and the imminent increase in the flow of Afghan drugs through Kosovo.

That this flow is huge has been attested to by many observers. Russian sources estimate that from 1991 to 2003 the same group shipped to Western Europe up to 300 tons of heroin and sold it to wholesale buyers of Kosovo Albanian nationality.  In the same period they sold up to 60 tons of heroin to Azeri and Roma (gypsy) wholesalers in the Volga and the Urals Federal Districts of Russia. The group’s total receipts for heroin in 1991-2003 are estimated to be $5 billion.[95]

The chief narco-baron of the group is said to be Vladimir Filin, who is also the head of Far West. Here is a relevant interview Filin afforded to his colleague Alexander Nagorny at Filin’s own alternate organization, Pravda.info:

There have been reports in mass media about the involvement of the U.S. military in Afghanistan in drug trafficking. I asked the well-known political scientist and specialist on organized crime Vladimir Filin to comment on this.

-Vladimir Ilyich, is it true that Americans are involved in drug business?

-Yes, they are in ideal situation for this. They control the Bagram airfield from where the Air Force transport planes fly to a U.S. military base in Germany. In the last two years this base became the largest transit hub for moving Afghan heroin to other US bases and installations in Europe. Much of it goes to Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. From there the Kosovo Albanian mafia moves heroin back to Germany and other EU countries.

-Why such a complex arrangement?

Drug traffickers enjoy relative safety in military bases. There is no serious control there. German police cannot work there. However, outside of military bases German law-enforcement is in effect. True, any police can be bought. But the level of corruption in Germany is not as high as, say, in Russia. This is why it is more convenient for Americans to establish distribution centers in other places. I believe that, in time, such centers will move to their military installations in Poznan, Poland, and also in Romania and Bulgaria. Poland is already a EU member. Romania and Bulgaria are expected to be in 2007. Corruption in these countries is almost as high as in Russia.

-How big is American drug traffic to Europe and who is behind it?

-About 15-20 tons of heroin a year. When Poznan become open, I think it could rise to 50, even 70 tons. Behind this business are the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). Actually, this is what they did already in Indochina in the 1960s-70s and in Central America in the 1980s.[96]

Under the circumstances I consider Filin to be no more reliable than his opposite number, Joseph D. Douglass, the author of Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and the West. But legitimate questions abound as to why the USA empowered the KLA to take over Kosovo.

<!– I will close with a question I have raised before. One has to ask why in 2004 some U.S. bureaucratic sectors in the Bush Administration were still using the KLA’s very special background to deal with the difficult situation in Haiti:

In 2004 a USAID Report confirmed that „Training and management specialists of the Kosovo Protection Corps, a civilian response unit consisting primarily of former Kosovo Liberation Army members, have been brought to Haiti“[97]

Why would AID bring veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army, „a major force in international organized crime, moving staggering amounts of narcotics.“[98] to train and manage the Haitian Army, an organization traditionally „corrupted by Colombian cocaine kingpins“?[99]

Whatever the answer, it is hard to imagine that AID in 2004 did not have drugs somehow in mind.

[„Peter Dale Scott has requested the deletion here of three erroneous paragraphs concerning Kosovo, Haiti, and AID. The error arose because his published source had misread and misunderstood an AID document.“]

How the U.S. Restored Narco-Barons to Power in Afghanistan, 2001

It is clear that the Blair and Bush Administrations did have drugs in mind when in 2001 they developed a strategy for ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Their plans focused chiefly on Ahmad Shah Massoud, overcoming the long-time resistance in Washington to supporting this known drug trafficker.[100]

Massoud of course was also the most successful guerrilla opponent of the Taliban. A more naked example of a U.S. drug ally was Haji Zaman in Jalalabad.

When the Taliban claimed Jalalabad…Zaman had fled Afghanistan for a leisurely life in Dijon, France. Just a few years at the top of the heroin trade in Jalalabad had given „Mr. Ten Percent“ a ticket to just about any destination he could have chosen. In late September 2001, British and American officials, keen to build up an opposition core to take back the country from the Taliban, met with and persuaded Zaman to return to Afghanistan.[101]

According to Asian sources, Zaman’s long-time Pakistani drug-trafficking partner, Haji Ayub Afridi, was also released from a Pakistani jail at this time, „reportedly at the request of the CIA.“[102]

The informed Indian observer B. Raman was outspoken about the U.S. use of narcobarons to oust the Taliban. Citing the subsequent failure to curb opium production, he wrote:

There are disturbing reports from reliable sources in Afghanistan that this marked lack of success in the heroin front is due to the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA, which encouraged these heroin barons during the Afghan war of the 1980s in order to spread heroin-addiction amongst the Soviet troops, is now using them in its search for bin Laden and other surviving leaders of the Al Qaeda, by taking advantage of their local knowledge and contacts. These Pakistani heroin barons and their Afghan lieutenants are reported to have played an important role in facilitating the induction of Hamid Karzai into the Pashtun areas to counter the Taliban in November, 2001. It is alleged that in return for the services rendered by them, the USA has turned a blind eye to their heroin refineries and reserves.[103]

A third major narcobaron selected by the CIA, according to Raman, was Haji Abdul Qadeer.

Haji Abdul Qadeer was the CIA’s choice [in 2001] as the Governor of the Nangarhar province in which Jalalabad is located. …. During the first Afghan war against the Soviet troops in the 1980s, he played an active role under the control of the CIA and the Directorate-General For External Security (DGES), the French external intelligence agency, in organizing the heroin trail to the Soviet troops from the heroin refineries of Pakistan owned by Haji Ayub Afridi, the Pakistani narcotics baron, who was a prized operative of the CIA in the 1980s. Abdul Qadeer and Afridi became very close associates in running this drug trade with the blessings of the CIA. Amongst others who were associated with this trade were Haji Mohammed Zaman and Hazrat Ali.[104]

If Raman is correct, therefore, the CIA not only blessed but controlled the flow of drugs from Afridi, Zaman, and Abdul Qadeer into the hands of Soviet troops like Vladimir Filin and Aleksei Likhvintsev.[105]

IV. The Meta-Group, the War on Terror, and 9/11

U.S. Geostrategic Goals and Chechnya

In the 1980s CIA Director William Casey used narcotics to achieve two goals, the immediate goal of weakening the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the long-term goal of financing Islamist resistance to break up the Soviet Union.[106] According to the partisan but well-informed observer Yossef Bodansky, Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, the U.S. still pursues the goal of weakening destabilizing Russia.

As if reliving the „good ol‘ days“ of Afghanistan of the 1980s, Washington is once again seeking to support and empower the most virulent anti-Western Islamist forces. The US crossed the line in mid-December 1999, when US officials participated in a formal meeting in Azerbaijan in which specific programs for the training and equipping of mujahedin from the Caucasus, Central/South Asia and the Arab world were discussed and agreed upon. This meeting led to Washington’s tacit encouragement of both Muslim allies (mainly Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and US „private security companies“ (of the type which did the Clinton Administration’s dirty job in the Balkans while skirting and violating the international embargo the US formally supported) to assist the Chechens and their Islamist allies to surge in the Spring of 2000 and sustain the ensuing jihad for a long time.

Washington’s motivation is oil pipeline politics and the economy. Essentially, Washington is determined to deprive Russia of a viable pipeline route through spiraling violence and terrorism, the political fallout of media accusations of Russian war crimes. In the calculations of the Clinton Administration, a US-assisted escalation and expansion of the war in Chechnya should deliver the desired debilitation of Russia.

The Clinton Administration believes that the spiraling violence in the Caucasus will scare Western investors and oil buyers from making deals with Russia. Meanwhile, with the sudden US attempted rapprochement with Iran, the Clinton Administration is heralding the Azerbaijani southern route (with a little detour in Iran) as seemingly feasible. And so, in the Summer of 2000, the Clinton Administration keeps fanning the flames of the Islamist jihad in the Caucasus through covert assistance, tacit encouragement of allies to actively support the mujahedin, as well as the orchestrating of an intense media campaign against Russia and its conduct in Chechnya.[107]

The Caucasian Common Market project of Khashoggi, Lord McAlpine, and James Baker, can be seen as contributing to this goal. While these western investors may have sought profits as the result of their investment, they were perhaps more anxious to see the reduction of Russian influence, thus providing a more secure environment for the new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which western oil companies count on to deliver oil from the Caspian Basin to the Mediterranean.

As the State Department noted in 2005,

the involvement of U.S. firms in the development and export of Azerbaijani oil is key to our objectives of diversifying world oil supplies, providing a solid base for the regional economy, and promoting U.S. energy security.[108]

The Bush Administration committed an estimated $1.5 billion to the Caspian basin area, including an $11 million program to train a „pipeline protection battalion“ for the special Georgian unit created to protect the Georgian section of the BTC pipeline.[109]

The Meta-Group’s Geostrategic Goal: Maintain the War of Terror

The fact that the United States will use drug traffickers as geostrategic assets does not at all mean that Washington and the traffickers will necessarily have the same agendas. In theory at least, the contrary should be true. Although the United States may have used known traffickers like Zaman and Qadir to regain access to Afghanistan, its stated ultimate goal, and the one assumed by the mainstream media, was to reimpose its own kind of order. Whether the country is Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Colombia, or Kosovo, America’s national interest is said to be to install and then protect pipelines. And pipelines require peace and security.

The prime geostrategic goal of the drug traffic in Afghanistan is precisely to prevent peace and security from happening. It is true that the international illicit drug industry, like the international oil industry, is polymorphous and flexible, relying on diversified sources and markets for its products in order to maintain its global dominance. But for the global drug traffic to prosper, there must always be key growing areas where there is ongoing violence, and state order does not prevail.

However, in speaking above of America’s stated national interest, I do not assume that a U.S. government will always represent that national interest. Something else has happened in recent decades, the growth of the drug trade to the point that it now represents a significant portion of national and international wealth. And it has to be said that the American free enterprise system, like every other dominant political system in a current nation with world pretensions, will tend above all to represent the interests of the wealthy.

Thus Bush Administration policies cannot be assumed to reflect the national goals of peace and security, as outlined above. On the contrary, its shocking underfunding of Afghanistan’s recovery, like its complex and destabilizing interventions in Georgia, suggest that it, as much as the drug traffic, hopes to utilize instability – as a pretext for maintaining unstable U.S. bases in countries like Uzbekistan, whose people eventually will more and more object to them. These policies can be said to favor the interests of the drug traffic more than the interests of security and orderly development.

A test of the Bush Administration’s true intentions in the War on Terror came as early as November 2001. The Americans had learned, correctly, that Osama bin Laden was holed up in the caves of Tora Bora. While storming the caves was a difficult military challenge, surrounding and isolating them was well within the capacity of U.S. military strength. However General Franks, the United States commander, entrusted the task of capturing bin Laden to two local commanders: Hazrat Ali and Haji Zaman.

As we have seen, Hazrat Ali and Haji Zaman were not only drug lords, they were earlier part of the 1980s heroin trail to Soviet troops that had been organized „with the blessings of the CIA.“ Thus the U.S. could hardly plead ignorance as to these men’s activities and interests, which clearly involved making sure that the writ of Kabul would never extend to their own Nangahar Province. For the drug trade to thrive in Afghanistan, it was necessary that the influence of Osama and the Taliban be preserved, not extinguished.

The folly of using Hazrat Ali and Haji Zaman was brought to Franks‘ attention at the time:

Military and intelligence officials had warned Franks and others that the two main Afghan commanders, Hazrat Ali and Haji Zaman, couldn’t be trusted, and they proved to be correct. They were slow to move their troops into place and didn’t attack until four days after American planes began bombing – leaving time for al-Qaida leaders to escape and leaving behind a rear guard of Arab, Chechen and Uzbek fighters.[110]

The failure to use U.S. troops cannot be attributed to the motive of appeasing local sentiments:

Pir Baksh Bardiwal, the intelligence chief for the Eastern Shura, said that he would welcome a massive influx of U.S. troops. He believed that the Pentagon planners were making a grave mistake by not surrounding Tora Bora.[111]

A U.S. journalist who was there, Philip Smucker, claims that the treachery of the local commanders went beyond their slowness to surround Tora Bora. He describes hearing how one lower level commander

whom Ali had assigned to guard the Pakistani border, had acted as an outright escort for al Qaeda…. „Ilyas Khel just showed the Arabs the way out of the country into Pakistan“…..That Ali had entrusted [Khel, who had once served under the military commander of Osama’s friend Younis Khalis] suggested to us that the escapes were part of a much broader conspiracy to assist al Qaeda right through to the end.[112]

How high up did this conspiracy go? Certainly Ali’s failure to capture Osama could have been and was predicted. But if capturing Osama was indeed the U.S. goal (as announced at the time by Colin Powell), the real question is why the task was not entrusted to U.S. troops.

In the wake of 9/11, Sibel Edmonds, a former FBI translator, has claimed to possess information linking the American 9/11, and much else, to massive drug-trafficking which has corrupted high level U.S. officials. Among other things, she has claimed that the U.S. has never gone after top-level drug traffickers, because

this would upset „certain foreign relations.“ But it would also expose certain of our elected officials, who have significant connections with high-level drugs- and weapons-smuggling – and thus with the criminal underground, even with the terrorists themselves…..[113]

After Ms. Edmonds reported improprieties to her FBI employers, she was fired. She has appealed her firing, but the Bush administration has invoked the unusual claim of the „state-secrets privilege“ to prevent the lawsuits she has filed from being heard in court. At this point we know little more than that what concerned her involved arms-dealing, drug-trafficking, and Turkey.

It is I think a matter of national priority to learn more about the American links to Far West, Ltd., the group accused of staging the Russian 9/11. It is a matter of more than purely historic interest to learn if that group’s Islamist and American connections could have supplied a meeting-ground for staging the American 9/11 as well.

For at present America faces in Afghanistan, what Russia faces in Chechnya, a war which is favorable to drug trafficking but increasingly deleterious to national well-being.[114] The Bush Administration continues to use 9/11 to sell its Asian adventures to the American people. Meanwhile elements profiting from the flow of Afghan drugs continue to grow stronger and more dangerous to the well-being of both countries.

Concluding Question: The Meta-Group and the United States Government

It seems clear that the meta-group, with its influential connections on at least three continents, was powerful enough to effect changes, through the Russian 9/11, in Russian history. The question arises whether they could similarly effect changes in American history as well.

As we have seen Russian sources claim that the U.S. Government has had access to he meta-group, for such especially sensitive projects as the assassination of Abu al Walid al-Hamadi. They claim the meta-group’s involvement in a number of U.S.-sponsored regime changes in eastern Europe, from the overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania to the recent deposition of Shevardnadze in Georgia. The Wall Street Journal attributed the latter to the work of „a raft of non-governmental organizations . . . supported by American and other Western foundations.“[115] One of these was the Albert Einstein Institution, funded by both the NED and the Soros foundations, which helped to create the dissident youth movementKmara in Georgia.Audrius Butkevicius, the meta-group member now resident in Georgia, is said to be closely connected with the Albert Einstein Institution.[116]

To this we should possibly add the so-called tulip revolution in March 2005 that ousted long-time leader Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, (It was after this event that Far West opened its office in Kyrgyzstan.)[117] Nagorny claims that the coup was organized by British intelligence and Chechens in Istanbul, with the „technical assistance“ of Americans.[118] Since then the heroin traffic through Kyrgyzstan has allegedly almost trebled.[119]

Returning to a question raised earlier, it also seems possible that the U.S. government might contemplate using Hizb ut-Tahrir and the meta-group for political changes in Russia itself, even while combating the Islamism of al-Qaeda elsewhere. This would be far from the first time that the U.S. Government had used drug-trafficking proxies as assets, and would do a lot to explain the role of the U.S. in 2001 in restoring major drug traffickers to power in Afghanistan. Dubious figures like Nukhaev, Khodorkovskii, and Khashoggi have already shown their interest in such initiatives; and western business interests have shown their eagerness to work with these allies of the meta-group.

It is fitting to think of most U.S. intelligence assets as chess pieces, moved at the whim of their controllers. That is however not an apt metaphor for the meta-group, which clearly has the resources to negotiate and to exert its own influence interactively upon the governments it works with.

Since first hearing about the meta-group’s role in the Russian 9/11, I have pondered the question whether it could have played a similar role in the American 9/11 as well. At this point I have to say that I have found no persuasive evidence that would prove its involvement. The fact remains that two informed and credible witnesses, Sibell Edmonds and Indira Singh, have spoken independently of the importance of international drug trafficking in the background of 9/11.

The Bush Administration has paid Sibell Edmonds the tribute of silencing her on the grounds of national interest. She has nonetheless made it clear that what she would talk about concerns that part of the world where the meta-group has influence:

SE [Sibell Edmonds]: It’s interesting, in one of my interviews, they say „Turkish countries,“ but I believe they meant Turkic countries – that is, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and all the ‚Stans, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and [non-Turkic countries like] Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of these countries play a big part in the sort of things I have been talking about.

CD [Chris Deliso]: What, you mean drug-smuggling?

SE: Among other things. Yes, that is a major part of it. It’s amazing that in this whole „war on terror“ thing, no one ever talks about these issues.[120]

Indira Singh, who lost her high-tech job at J.P. Morgan after telling the FBI about Ptech and 9/11, was even more dramatic in her public testimony at a Canadian event:

I did a number of things in my research and when I ran into the drugs I was told that if I mentioned the money to the drugs around 9/11 that would be the end of me.[121]

The False Dilemmas of 9/11 Theories

I said earlier that by suppressing awareness of the role of drug-trafficking in our society, we give drug traffickers a de facto franchise to exert political influence without criticism or opposition. An example of this is the discussion of 9/11 in America, which usually fails to consider the meta-group among the list of possible suspects.

I have tried to suggest in this paper that in fact the meta-group had both motive – to restore the Afghan opium harvest and increase instability and chaos along the trade routes through Central Asia – and opportunity – to utilize its contacts with both al-Zawahiri in al Qaeda and the CIA in Washington. It is furthermore the best candidate to explain one of the more difficult anomalies (or indeed paradoxes) of the clues surrounding 9/11: that many of the clues lead in the direction of Saudi Arabia, but some lead also in a very different direction, towards Israel.[122]

Here it is worth quoting again the well-informed remark of a Washington insider about the meta-group’s predecessor, BCCI: „Who else could wire something together to Saudi Arabia, China, Israel, and the U.S.?“[123] The current meta-group fills the same bill, for it unites supporters of Muslim Salafism (Saidov) with at least one Israeli citizen (Kosman).

The meta-group’s involvement in the Russian 9/11 of course does nothing to prove its involvement in the American one. However awareness of its presence – as an unrecognized Force X operating in the world – makes previous discussions of 9/11 seem curiously limited. Again and again questions of responsibility have been unthinkingly limited to false dilemmas in which the possible involvement of this or any other Force X is excluded.

An early example is Michael Moore’s naïve question to President Bush in Dude, Where’s My Country: „Who attacked the United States on September 11 – a guy on dialysis from a cave in Afghanistan, or your friends, Saudi Arabia?“[124] A far more widespread dilemma is that articulated by David Ray Griffin in his searching critique of the 9/11 Commission Report:

There are two basic theories about 9/11. Each of these theories is a „conspiracy theory.“ One of these is the official conspiracy theory, according to which the attacks of 9/11 were planned and executed solely by al-Qaeda terrorists under the guidance of Osama bin Laden….Opposing this official theory is the [sic] alternative conspiracy theory, which holds that the attacks of 9/11 were able to succeed only because they were facilitated by the Bush administration and its agencies.[125]

Griffin of course is not consciously excluding a third possible theory – that a Force X was responsible. But his failure to acknowledge this possibility is an example of the almost universal cultural denial I referred to earlier. In America few are likely to conceive of the possibility that a force in contact with the U.S. government could be not just an asset, but a force exerting influence on that government.

My personal suggestion to 9/11 researchers is that they focus on the connections of the meta-group’s firm Far West, Ltd. – in particular those which lead to Khashoggi, Berezovskii, Halliburton and Dick Cheney, and Diligence, Joe Allbaugh, and Neil Bush.

DIRECTORS OF FAR WEST, LTD.[126]

Leonid Leonidovich Kosyakov, b. 1955, Ukrainian citizen. Until 2005 resided in Dubai and Switzerland. ’83-’85 – in command of a special GRU group in Shindand, West. Afghanistan, assigned to intercept caravans with drugs. In different times under his command served Filin, Lunev, Likhvintsev, Surikov, Saidov, and Petrov. Ret. in ’93. Owns big travel company in Dubai. In the spring of 2005 was appointed to general’s position in Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and stepped down as the official president of Far West Ltd.

Vladimir „Ilyich“ Filin, b. 1960, Kiev, Ukraine. Ukrainian. Doctor of sciences (1982). In ’83-84 served in a special unit of GRU in Western Afghanistan, assigned to intercept caravans with drugs. In 1993 retired from GRU in the rank of Lt.-Colonel. A British citizen since 2000. In 2004 Filin was listed as political scientist and expert on „revolutionary and guerilla movements in the developing world“ at IPROG, the Moscow Institute for Globalization Studies.

Anatoly Baranov. Journalist. Under Masliukov-Primakov cabinet served as public relations executive director, Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG. In 2002 bought forum.msk.ru. Owner of Pravda-info. 2003 – Press secretary to the deputy prime minister Alyoshin (military-industrial complex). „Coordinator of media projects“ at IPROG.

Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuanian. Presently resides in Georgia. Former Lithuanian minister of defense. Sentenced for bribery. Has close ties with Albert Einstein Institution. Member of Far West Ltd. board of directors and the editorial board of Pravda.info. ’94 – visiting scholar at Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London (together with Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, now in prison for espionage).

Alfonso Davidovich Ochoa (b. 1948), Venezuelan, resides in Munich, Germany. Has German and Venezuelan citizenship. In the 1970s went through special training in the USSR and East Germany. Was close to the Cuban General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez. In the past used passports in the names of Jose Rodriguez, Captain of the Cuban Army, and Jose Alva, Colombian citizen. Responsible for FWL office in Bogotá.

Alexei Likhvintsev („Abdulla,“ „Pribalt“), b. 1959, Lviv, Ukraine. Ukrainian. British citizen (2000), resides in Britain (Scotland?). ’84-85 special GRU unit based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan). Nov ’87-Jan ’89 – military advisor in Angola. 90′-’93 – together with Filin on assignment to sell the property of the Soviet Army in East Germany, did business with Kosovo Albanian companies. ’93.

Valery Nikolaevich Lunev (b. 1960, Belorussia). Belorussian. ’83-84 – special GRU unit based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan. Married to Dzhokhar Dudaev’s relative Fatima (b. 1970). Retired from the military in March of 1995. Lunev is responsible for security and „strong arm operations“. For his operations he hires the former and active duty officers of Russian secret services, including spetsnaz. Resides in the Netherlands, has Dutch citizenship. In 1990-91 Lunev took part in overthrowing the regime of Zviad Gamsahurdia in Georgia. Has extensive contacts in Tajikistan.

Ruslan Shamilievich Saidov (b. 1960, city of Khasavyurt, Dagestan). Avar Chechen-Spanish. Has Turkish passport in the name of Hungar (?) Mehmet and passport of Arab Emirates. ’83-84 – special GRU unit based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan. Later, assignments in Lebanon and Syria. Ret. Major of GRU ’93. Resides in Turkey since ’95 and in Dubai. Advisor to Necmettin Erbakan – ’96. Business partner of the Islamic Bank of Dubai and Habib Bank. Since mid-90s Saidov formed stable relations with the Saudi businessman Adnan Hashoggi, Prince Turki al-Faisal and Prince Na’f. Close to Basaev and Khattab.

Anton Victorovich Surikov , „Mansur“ (Ancestral name: Mansur Ali-Hadzhi Natkhoev), b. 1961, Sukhimi, Georgia, USSR. Ethnic Adygei. Son of a leading figure in the Soviet military-industrial establishment. Resides in Moscow. Has Turkish and, possibly, US citizenship. Doctor of sciences. ’84-served in a special GRU unit, based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan). ’90-96 – Institute of USA and Canada. ’92 – 93 – deputy of the Abkhazian minister of defense, makes friends with Shamil Basaev, commander of the special battalion trained by GRU. ’94 – visiting scholar at the Center for Defense Studies, King’s College London. ’96 – ret. Colonel. Also on IPROG staff.

Yakov Abramovich Kosman (b. 1946), resides in Nice, France. Has German and, possibly, Israeli citizenship. Involved in real estate operations and banking. Has contacts with Kosovo Albanian criminal societies in European countries. In 1997-2000 he served as financial consultant to Hashim Thaçi, the chief commander of KLA. The new president of Far West, Ltd.

Peter Dale Scott’s last book was Drugs, Oil, and War (2003). For the past three years he has been living in Berkeley and Thailand, while writing a book on oil, drugs, and 9/11. His website is www.peterdalescott.net

Footnotes

[1] Asia Times, 10/27/05, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GJ27Ag02.html.

[2] Nick Kochan, The Washing Machine: How Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Soils Us (Mason, OH: Thomson, 2005), 124.

[3] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2004; quoted in Kochan, The Washing Machine, 124: „The effects of this worldwide, highly integrated industry have been felt from Colombia to Thailand, from Afghanistan to Sudan, and from Russia to the United States. No country has been impervious. Transnational drug networks have exploded in response to the new conditions in the former Soviet Union. Particularly menacing are the connections that have been identified between networks in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Soviet successor states.“

[4] Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America (Boston: Little Brown, 2000), 208-09.

[5] Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/ Chicago Review Press, 2001); Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

[6] Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI (New York: Random House, 1993), 347.

[6a] A comprador is an agent who acts as intermediary between local and international commerce. The term is used pejoratively in Marxist literature, but I use it neutrally here. Each compradorial revolution must be judged on its own merits

[7] „According to the UN, opium production [in Afghanistan] peaked in 2004 to near record levels of 4,200 metric tonnes – nearly 90% of the world market“ (BBC News, 4/26/05, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4487433.stm).

[8] The former dominance of the Burma drug trade by the Taiwan-based Guomindang (GMD) has now been replaced in press accounts by the control of the United Wa State Army, an ostensibly indigenous group. At the heart of the Wa Army, however, control of the traffic by Taiwan intelligence endures. See Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 1999), 321, 324, 380.

[9] Letter of Anton Surikov to Oleg Grechenevsky, discussed below: „I am personally acquainted with Mr. Ermarth as political scientist since 1996. It’s well known by many people and we never hid this fact.“ Fritz Ermath did not retire from the CIA until 1998. Cf. Argumenty i Facty, 9/15/99, http://www.aif.ru/oldsite/986/art010.html. That the two men met in 1996 was indeed public knowledge. The Russian journal Commersant published a photo of the two men and others at the International Seminar on Global Security in Virginia, April, 1996.

[10] Interview, http://www.pravda.info/region/3601.html, discussed below. Cf. Letter of Anton Surikov to Oleg Grechenevsky, discussed below: „We cooperate with the American side in the sphere of commercial transportation not on the basis of direct commercial contracts between our agency [Far West, Ltd.] and the U. S. government, but through the intermediary company co-founded by the agency and a private U.S. company, which in its turn also interacts with the U.S. government.“

[11] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), http://www.compromat.ru/main/surikov/saidov.htm.

[12]John B. Dunlop, „Storm in Moscow“: A Plan of the Yeltsin „Family“ to Destabilize Russia

The Hoover Institution, October 8, 2004, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/res/papers/Dunlop%20paper.pdf.

[13] Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 6-15.

[14] See the anecdote in the latest edition of Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/ Chicago Review Press, 2003), xii; discussed also in Peter Dale Scott, „The Sleep of Reason: Denial, Memory-Work, and the Reconstruction of Social Order,“ Literary Responses to Mass Violence (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University, 2004).

[15] Scott, Deep Politics, 164-81.

[16] This distinction between a government operation ad a socio-political force reflects the distinction I make between parapolitics and deep politics (Scott, Deep Politics, 6-12).

[17] Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, 3/17/03, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030317fa_fact. Soon after the exposure of Perle’s contact with Khashoggi, which, Hersh argued, violated a federal Code of Conduct for government employees, Perle resigned his influential position as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board.

[18] Interfax, 9/21/05. See below.

[19] Richard Secord, with Jay Wurts, Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos (New York: John Wiley, 1992), 283-84; cf. Robert Parry, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq (Arlington, VA: Media Consortium, 2004), 136, 139.

[20] Patrick Cockburn, „Russia ‚planned Chechen war before bombings,'“ Independent, 1/29/00, http://www.naqshbandi.net/haqqani/features/caucasus/news/stepashin_confession.htm.

[21] Nafeez Mossadeq Ahmed, „The Smashing of Chechnya: An International Irrelevance.

A Case Study of the Role of Human Rights in Western Foreign Policy“

http://mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq5.html.

[22] John B. Dunlop, „`Storm in Moscow‘: A Plan of the Yeltsin „Family“ to Destabilize Russia

The Hoover Institution, October 8, 2004, 15-17

[23] Dunlop, „`Storm in Moscow,'“ 18.

[24] Although Dunlop does not mention it, Khashoggi „himself, in a letter addressed to Versiya, denied the allegation that the meeting occurred specifically at his estate“ (Versiya, 2/3/00). The book Blowing Up Russia goes further, arguing that „no such meeting took place, and someone deliberately misinformed the Russian media.“ The logic advanced for this conclusion is that the bombings were not needed „by the insurgents in Chechnya to encourage the legal recognition of their independent republic“ (Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, Blowing Up Russia [New York: S.P.I. Books, 2002], 105, 108). However this „logic“ ignores the more likely motive of Basaev: to weaken the influence of the moderate Chechen leader Maskhadov, and create future political space for action by Salafi Muslim jihadists. See Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 152-55.

[25] John B. Dunlop, „Storm in Moscow“: A Plan of the Yeltsin „Family“ to Destabilize Russia

The Hoover Institution, October 8, 2004.

[26] Dunlop, „Storm in Moscow,“ 41: „At the end of June [2000] there arrived at the editorial board of Versiya a large postal envelope without a return address. In it was a photograph in which were depicted three men…. After a time, there was a telephone call to the editorial offices, and the man who called, who did not introduce himself, said: ‚That is the photograph of the meeting of Voloshin with Basaev. It is easy to recognize Voloshin, but Basaev is the bearded man to the extreme right. That is what you wrote about [in the 3 August 1999 issue] and what you need.‘ The unidentified man explained that the photograph was from a still of footage shot with a video-camera…“ (The third man in the photograph, Versiya asserted, was former GRU operative Anton Surikov.) Versiya published the photograph of the three men at the head of the article.“

[27] Khashoggi’s connections to U.S. intelligence date back to his involvement in Lockheed payoffs to Saudi politicians in the 1960s. These tended to overlap with CIA patterns of corruption; and the USAF actually ran a similar program with Lockheed, „code-named ‚Operation Buttercup‘ that operated out of Norton Air Force Base in California from 1965 to 1972“ (San Francisco Chronicle, 10/24/73, 22).“ For the pattern of Lockheed payoffs tracking the CIA’s, see Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York: Viking, 1977), 134, 227-8, 238.

[28] Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swann, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon (New York: Viking, 2000), 283.

[29] Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 84.

[30] Robert Parry, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq (Arlington, VA: Media Consortium, 2004), 136, 139. A Portuguese newspaper article alleged that Khashoggi was a director of BCCI, and this claim has often been repeated. The best sources confirm only Khashoggi’s profitable arms deals with the bank as co-investor, and his cousin Yassin’s participation in a BCCI affiliate, Hong Kong Deposit and Guaranty (Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 108-09, 129, 135-38).

[31] Ron Kessler, The Richest Man in the World , 181-83.

[32] „Separatism, Islam and Oil,“ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2000/02/game/344.htm. Cf. „The tendencies of interregional and international integration in North Caucasia,“ Caucasian Knot, eng.kavkaz.memo.ru/reginfotext/ engreginfo/id/560578.html: „One of the projects of Caucasian integration is called „Caucasian Common Market“. It was offered in 1997 by Chechen politicians with the support of the western states – USA and Great Britain. This project is on the stage of implementation: in Georgia a branch of Caucasian Common Market is established, a company for insurance of foreign investments is established, an industrial construction consortium „Caucasus“ is organised that apart from renovation of the port Poti plans to construct motorways and railways in Chechnya. The executive bodies of Caucasian Common Market are also represented in Baku. Caucasian-American chamber of commerce and as part of it Caucasian investment fund were organised in the USA. These organisations are going to collect 3 billion USD as the initial capital for the projects of Caucasian Common Market.“

[33] Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 206, 11/4/97. Another interested party before his tragic death with Princess Diana was Dodi al-Fayad, the owner of Harrod’s and Khashoggi’s nephew.

[34] AFP, „From criminal to Islamist: US journalist traces the life of a Chechen rebel,“ JRL 7252, 7/16/03, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7252-17.cfm#top. Nukhaev’s criminal background was known in the West before his dealings with Lord McAlpine and (allegedly) James Baker. See A. Zhilin, “ The Shadow of Chechen Crime over Moscow,“ Jamestown Foundation, 3/22/96, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?search=1&volume_id=3&issue_id=128&article_id=15.27; Paul Klebnikov, Razgovor S Varvarom Besedy S Chechenskim Polevym Komandirom Khozhakhmedom Nukhaevym O Banditizme I Islame (Talks with a Barbarian). . This background did not deter Margaret Thatcher from posing in a photograph with Nukhaev.

[35] „Caucasian diamond traffic“ (Moscow, 2005), http://www.civilresearch.org/pdf/7.pdf: „In spring 1997 Adnan Khashoggi introduced Hozh-Ahmed Nukhaev to James Baker.“

[36] Boris Kagarlitskii, „S terroristami ne razgovarivaem. No pomogaem?“ Novaya gazeta, 24 January 2000; Boris Kagarlitskii, trans. Olga Kryazheva, „We Don’t Talk To Terrorists. But We Help Them? A version of apartment explosions in Russia,“ Novaya Gazeta, 1/24/00, http://geocities.com/chechenistan/conspiracy.html).

[37] See Lilia Shevtsova, translated by Antonina Bouis, Putin’s Russia (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 279, fn 15; citing Profil‘, 11/27/00, 18-20.

[38] For the complex story of Turkish involvement in the Chechen War, see e.g. „Turkey and the Chechens,“ BBC News, 3/16/01, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1223398.stm;. Hunter, Islam in Russia, 362-71.

[39] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), http://www.compromat.ru/main/surikov/saidov.htm.

[40] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), ru.compromat. This and other discrepancies between Dunlop and his source Yasenev were first pointed out by the Russian research group burtsev.ru at http://left.ru/2005/10/burtsev127.html .

[41] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), ru.compromat..

[42] „KLA Funding Tied To Heroin Profits,“ Washington Times, 5/3/99.

[43] SIDA/Cornell Caspian Consulting, „The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview,“ 2002, http://www.cornellcaspian.com/sida/sida-cfl-2.html.

[44] Anton Surikov, Crime in Russia, 38-39.

[45] Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale UP, 2002), 279, 284-85.

[46] Toronto Sun, 6/27/99.

[47] Pravda.ru, 7/3/03, http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/91/365/10389_peacekeepers.html.

[48] The map was allegedly shown by Surikov’s partner Sergei Petrov to a Russian businessman in Geneva while discussing a drug deal (http://www.compromat.ru/main/surikov/a.htm).

[49] Peter Klebnikov, „Heroin Heroes,“ Mother Jones, January/February 2000, http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2000/01/heroin.html; Peter Dale Scott, „Deep Politics: Drugs, Oil, Covert Operations and Terrorism,“ http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/911Background.htm.

[50] Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 285, fn. 11.

[51] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), ru.compromat. Cf. Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America (Boston: Little Brown, 2000), 265: „Astonishingly, both the [George H.W.] Bush and the Clinton administrations have unwittingly helped foster the Russian mob and the untrammeled corruption of post-Soviet Union Russia. When the CIA was asked in 1992 by Kroll and Associates, working on behalf of the Russian government, to help locate $20 billion that was hidden offshore by the KGB and the mob, the Bush national security team declined to cooperate. The Bush group rationalized, according to Fritz Ermarth, a top CIA policy analyst writing in The National Interest, `that capital flight is capital flight. It doesn’t matter who has the money or how it was acquired even if by theft; so long as it is private, it will return to do good things if there was a market.'“

[52] Founder and Chair of IPROG Board and the Institute’s director until April 2002 when he was replaced by Boris Kagarlitskii.

[53] Member of Yeltsin „family;“ Deputy Minister of Finance and then Prime Minister for four years until fired by Putin 2/24/04.

[54] Dunlop, „Storm in Moscow,“ 44-45.

[55] PBS, Frontline, October 2003, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/moscow/khodorkovsky.html. Cf. Menatep Press Release of 4/30/02, http://www.groupmenatep.com/pressroom/pressroom_april_30_02.cfm: „30.04.2002: Group MENATEP Invests US $25 Million in Blackstone Capital Partners IV: Group MENATEP’s GM Investment & Co Ltd has agreed to invest up to US $25 million in Blackstone Capital Partners IV, a private equity investment fund managed by The Blackstone Group, an investment bank with offices in New York and London. Primary investment targets will include major industrial, service and communications-related companies in the United States and Europe. In the last six months, Group MENATEP has made commitments to invest in excess of US $150 million with a number of investment firms, including AIG Capital Partners, Global Asset Management, The Carlyle Group, and now The Blackstone Group (Source: PR Newswire).“

[56]„Former Primakov Official Attacks High-Level Corruption and Yeltsin’s Plans in 2000,“ Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 5/25/99, JRL 3306, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/3306.html##9.

[57] Chechen Press, 5/28/05, http://www.chechenpress.co.uk/english/news/2005/05/28/08.shtml.

[58] As will be apparent in a moment, it makes sense that Surikov would have been opposed not only to Yeltsin but to the relatively secular, anti-Islamist Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudaev. For Dudaev see Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 150-51.

[59] Military Policy Research, Archive Search Results, http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:Vt5emTAcJJEJ:www.mpr.co.uk/scripts/sweb.dll/li_archive_item%3Fmethod%3DGET%26object%3DLDS_1995_25_MAR+%22Crime+in+Russia:+the+international+implications+&hl=en. The full citation for the book is Anton Surikov, Crime in Russia: the International Implications (London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, University of London, 1995). The database WorldCat lists it in three U.S. libraries: Columbia, Cornell, and the U.S. Army War College.

[60] www.iprog.ru/cast/?id=8.

[61] Letter of 9/17/05 to Oleg Grechenevsky, http://www.mail-archive.com/cia-drugs@yahoogroups.com/msg01967.html. According to one 1999 article in Russia, Ermarth introduced Surikov to Steve Forbes who offered to help him participate in the project –together with Ermarth and UK Ambassador Sir Rodric Braithwaite –to reveal the ties between the Yeltsin Administration and Russian corruption. But this claim needs to be treated with extreme caution, given the false stories at the time linking Ermarth, Braithwaite, and Surikov to an imaginary joint campaign against Russian corruption. See The Electronic Telegraph (UK), 9/11/99, JRI #3493, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/3493.html.

[62] Commersant (n.d). In an alleged transcript of a drug-related dialogue beween Sergei [Petrov] and a businessman, the latter says, „You’ve said Surikov was also a CIA man.“ See transcript of audio recorded conversation between businessman Gennady Nikolaevich (GN) with Sergei (S), which took place on September 29, 2003 in the Hotel Noga Hilton in Geneva, http://www.compromat.ru/main/surikov/narko.htm.

[63] Left Front Press Conference, , http://left.ru/2005/11/preskonf_eng.html. Kagarlitskii was defended at the press conference by the former Yukos official Ilya Ponomarev.

[64] Another IPROG member is Ilya Ponomarev (see preceding footnote).

[65]Dunlop, „Storm in Moscow,“ 42. Dunlop’s important and truncated description of Mekhmet has a strange and irrelevant citation: „On Erbakan, see Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 365.“But there is no need to identify Erbakan, and Hunter is silent about Mekhmet.

[66] See e.g. Mohamed H. Heikal, Daily Yomiuri, 8/8/94.

[67] Surikov’s book, Crime in Russia, p. 33, confirms that „Chechen transport of armaments to Aden airport was even carried on during the civil war in Yemen in 1994.“

[68] Independent (London), 8/5/05.

[69] Milli Görüş, the chief organization of Turks in Germany, is said to have as it goals the „abolition of the laicist government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic state and social system ….Former Turkish prime minister Nehmettin Erbakan, whose Refah Party was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court in January of 1998 for `activities against the country’s secular regime,‘ is still Milli Görüş‘ undisputed leader, even if his nephew Mehmet Sabri Erbakan is its president“ (Lorenzo Vidino, „The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,“ Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005, http://www.meforum.org/article/687.

[70] Cf. Independent (London), 8/5/05.

[71] On 1/20/02, „Dagestani authorities announced that they had detained Nadirshakh Khachilaev, the leader of Dagestan’s Laks minority groups and a former State Duma deputy, on suspicion of having organized the bombing of the Interior Ministry troop truck in Makhachkala. Khachilaev, who once headed the Union of Muslims of Russia and has also been described as one of Dagestan’s most powerful mafia bosses, was detained along with another eight or so suspects over the weekend“ ( Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 1/21/02, http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=25&issue_id=2179&article_id=19084). Cf. Hunter, Islam in Russia, 264-65.

[72] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), ru.compromat.

[73] „Russia is also concerned about the HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami], for it fears that the movement will spread to Muslim regions of Russia. Russian intelligence is now collaborating closely with the Central Asian states to combat the HT“ (Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia [New Haven: Yale UP, 2002], 132). Cf. Surikov statement to Sufis below.

[74] Graeme Herd with Ene Rôngelep and Anton Surikov, Crisis for Estonia? Russia, Estonia and a Post-Chechen Cold War. London Defence Studies, 29 (London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1994), 33.

[75] Cf. B. Raman, „Istanbul: The enemy within,“ Asia Times, 11/22/03, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK22Ak01.html. In this essay Raman shows the direct links between Turkish terrorists (former disciples of Erbakan) and groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba sponsored by Pakistan’s ISI.

[76] Yuri Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya“ („An Orange Revolution is in Store for Russia“), ru.compromat.

[77] „Geroinovyi tur.“ By Nikita Kaledin. Stringer-news, November 4, 2003: http://www.stringer-news.ru/Publication.mhtml?PubID=2448&Part=39; partially translated in „Afghan Drug Scene: The Poppy Power,“ News Central Asia, http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=406.

[78] Pravda.ru, 7/30/01, http://english.pravda.ru/main/2001/07/30/11317.html. Surikov’s accusation was noted by Maureen Orth in the March 2002 issue of Vanity Fair: „To find out, I track down in Moscow the only Russian official who has spoken on the record about this issue. Dr. Anton V. Surikov is chief staff of the Committee of Industry, Construction, and High Technology in the Russian parliament. Last spring he told the Moscow News that the mayor of Dushanbe was a major drug dealer. That interview precipitated not only a denial from the mayor but also, according to Surikov, a demand that the Tajik journalist the mayor

erroneously believed was Surikov’s source be arrested.“ In the same interview, Surikov also noted that, „as early as the mid-90s, the Russians were`buying heroin and transporting it from the northern part of Afghanistan to Russian military bases in Tajikistan by truck and helicopter.'“

[79] According to Yasenev, „Lunev is responsible for security and `strong arm operations‘. For his operations he hires the former and active duty officers of Russian secret services, including spetsnaz. In 1990-91 Lunev took part in overthrowing the regime of Zviad Gamsahurdia in Georgia.“ Lunev thus helped install Shevardnadze, who in 1991 supported Yeltsin against Gorbachev.

[80] http://www.pravda.info/news/2695.html,

Анатолий Баранов и Антон Суриков вошли в состав руководства агентства «FarWestLtd» – 2005.05.03.

[81] http://www.pravda.info/region/3601.html.

[82] http://pravda.info/aboutus/.

[83] Kagarlitskii, Director of IPROG, has also published many books in English, as well as in The Nation, Zmag, Counterpunch, and other journals.

[84] Those in both organizations are Anton Surikov, Vladimir Filin, Ruslan Saidov, Anatolii Baranov, Audrius Butkevicius, and Natalia Roeva. This list differs from the paravda.info list only in the omission of Likhvintsev.

.

[85]For Bout’s involvement with blood diamonds, and the US failure to deal with this problem, see Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), especially 44: „Intelligence officials say Bout [following 9/11] flew U.S. clandestine operatives into Afghanistan and badly needed ammunition and other supplies to the Northern Alliance. In exchange, they said, his past activities would be ignored.“ For more on Bout see Nick Kochan, The Washing Machine: How Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Soils Us (Mason, OH: Thomson, 2005), 36-61.

Cf. Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil (New York: Crown, 2003), 15: „In the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden’s main supply sergeant was Victor Bout, a former Russian military officer who had served in Angola, where he got involved in arms trafficking and oil. …Bout had a reputation for delivering anything, anywhere, including the nasty stuff.“

[86] Yasenev, „Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya.“

[87] Georgian tycoon, close associate of Boris Berezovskii. Cf. Klebnikov, Godfather of the Kremlin, 262: „Often Berezovskii acted in Chechnya through Badri Patarkatsishvili, the Logovaz partner who, according to the Russian security services, had long served as the company’s primary intermediary with organized crime groups.“ Klebnikov reports (161, cf. 331) that Moscow police heard in early 1995 from a gangster that „he had been approached by Berezovsky’s aide, Badri, with a contract for Listyev’s assassination.“ (In February 1995 Listyev, the director of Russia’s most important TV network ORT, was shot dead in his apartment building.)

[88] Diligence, LLC Press Release 12/8/03, http://www.diligencellc.com/DME_announce.html.

[89] David Isenberg, „Myths and mystery,“ Asia Times, 5/20/04.

[90]Financial Times, 12/11/03. Cf. Asia Times, 5/20/04.

http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=9375. „Mr Daniel’s Houston investment fund, Crest Investment Corporation, employs Neil Bush as co-chairman.“ Ed Rogers, Diligence’s vice chairman, was one of George H.W. Bush’s top assistants when he was US president. On resigning from the White House, he negotiated a lucrative contract to act as lobbyist for the former Saudi intelligence chief and BCCI front man Kamal Adham, at a time when American and British prosecutors were preparing criminal cases against him. Rogers used Khashoggi as a go-between to secure the contract, which was canceled after White House criticism of it (Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 362-64).

[91] Ibid.

[92] Wayne Madsen,

[93] The Baltic Times, 9/23/05, http://www.baltictimes.com/hot1.php?art_id=13659.

[94] Interfax, 9/21/05, http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11386915. Cf. http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/09/22/berezovskyriga.shtml: „Berezovsky is meeting Neil Bush on business, as the U.S. president’s brother is a stockholder of Berezovsky’s educational company Ignite, the spokesperson [for Belokon Holding] said.“

[95] www.compromat.ru/main/zuganov/surikov2.htm.

[96] Alexander Nagorny „Narcobarons from the CIA and MI-6“ Pravda-info 2004.09.13 http://www.pravda.info/kompromat/1203.html.

59 Anthony Fenton, „Kosovo Liberation Army helps establish `Protectorate‘ in Haiti,“ citing Flashpoints interview, 11/19/04, http://www.flashpoints.net). Cf. Anthony Fenton, „Canada in Haiti: Humanitarian Extermination,“ CMAQ.net, 12/8/04; http://www.cmaq.net/fr/node.php?id=19240.

[98] San Francisco Chronicle, 5/5/99.

[99] New York Times, 6/2/04.

[100] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 536: „Massoud was a drug trafficker.“ Cf. 345, 430, 458, 516, 519.

[101] Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror’s Trail (Washington: Brassey’s, 2004), 9. Ironically, this decision by British and American officials (the latter almost certainly CIA) may have contributed to bin Laden’s escape from Tora Bora in December 2001. Cf. CNN, 12/29/01: „Abdullah Tawheedi, a deputy head of intelligence in Afghanistan, says he has received `reliable information‘ that the terrorist leader paid a `large amount‘ of money to buy his way out of Afghanistan. Tawheedi named Haji Zaman — a well-known independent military commander — as the man responsible for taking bin Laden across the border to Pakistan. Ironically, Haji Zaman had recently been fighting against bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization. But Tawheedi says he believes Haji Zaman was apparently persuaded — by money — to help the terrorist leader.“

[102] B. Raman, „Assassination of Haji Abdul Qadeer in Kabul,“ South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 489, www.saag.org/papers5/paper489.html: „11.With an Afghan passport, Afridi, a Pakistani national belonging to the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), voluntarily traveled to Dubai , where he allegedly negotiated with American authorities the terms of his voluntary surrender and from there he boarded a cargo flight to the US in December 1995 to hand himself over to the US drug control authorities. He was sentenced to three and a half year’s imprisonment. After serving his sentence, he returned to Pakistan in August,1999. He was arrested by the Pakistani drug control authorities and prosecuted in a drug smuggling case pending against him. The court sentenced him to seven years imprisonment in the middle of 2001. Hardly had he started his sentence in a Karachi jail, when he was got released by the ISI, reportedly at the request of the CIA, after the war against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda had started on October 7, 2001, and allowed to proceed to his home in the Khyber Agency.“ Cf. Asia Times Online, 12/4/01; Peter Dale Scott, „Pre-1990 Drug Networks Being Restored Under New Coalition?“ http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/qf5.html.

[103] B. Raman, „Assassination of Haji Abdul Qadeer in Kabul, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 489.

[104] Raman, op. cit., emphasis added.

[105] A possible explanation for the release and recruitment of major traffickers in 2001 would be the desire to combat the influence in the traffic of narco-barons who supported the Taliban, such as Bashir Noorzai and Juma Khan. The fact remains that the Taliban had effectively suppressed the planting of opium, a major event in drug suppression that has now been completely reversed by the U.S. invasion.

[106] Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 49-50.

[107] Yossef Bodansky, „The Great Game for OIL,“ Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, June-July 2000, pp. 4-10, http://news.suc.org/bydate/2000/Sep_28/11.html. Kagarlitsky’s article itself can be seen as an important part of this campaign.

[108] U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, 363; quoted in Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2004), 137.

[109] Klare, Blood and Oil, 136, 137.

[110] Knight-Ridder, 10/31/04.

[111] Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great Escape, 88.

[112] Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great Escape, 110-11. Some of those whose escape from Tora Bora was assisted later led terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

[113] Christopher Deliso, „The Stakes Are Too High for Us to Stop Fighting Now,“ interview with Sibel Edmonds, http://antiwar.com/deliso/. For a survey of the Sibel Edmonds story, see David Rose, „An Inconvenient Patriot,“ Vanity Fair, September 2005: „Much of what Edmonds reportedly heard seemed to concern not state espionage but criminal activity. There was talk, she told investigators, of laundering the profits of large-scale drug deals and of selling classified military technologies to the highest bidder.“

[114] The Iraq War is also beneficial to the drug traffic. See the following story from the Balochistan Post, quoting the London Independent: „“BAGHDAD: The city, which had never seen heroin, a deadly addictive drug, until March 2003, is now flooded with narcotics including heroin. According to a report published by London’s The Independent newspaper, the citizens of Baghdad complained that the drugs like heroin and cocaine were being peddled on the streets of the Iraqi metropolis. Some reports suggest that the drug and arms trafficking is patronized by the CIA to finance its covert operations worldwide.“

[115] Wall Street Journal, 11/24/03.

[116] „In June 1992, independent Lithuanian Minister of Defense, Audrius Butkevicius, hosted a symposium to thank the Albert Einstein Institution’s key role during the independence process of the Baltic countries“ (Thierry Meyssan,“ The Albert Einstein Institution: non-violence according to the CIA,“ http://www.voltairenet.org/article30032.html). Cf. Paul Labarique : «Les dessous du coup d’État en Géorgie», text in French, Voltaire, January 7, 2004.

[117] Saidov, in his own words, was in Andijan at the time of the subsequent turmoil in the Uzbek Fergana Valley, which straddles the drug route through the Kyrgyz town of Osh: „`In May 11-18 I was in Uzbekistan, in the Fergana Valley, where I witnessed the suppression of the people’s uprising in Andijan by the dictatorial regime of Islam Karimov,‘ – says the Dagestani historian Ruslan Saidov“ (http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/rus/rusnews/2005/05/rusnews30052005_5.html).

[118] http://www.apn.ru/?chapter_name=impres&data_id=430&do=view_single.

[119] Из Оша в Андижан(„From Osh to Andijan“), http//www.polit.ru/analytics/2005/06/06/andij_print.html.

[120] Christopher Deliso, „The Stakes Are Too High for Us to Stop Fighting Now,“ interview with Sibel Edmonds, 8/15/05, http://antiwar.com/deliso/.

[121] Indira Singh testimony, 9/11 Citizen’s Commission, 130, http://justicefor911.org/September-Hearings.doc.

[122] Khashoggi is perhaps the most famous example of a Saudi-Israel connection. One of the few in the United States who has dared to discuss the 9/11 clues pointing towards Israel is Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2004), 259-68, 578-79.

[123] Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI (New York: Random House, 1993), 347.

[124] Michael Moore, Dude, Where’s My Country (New York: Warner Books, 2003), 15. The same superficial analysis is a blemish of his film Fahrenheit 911.

[125] David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press/Interlink, 2004), 5.

[126] Commenting on the list published by Pravda.info on May 3, 2005, http://www.pravda.info/news/2695.html.


Site Meter

Will the current crisis in Kyrgyzstan lead to greater instability, and perhaps an expansion of the current conflict in Central Asia? There are good reasons to be concerned. Deep forces, not adequately understood, are at work there; and these forces have repeatedly led to major warfare in the past.

The pattern of events unfolding in Kyrgyzstan is ominously reminiscent of how America became involved in Laos in the 1960s, and later in Afghanistan in the 1980s. American covert involvement in those countries soon led to civil wars producing numerous casualties and refugees. It will take strenuous leadership from both Obama in Washington and Medvedev in Moscow to prevent a third major conflict from breaking out in Kyrgyzstan.

I call the pattern I refer to “a Laotian syndrome” of coups, drugs, and terror, since it was first clearly illustrated by American interventions in Laos in the late 1950s and 1960s. The syndrome involves a number of independent but interactive elements whose interconnection in the past has not generally been recognized. What it reflects is not a single agenda, but a predictable symbiosis of divergent groups, responding to the powerful forces that the drug traffic creates. In this syndrome, something like the following pattern emerges.

„1) Covert U.S. activity results in the ousting of a moderate government, and its replacement by a more corrupt and unpopular one, unsupported by the culture of the country on which it is imposed.

2) A successor regime, to maintain its uncertain grip on power, intensifies its control over the local drug traffic.

3) This control involves collaboration with local drug mafias, leading to their expansion.

4) The flow of drugs from the country (or through, in the case of Kyrgyzstan) increases significantly.

5) Eventually, in the context of weakened legitimacy and strengthened illegitimacy, a successor government is ousted.

6) What ensues is a violent civil war.

7) The final outcome is a government not to America’s liking.“

The pattern does not repeat itself identically. In Laos, CIA intrigue and money in 1959 produced an unpopular pro-American regime under right-wing general Phoumi Nosavan, which lasted eighteen months.1 Similar CIA intrigues in Afghanistan two decades later completely backfired, and produced instead an equally unpopular anti-American regime under Nur Mohammed Taraki, which lasted sixteen months.2

But the root problem was the same: the CIA’s gratuitous destabilization of an inoffensive country encouraged local intrigues and paranoia, and soon produced an unstable and divisive government without a popular base. Eventually a resulting weakened government (the next in Laos, a little later in Afghanistan) favored both drug and terrorist activity in its territory, as predictably as a pine forest weakened by drought will invite an infestation of beetles.

The longer-term result was a country where civil politics had been replaced by civil war. In the case of Laos and Afghanistan U.S. covert activity, waged as part of the Cold War, produced Soviet military and intelligence responses. (It may, in the case of Afghanistan, have been designed to produce such responses.) Former Carter advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who authorized the CIA’s covert Afghan operations of 1978-79, later boasted to a French newspaper:

„The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.’”…

When asked whether Islamic fundamentalism represented a world menace, Brzezinski replied, “Nonsense!”3″

The last decade of Kyrgyz history suggests that U.S. and Russian covert operators have continued to tussle in the “great game” of dominating the Central Asian heartland. And once again, while the leaders of both countries to evolve common policies for Kyrgyzstan, there may be bureaucrats below them who harbor more belligerent intentions.

To the general public, it would seem obvious that none of these developments have been in the interests of either America or the world. Yet American agencies have still not learned from the obvious fiasco of their Laotian venture, which resulted in a huge increase in opium production, before this peaceful Buddhist nation ceased (thanks to American efforts) to be neutralist, and instead became nominally Communist.

America’s destabilization of remote Laos, a neutral and harmless nation, was in accordance with the ideological doctrine being peddled in a book by three policy hawks at the time: A Forward Strategy for America, by Robert Strausz-Hupé. William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony. The book rejected coexistence as a foreign policy, and argued for “a strategy of active pressures directed against the communist bloc,” wherever it was seen to be vulnerable.

The American sponsored “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (March 2005) is a conspicuous product of the forward strategy doctrine. This is no accident: it came at a time when George W. Bush repeatedly spoke of a “forward strategy of freedom,” or a “forward strategy for freedom.”4 But by the 21st century the forward strategy in countries with drug economies had a track record, which its advocates in Washington might well have reviewed before advocating an intervention so close to both Russia and China.

In 1959 the CIA attempted to impose a right-wing government in Laos: after a decade and a half of expanding drug trafficking and a futile, bloody, drug-financed war, Laos became (at least nominally) a communist nation. Undeterred by the dismal outcome in Laos, in 1978-79 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Gates, and the CIA mobilized right-wing elements again in Afghanistan, another nation contiguous to the then Soviet Union.5 The immediate result was the same as Laos: the replacement of a neutralist regime by a radical and polarizing one (in this case communist), followed by another radical increase in drug trafficking, and another decade of bloody and unsuccessful war.

What were the forward strategists hoping for in Kyrgyzstan? In April of this year the unpopular regimeinstalled by the 2005 Tulip Revolution was itself replaced. Although it is too early to predict the outcome of these dislocations, thousands of lives have been lost in the ethnic violence of June 2010, and drug traffickers are apparently profiting from the near anarchy to consolidate their hold on southern Kyrgyzstan. That is just what happened to Laos in 1959; it is what Jimmy Carter’s drug advisor David Musto warned would happen in Afghanistan in 1980.6 Did someone want it to happen again?

All in all, the coup-drug-terror syndrome in Kyrgyzstan well illustrates the Marxist dictum that history repeats itself, first as tragedy (Afghanistan in 1978-80), and the second time as farce.

The Coup-Drug-Terror Syndrome in Kyrgyzstan

After the break-up of the former Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan, under the leadership of Askar Akayev, was relatively the most moderate and open government among the six post-Soviet “stans” of Central Asia. Alone among the successor strong men, Akayev was not a long-time Communist Party apparatchik, but an intellectual who read Heine, a physicist, “a researcher in St Petersburg and an associate of legendary Russian physicist and dissident Andrei Sakharov.”7

It is true that Akayev’s initial efforts to make Kyrgyzstan an open and pluralistic democracy did not last long: an on-going economic crisis made his regime increasingly unpopular.8 Meanwhile he soon came under pressure from neighboring Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and China to crack down on the dissidents who were using Kyrgyzstan as a base for mobilizing against their home countries.9 Eventually the country’s economic problems led to popular protests and their brutal suppression.

But in international policy Akayev managed at first to maintain good relations with both the U.S. and Russia. In December 2001, following 9/11, he granted America a vital base at Manas, for support of its war effort in land-locked Afghanistan. Almost immediately, the Pentagon awarded the Akayev family payoffs on fuel supplies to Manas, via two Gibraltar-based companies (named Red Star and Mina) set up by a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel.10 American dollars proceeded to accelerate government corruption, just as they had earlier in Laos and Afghanistan.

hen in October 2003 Akayev allowed Putin to reopen an old Soviet base in Kant, as what was described as “a deterrent to international terrorism” in nearby Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.11 This move was not well received.

„Though [Kant was] less than a quarter of the size of Manas, Akayev’s decision landed him on America’s “watch list” and increased aid flowed to the Kyrgyz opposition via American NGOs. In 2004 Washington in assisting the democratic process directed $12 million, an amount six times the ‘formal” rent for Manas, into Kyrgyzstan in the form of scholarships and donations, while the State Department even funded TV station equipment in the restive southern provincial town of Osh. George Soros through his various foundations also helped fund the opposition, while Freedom House operated a printing press in Bishkek.12“

The So-Called Tulip Revolution of 2005

For the reasons cited above, Akayevlost acceptance in Washington, just like the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma in Laos in the 1950s, or Mohammed Daud in Afghanistan in the 1970s. Akayev was overthrown in the so-called “Tulip Revolution” of March 2005, by far the bloodiest and least democratic of all the so-called “color revolutions” that had already changed governments in Serbia (2002), Georgia (2003), and the Ukraine (2004). Those regime changes had been essentially nonviolent. In the Tulip Revolution, however, the London Independent reported on March 26, 2005 that, “According to hospital officials, two people had been killed and 360 wounded in the violence, and 173 were still in hospital.”13

In truth the so-called Tulip Revolution was no revolution in the true sense at all, but a palace coup, replacing the northern Kyrgyz coterie behind Akayev with a new southern coterie behind his replacement, Kurmanbek Bakiyev.Craig Smith in the New York Times acknowledged as much even before the coup was over:

„A malaise is settling over this country as the uprising a week ago begins to look less like a democratically inspired revolution and more like a garden-variety coup, with a handful of seasoned politicians vying for the spoils of the ousted government.

”Let’s not pretend that what happened here was democratic,” said Edil Baisalov, one of the country’s best-known democracy advocates, speaking to clearly disheartened students beneath huge Soviet-era portraits of Lenin, Marx and Engels in the auditorium of what has been the American University since 1997.

Mr. Baisalov bemoaned what he said Kyrgyzstan lost out on when the presidential palace was stormed and President Askar Akayev fled: the kind of cathartic national experience that he witnessed in Ukraine as its Orange Revolution unfolded. That was a slow-building, well-organized event that took two months to reach a successful conclusion.

”What Ukraine went through was very important to their democratic development,” he said. ”We didn’t have that great emotional experience of civic education.”14

As a symptom that the deep politics of Kyrgyzstan were unchanged, the U.S. Manas supply contracts, which earlier benefited Akayev’s family, were promptly taken over by Bakiyev’s son Maksym.

Nevertheless Ariel Cohen claimed in the Washington Times that “the people of Kyrgyzstan have won their freedom;” and he attributed the changeover, with good reason, to President George W. Bush’s words spoken in his Inaugural Address and State of the Union speech.”15

President Bush himself gave an imprimatur to the changeover. Visiting Georgia in May 2005, he told Georgian President Saakashvili,

Georgia will become the main partner of the United States in spreading democracy and freedom in the post-Soviet space. This is our proposal. We will always be with you in protecting freedom and democracy….. You are making many important contributions to freedom’s cause, but your most important contribution is your example. Hopeful changes are taking places from Baghdad to Beirut and Bishkek [Kyrgyzstan].16

And indeed it was true that, as the right-wing Jamestown Foundation in Washington revealed, “three Georgian parliamentarians, once active engineers of Georgia’s Rose Revolution, had paid an unofficial visit to Kyrgyzstan to support the attempted ‘Tulip Revolution’ there.”17

But this was only one aspect of a U.S.-coordinated effort. According to Der Spiegel in April 2005,

As early as February, Roza Otunbayeva [one of Bakiyev’s co-conspirators in 2005] pledged allegiance to a small group of partners and sponsors of the Kyrgyz revolution, to ‘our American friends’ at Freedom House (who donated a printing press in Bishkek to the opposition), and to George Soros, a speculator who previously helped unseat Edward Shevardnadze’s government in Georgia. Trying to help the democratic process, the Americans poured some $12 million into Kyrgyzstan in the form of scholarships and donations.18

The Post-Tulip Bakiyev Government – and Drugs

There seems little doubt that although the Akayev government had been corrupt, corruption only increased under the new post-Tulip Bakiyev regime. In the words of Columbia University Professor Alexander Cooley, the Bakiyev family “ran the country like a criminal syndicate.”19
More specifically, the Bakiyev family, according to Peter Leonard of Associated Press, took complete control of the drug traffic transiting the country.

Authorities and analysts have little doubt that Bakiyev and his relatives are at the heart of the drug trade.

“The whole Bakiyev family is involved in drug trafficking,” said Alexander Knyazev, a respected independent political analyst in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital.

“After Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to power, all drug lords were killed, and (his elder brother) Zhanybek Bakiyev consolidated most of the drug trafficking in his hands.”

Acting deputy prime minister and general prosecutor Azimbek Beknazarov also endorses the view that Bakiyev and his family have interests in the drug trade, although no specific criminal probes have yet been initiated into those allegations.20

In October 2009 Bakiyev abolished the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency, leading the Jamestown Foundation to speculate that Bakiyev was “centralizing illegal control over the drug economy, [and was] disinterested in international initiatives to control narcotics.” It added that

Overall, roughly five identifiable criminal groups control drug transit through Kyrgyzstan. Although they are known to the security structures, these groups have ties to the government, or at times represent government and therefore are free to carry out their activities with impunity.21

In May 2010 former Kyrgyz Deputy Security Council Secretary Alik Orozov told a Bishkek newspaper that the Drug Control Agency had been closed by Janysh Bakiyev, who wished to take full control over drug trafficking. The charge was endorsed by the former deputy head of the former Drug Control Agency, Vitaliy Orozaliyev, who added that

problems started to emerge at the level of the US Department of State. All initiatives to extend the financing of the Drug Control Agency were axed exactly there. All previous US ambassadors were regular guests of the Drug Control Agency. However, with the arrival of [US ambassador to Kyrgyzstan] Tatiana Gfoeller [in 2008], all contacts were cut as if they were cut with a knife. She demonstrated full indifference to the agency, she fully distanced herself from this project and she did not accept our invitations. She even did not want to give accommodation to our US colleagues [in the DEA] – who wanted to set up something like a bureau of their own in Bishkek – in the territory of the US embassy. What caused such a sharp turn in US diplomacy to the problems of fighting drug-related crimes in Kyrgyzstan is only anyone’s guess.22

The Counter-Coup of April 2010

Bakiyev’s drug involvement does not appear to have aroused any protest in Washington. But in February of 2009 Kyrgyzstan’s parliament voted 78-1 to close the U.S. air base at Manas, and in the same month Bakiyev announced in Moscow that he would close Manas and accept more than $2 billion in emergency assistance and investments from Russia. However,

the Kyrgyz government ended up double-crossing Moscow by accepting an initial $300 million payment before it renegotiated a higher rent with the United States for the renamed “Manas Transit Center.” As a result, relations between Moscow and Bishkek plummeted to an all-time low, while Bakiyev’s government gleefully cashed in the new checks provided by both Moscow mostly minority Uzbeks, say they were attacked by the Kyrgyz military and the police, and their accounts have been backed up by independent observers.23

But Bakiyev’s glee was short-lived. His political opponents, aware of and appalled by his mercenary manipulations, united in April 2010 in a successful, Russian-supported effort to overthrow him. According to the Christian Science Monitor

,

Many believe the coup in Kyrgyzstan was staged by the Russians, who were quietly unhappy with the previous leader. The Kremlin considered Mr. Bakiyev not loyal enough, as he appeared reluctant to close America’s Manas air base, which plays a critical role in resupplying US troops in nearby Afghanistan.24

Russia’s displeasure with Bakiyev was also spelled out by a writer for the PNAC-linked (Project for the New American Century) Jamestown Foundation:

Medvedev was uncompromising in asserting Russian domination of the post-Soviet space. He insisted that the government of the Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was overthrown in a bloody revolution last week that left over 80 dead and some 1,500 wounded, due to Bakiyev’s inconsistency in opposing the US military presence in Central Asia. According to Medvedev, Bakiyev first ordered the US and its allies to leave the airbase, Manas, near the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek. Then he allowed the Americans to continue to use Manas to transfer personnel and supplies into Afghanistan, renaming the airbase into “a transit center” and increasing payments for the lease. Now, Medvedev joked, all may see the results of “such a consistent policy” (www.kremlin.ru, April 14).

The message sent to the Washington elite is obvious: keep out of Moscow’s sphere of influence. Medvedev insisted the US “must not teach Russia how to live” (RIA Novosti, April 14).25

Deep Forces and the Kyrgyz crisis of June 2010

It is too early to speak with confidence about who was responsible for the major ethnic violence of June 2010, with more bloodshed than in the previous episode of 1990. There seems no reason however to doubt the finding of UN observers that the fighting was not spontaneous, but “’orchestrated, targeted and well-planned’ — set off by organized groups of gunmen in ski masks.”26

Since the June events, the new Kyrgyz regime has charged that they were fomented by the Bakiyev family, in conjunction with at least one drug lord and representatives of the jihadi Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU):

The head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Security Service, Keneshbek Duishebaev, is claiming that relatives of former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev conspired with Islamic militants to destabilize southern Kyrgyzstan.
According to Duishebaev, Maxim Bakiyev, the son of ousted president Bakiyev, met with representatives of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Dubai, while the former president’s brother Janysh brokered deals with Afghan Taliban and Tajik fighters. “The transfer of militants to the south of the republic was made on the eve of the June events from Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province via Tajikistan’s Khorog and Murghab districts. Cooperation in transferring [the militants] was made by a former Tajik opposition commander and drug baron, whose contact was Janysh Bakiyev,” Duishebaev said.
Taliban, Tajik, IMU, and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) fighters were offered $30 million in payment, he added….. Duishebaev warned that Islamic militants are seeking to exploit the unrest in southern Kyrgyzstan. “Recently, IMU leaders and warlords held a meeting in south Waziristan, Pakistan. The participants of the meeting concluded the current situation in Osh and Jalal-abad provinces are favorable for sparking destructive activities across the all over the region,” he said.27

The Times (London) reported these charges, and added:

The interim president, Roza Otunbayeva, said that “many instigators have been detained and they are giving evidence on Bakiyev’s involvement in the events”. Kyrgyzstan’s deputy security chief, Kubat Baibalov, claimed that a trained group of men from neighbouring Tajikistan had fired indiscriminately at Uzbeks and Kyrgyz last week from a car with darkened windows to provoke conflict.”28

According to many sources, the IMU is a network grouping ethnic Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and relying heavily on narcotics to finance its anti-government activities.29

However the new government’s charges against Bakiyev and the IMU may have been self-serving. It has become increasingly clear that the victims of the massacre were “mostly minority Uzbeks [who] say they were attacked by the Kyrgyz military and the police, and their accounts have been backed up by independent observers.”30 The Uzbek neighborhoods were left in ruins, while ethnic Kyrgyz areas were largely untouched.31 It may emerge that the violence grewout of a prior conflict in May involving local mafia leaders, in the wake of the April 2010 coup.32 This led in late May to riots that former President Bakiyev was suspected of organizing.33

The situation calls for an impartial international investigation. If the current conflict is not thoroughly resolved, it is likely that both Islamic extremists and local drug traffickers will be drawn into it.34

The Kyrgyz Crisis and TransnationalTerror-Drug Mafias

One cannot lightly dismiss the Kyrgyz government charge that the IMU had met in South Waziristan to plan violence in Central Asia. Even before the June riots, there had been a disturbing report that the IMU (and its Turkic split-off, the Islamic Jihad Union or IJU) had established control over parts of South Waziristan, and were planning and training for extended activities in Central Asia.35 Of particular concern was the following paragraph:

The News International recently reported that affluent settlers from the Uzbek and Tajik areas of Afghanistan had come to Waziristan and Tank and had established mini-states. The Uzbek- and Tajik-Afghans were growing in both numbers and wealth, posing a threat to local tribesmen, the story said.36

This raises the crucial question of the source of this jihadi wealth. Was it just from wealthy jihadi sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, as has been alleged of the IMU?37 Was it also a by-product of the heroin traffic, as others have surmised? Were external intelligence agencies exploiting the situation for their own political agendas? Or, most alarming of all, was it from a milieu fusing jihadi activity, the actions of intelligence networks, and the alarming heroin traffic?38 Whatever the answer, it is obvious that the current disturbances in Kyrgyzstan, and corresponding breakdown of weak central authority, are a boon to extremism and drug trafficking alike.

The last possibility, that there is a deep force behind drug, intelligence, and jihadi activity, would be consistent with the legacy of the CIA’s earlier interventions in Afghanistan, Laos, and Burma, and with America’s overall responsibility for the huge increases in global drug trafficking since World War II. It is important to understand that the more than doubling of Afghan opium drug production since the U.S. invasion of 2001 merely replicates the massive drug increases in Burma, Thailand, and Laos between the late 1940s and the 1970s. These countries also only became major sources of supply in the international drug traffic as a result of CIA assistance (after the French, in the case of Laos) to what would otherwise have been only local traffickers.

As early as 2001 Kyrgyzstan’s location had made it a focal point for transnational trafficking groups. According to a U.S. Library of Congress Report of 2002,

Kyrgyzstan has become a primary center of all aspects of the narcotics industry: manufacture, sale, and drug trafficking. Kyrgyzstan’s location adjacent to major routes across the Tajik mountains from Afghanistan combines with ineffectual domestic smuggling controls to attract figures from what a Kyrgyz newspaper report characterized as “an international organization uniting an unprecedentedly wide circle of members in the United States, Romania, Brazil, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan…These are no half-literate Tajik-Afghan drug runners, but professionals who have passed through a probation period in the mafia clans of the world narcotics system…”39

Others, notably Sibel Edmonds in the United States, have alleged that there is a network of drug-financed and intelligence-related terror activities stretching from Kyrgyzstan to Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Turkey.40

It is because of this possible convergence of disparate elements on the Kyrgyz intelligence-terror-drug scene that I have described the topic of this paper as a syndrome, not as a single-minded scheme or stratagem. Some of the possible components in this syndrome are barely visible. In his monumental book Descent into Chaos, Ahmed Rashid refers to the existence of a “Gulf mafia,” to which the Taliban by 1998 was selling drugs directly.41 A search of Lexis-Nexis yields no results for “gulf mafia,” and there is no other hit in Google Books. Yet there is abundant evidence for such a mafia or mafias, even if little is known about it or them.42

Perhaps the most notorious example of such a drug mafia in the Persian Gulf is the D-Company of Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, one of the two men (the other is Mexico’s Joaquin Guzman) to be listed both on the Forbes’ Most Wanted Fugitives list and also on the Forbes list of billionaires. Dawood Ibrahim merits a special section in a recent Congressional Research Service report on the nexus between criminal syndicates and terrorist groups. Entitled “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress,” the report described Dawood’s involvement with al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).43 This detailed report did not mention the allegation by Yoichi Shimatsu, former editor of the Japan Times, that Ibrahim had “worked with the U.S. to help finance the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s, and that because he knows too much about the America’s ‘darker secrets’ in the region, Pakistan could never turn him over to India.’”44

The Congressional Research Service Report cites Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company as its prime example of what it calls a fusion crime-terror organization (its next example is the FARC in Colombia). It is possible that the leading Mexican cartels should also be regarded as fusion networks, since their practice of terroristic violence has become such an integral part of the political process in Mexico. We can perhaps predict that such fusion networks will continue to dominate both the heroin and the Cocaine traffics, because terrorism and trafficking are so useful to each other. Terrorism creates the kind of anarchy that favors drug production and trafficking, while drug trafficking provides the most convenient and local source of funds for terrorism. Add the demonstrated interest of ISI and other intelligence agencies in both activities, and you have the right environment to foster what I have called the coup-drug-terror syndrome.

In all there are many discrete components of the coup-drug-terror syndrome, beginning with the naïve American belief that imposing American political values on distant countries benefits all concerned, including the peace and security of the globe. The various elements do not have to collude together. But past experience suggests what are the likely outcomes of ill-considered policies that may have been meant to achieve something quite different.

Moscow, Washington, and the Kyrgyz Crisis

What is particularly alarming about this syndrome is that, both in Laos and in Afghanistan, the outcome was a decade of devastating and incompletely settled war. At present there are no signs that Moscow and Washington are willing to fight over Kyrgyzstan. Fortunately the new leader for the moment, Roza Otunbayeva, has good relations with both capitals, and they are promising her support.

Yet there are signs that in both capitals there is tension between the dominant policy and militant factions less willing to compromise. In Washington, for example, Michael McFaul, Obama’s senior director for Russian affairs, said of Bakiyev’s overthrow in April: “This is not some sponsored-by-the-Russians coup, there’s just no evidence of that.”45 As previously noted, there were many in Washington who disagreed, including the ideologically motivated Jamestown Foundation. Fred Weir has since described the April events in the Christian Science Monitor as “a Moscow-backed coup d’etat that was thinly disguised as a popular revolt.”46

In Moscow too there are signs that some desire a more militant approach to the Kyrgyz crisis than that advocated by President Medvedev. When Roza Otunbayeva appealed to Medvedev for Russian troops to help quell the spiraling ethnic crisis in Osh, Medvedev turned her down: “’”It is an internal conflict, and so far Russia doesn’t see conditions for participating in its resolution,’ Russian presidential press secretary Natalia Timakova said.”47 Medvedev’s caution reflected his underlying concern about the treacherous instability of Kyrgyzstan, and his concern not to involve in the conflict the ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan. (Russia did dispatch a paratrooper battalion to its base at Tank in the north of the country where most ethnic Russians reside.)48 As Medvedev warned Washington in April, “Kyrgyzstan risked splitting into North and South. If that happens, extremists might start flowing in, turning the country into a second Afghanistan.“49

The approach of Viktor Ivanov, a senior advisor to Putin, was more interventionist. He told a Russian newspaper on June 20 of this year that the Osh area was a major region of Islamist-controlled drug trafficking, and thus a Russian military base should be established there.50 Nevertheless, in Washington four days later, Medvedev repeated to Obama that, “I think that the Kyrgyz Republic must deal with these problems itself. Russia didn’t plan and is not going to send contingent of peacekeeping forces though consultations on this issue were held.”51 Later Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), asserted that “there was no decision made on setting up a Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan, particularly, near Osh.”52

Viktor Ivanov wears two hats: he is both a senior member of Russia’s National Antiterror Committee, and he also heads Russia’s Federal Service for the Control of Narcotics. For some time he has been in the forefront of those Russian officials expressing frustration at the American failure to limit Afghan drug production.53 He is far from alone in his concern about the virtual explosion of Afghan drugs reaching Russia since 2001, which many Russian observers have labeled “narco-aggression.”

As early as February 2002, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov raised the issue of “narco-aggression” with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, telling them that whereas Russian border guards seized only 2 kg of heroin in 1996 on the Afghan-Tajik border, and about 800 kg in 2000, in 2001 more than five metric tons of drugs were seized, and half of the drugs were heroin.54

According to Sergei Blagov, a reporter in Moscow for ISN Security Watch,

Russian officials have estimated that the country’s drug addiction rates have increased several fold since the US-led invasion and the offensive against the Taliban’s in 2002, which was followed by hikes in Afghan opium production. Russia is now the largest heroin consumer in the world, with an estimated 5 million addicts.

Facing what it perceives as western willingness to allow opium production to flourish in Afghanistan, Russia’s top officials have described the situation as “narco-aggression” against Russia and a new “opium war.” They also suggest that the international alliance undertake aerial spraying against Afghanistan’s poppy fields.

The Russian press has been even less diplomatic, claiming that US and NATO forces were directly involved in the drug trade. Russian media outlets allege that the bulk of the drugs produced in Afghanistan’s southern and western provinces are shipped abroad on US planes.

Not surprisingly, Russia regards with resentment NATO’s liberal approach toward the Afghan drug industry and the alliance’s reluctance to cooperate in fighting the drug trade. Continued NATO inaction on the drug issue could potentially undermine Russia’s security cooperation with the West on crucial matters such as strategic arms reduction and non-proliferation.55

Repeatedly Viktor Ivanov has appealed to America to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan as systematically as it has attacket Coca plantations in Colombia, and for the international community to join Russia in this appeal.56 On June 9, 2010, both he and President Medvedev addressed an International Forum on Afghan Drug Production (which I attended), in an effort to muster this international support.57 I myself share the American conclusion that spraying opium fields would be counterproductive, because it would fatally weaken efforts to woo Afghan farmers away from the Taliban. But I do think that the interests of peace and security in Central Asia would be well served if America brought Russia more closely into joint activities against the global drug trade.

And as a researcher, I believe that Russia has a legitimate grievance against America’s current Afghan strategy, which has left wide open a major drug corridor into Russia from the northeastern Afghan province of Badakhshan.

“Narco-Aggression” and America’s Skewed Opiate Strategy in Afghanistan

For this reason America should revise its skewed drug interdiction strategy in Afghanistan. At present this is explicitly limited to attacking drug traffickers supporting the insurgents, chiefly the Pashtun backers of the Taliban in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.58 Such strategies have the indirect effect of increasing the drug market share of the north and northeastern provinces.

These provinces support the past and present CIA assets in the Karzai regime (headed by Hamid Karzai, a former CIA asset),59 including the president’s brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, an active CIA asset, and Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former CIA asset.60 In effect America has allied itself with one drug faction in Afghanistan against another.61

This strategy has seen repeated attacks on the poppy fields and markets of the southern provinces. Meanwhile production in the northeastern province of Badakhshan, the home of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, has continued, despite denials, to dominate the economy of that province.62

(The statistics for Badakhshan, the most inaccessible of the Afghan provinces, have been much contested. A UN map of Afghan poppy production for 2007-2008 showed Badakhshan as the provincewith the least opium cultivation: 200 hectares, as opposed to 103,590 for Helmand.63 But LonelyPlanet.com posted an article in 2009, claiming that “Badakhshan is second only to Helmand for opium production. Controlled by Northern Alliance, opium is the backbone of the local economy.“64 And a detailed article in 2010 reported,

The biggest economic asset of the province, the one business most of the would-be Badakhshan VIPs find necessary and profitable to enter into sooner or later, is in fact cross-border smuggling. Actually, some sources claim that the local control of routes and border crossings in Badakhshan corresponds to the map of political power grouping in the province. Even if Badakhshan has lost its former status as one of the principal opium producing regions in Afghanistan, the local expertise and trade links have been maintained. Many laboratories for heroin processing are active in the province…65

Meanwhile there have also been occasional reports over the last decade of IMU terrorist movements from South Waziristan through both Afghan and Tajik Badakhshan.

The Badakhshan drug corridor is a matter of urgent concern for Russia. The Afghan opiates entering Russia via Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the chief smuggling route, come from Badakhshan and other northeastern provinces. The reductions of the last three years in Afghan drug production, while inadequate overall, have minimally impacted the northeast, allowing opiate imports into Russia to continue to grow. Meanwhile the much-touted clearing of opium poppy from the Afghan northern provinces has in some cases simply seen a switch “from opium poppies to another illegal crop: cannabis, the herb from which Marihuana and hashish are derived.”66

As a result, according to U.N. officials, Afghanistan is now also the world’s biggest producer of hashish (another drug inundating Russia).67 This has added to the flow of drugs up the Badakhshan-Tajik-Kyrgyz corridor. In short, the political skewing of America’s Afghan anti-drug policies is a significant reason for the major drug problems faced by Russia today.

What are the reasons for America’s relative inactivity against Badakhshan drug flows? Some observers, not only Russian, have wondered if there is a larger strategy directed against Russia itself. An article in India’s major journal The Hindu, entitled “Russia: victim of narco-aggression,”included the following suggestive reference by John MacDougall, writing for Agence France-Presse:

In 1993, Russian border guards returned to Tajikistan in an effort to contain the flow of drugs from opium-producing Afghanistan. In 2002 alone they intercepted 6.7 tonnes of drugs, half of them heroin. However, in 2005 Tajik President Imomali Rakhmon, hoping to win financial aid from the U.S., asked the Russian border guards to leave, saying Tajikistan had recovered enough from a five-year civil war (from 1992-97) to shoulder the task. Within months of the Russian withdrawal, cross-border drug trafficking increased manifold.68

And we have already noted the Kyrgyz charge that in 2009 the U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Tatiana Gfoeller, “demonstrated full indifference” as Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s brother Janysh closed down the Drug Control Agency there.69

Whatever the causes for the spectacular drug flow, it should be both a global priority and an American priority to address this crisis more vigorously. The reasons for doing so are not just humanitarian. Earlier this year Ivanov told Newsweek,

I have no doubts that drug traffic feeds terrorism in Russia. Huge amounts of illegal money flow to radical groups from the drug trade. At a recent meeting of the Security Council in Mineralniye Vody [in the North Caucasus], we saw reports that the drug traffic coming to Dagestan has increased by 20 times over the last year. That is what fuels terrorism, because terrorists buy their communication equipment and weapons with drug money.70

Conclusion: The Global Banking System and the Global Drug Trade

I believe that Ivanov is correct in linking terrorism to local drug money. I fear also that there might be an additional dimension to the problem that he did not mention: transnational deep forces tapping into the even more lucrative market for drugs in western Europe and America. Undoubtedly proceeds from the global opiate traffic (estimated at $65 billion in 2009), are systematically channeled into major banks, as has also been well documented for the profits from Cocaine trafficking into U.S. banks. When just one U.S. bank – Wachovia – admits that it violated U.S. banking laws to handle $378 billion in illicit  ine funds, this supplies a measure of how important is the transnational dimension underlying local fusion drug-terror networks, whether in Dagestan or the Persian Gulf.71

Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, has alleged that “Drugs money worth billions of dollars kept the financial system afloat at the height of the global crisis.” According to the London Observer, Costa

said he has seen evidence that the proceeds of organised crime were “the only liquid investment capital” available to some banks on the brink of collapse last year. He said that a majority of the $352bn (£216bn) of drugs profits was absorbed into the economic system as a result… Costa said evidence that illegal money was being absorbed into the financial system was first drawn to his attention by intelligence agencies and prosecutors around 18 months ago. “In many instances, the money from drugs was the only liquid investment capital. In the second half of 2008, liquidity was the banking system’s main problem and hence liquid capital became an important factor,” he said.72

As a former diplomat, I sincerely hope that the U.S. and Russian governments will collaborate to address these drug-related problems together, in Kyrgyzstan, in Afghanistan, and on the level of curbing? a venal global banking system.

As a researcher, I have to say that I see the U.S. Government as part of the problem, not as a very likely solution to it. We have too often seen the U.S. habit of turning to drug traffickers as covert assets in areas where it is weak, from Burma in 1950 right down to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.73

I conclude that some other major force will have to be assembled to force a change in U.S. government behavior. Russia is right in bringing this problem to the attention of the Security Council, but this is a problem transcending governments. Perhaps religious organizations around the world could be one place to start mobilizing an extra-governmental force. Journalists and other researchers could also supply a component. Somehow the world must be made aware that it does indeed face a triple threat: the threat of drugs, the threat of drug-financed terrorism, and eventually the threat of war.

Meanwhile it is far too early to predict what may eventually transpire between America and Russia in Kyrgyzstan. But it is none too soon to assert that history is repeating itself in an alarming and predictable way, and to recall that the ingredients of the coup-drug-terror syndrome have led to major warfare in the past.

My personal conclusion is that deep forces, not fully understood, are at work now in Kyrgyzstan, as they have been earlier in Afghanistan and other drug-producing countries. My concern is heightened by my increasing awareness that for decades deep forces have also been at work in Washington.

This was demonstrated vividly by the U.S. government’s determined protection in the 1980s of the global drug activities of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which has been described as “the largest criminal corporate enterprise ever.”74 A U.S. Senate Report once called BCCI not just a “rogue bank… but a case study of the vulnerability of the world to international crime on a global scope that is beyond the current ability of governments to control.”75 Governments indeed long failed to regulate BCCI, because of its ability to influence governments; and when BCCI was finally brought down in 1991, it was as the result of relative outsiders like Robert Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York:

In going after BCCI, Morgenthau’s office quickly found that in addition to fighting off the bank, it would receive resistance from almost every other institution or entity connected to BCCI [including] the Bank of England, the British Serious Fraud Office, and the U.S. government.”76

I have tried to show elsewhere that BCCI was only one in a series of overlapping banks with similar intelligence connections, dating back to the 1940s.77

When I first wrote about Washington’s protection of BCCI, I assumed that the BCCI benefited from its status as an asset or instrument for covert U.S.and British intelligence strategies. Since then I have come to wonder if CIA and BCCI were not both alike instruments for some deeper force or forces, embedded in the state but not confined to it, which has or have been systematically exploiting the drug traffic as a means to global power.
Not until there is a more general awareness of this deep force problem can we expect Washington to respondwith a more rational drug policy. My hope in this essay is to provide a further step in the effort to clarify just what these deeper forces are, and the extent to which they are responsible for America’s current, grave, constitutional crisis.

Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Drugs Oil and War,The Road to 9/11, The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War. His American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection and the Road to Afghanistan is in press, due in fall 2010 from Rowman & Littlefield.
He wrote this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal.

Wiener Deklaration: Schluss mit ‚Drogenkriegen‘

Repressive Maßnahmen durch Polizei und Justiz verschärfen laut Experten das Problem für Drogensüchtige und damit auch die Bekämpfung von Aids. Sie fordern deshalb nun in einem internationalen Aufruf – der „Wiener Deklaration“ – das Ende von kontraproduktiven „Drogenkriegen“. Die „Vienna Declaration“ plädiert für eine Drogenpolitik auf der Basis wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse und liegt seit heute Montag zur Unterzeichnung auf.

Zu den ersten Unterzeichnern gehört Francoise Barre-Sinoussi, die im Jahr 2008 mit ihrem Kollegen Luc Montagnier für die Entdeckung des AIDS-Virus den Medizin-Nobelpreis erhalten hat.

Sucht ist Krankheit, kein Verbrechen

„Viele von uns in der Aids-Forschung und in der Betreuung der Betroffenen sehen jeden Tag die verheerenden Effekte von falschen Strategien in der Drogenpolitik. Sie heizen die Aids-Epidemie noch weiter an und bedeuten Gewalt, steigende Kriminalitätsraten und die Destabilisierung ganzer Staaten. Trotzdem gibt es noch keinen Beweis, dass sie den Drogenkonsum oder die Versorgung mit Drogen reduzieren“, erklärte dazu Julio Montaner, Präsident der IAS.
Als Wissenschaftler sei man verpflichtet, Strategien auf Basis von gesicherten Erkenntnissen vorzuschlagen. In Sachen illegaler Drogen würden sie dort beginnen, wo man „Sucht als Krankheit und nicht als Verbrechen“ akzeptiere.

In Osteuropa sind Drogen wichtigster Infektionsgrund
Die Verfasser der Deklaration berufen sich auf die Erkenntnisse, die in rund 25 Jahren der Geschichte von HIV/AIDS gesammelt wurden. Außerhalb des südlichen Afrikas sei Drogengebrauch durch die Injektion von Suchtgiften bereits für eine von drei HIV-Infektionen verantwortlich. „In einigen Regionen mit besonders schneller Ausbreitung von HIV, zum Beispiel in Osteuropa und Zentralasien, ist der injizierende Drogenkonsum die hauptsächliche Ursache für HIV-Infektionen“, hieß es dazu in einer Presseaussendung.

Gesetzliche Barrieren gegenüber wissenschaftlich belegten positiven Konsequenzen von Programmen wie Nadeltausch und Opiat-Subsitutionstherapie würden Hunderttausende neue Infektionen mit HIV und Hepatitis pro Jahr verursachen. Die Kriminalisierung von i.v.-Drogenkonsumenten würde aktuell Rekordzahlen bei den Inhaftierungen und gleichzeitig hohe Ausgaben für die Gefängnisse bedeuten.

Repressive Maßnahmen verstärken Problem
„Die Kriminalisierung von Konsumenten illegaler Drogen heizt die HIV-Epidemie an und hat zum größten Teil zu negativen gesundheitlichen und sozialen Konsequenzen geführt. Hier ist eine umfassende Neuorientierung erforderlich.“, so die offizielle Erklärung der „Wiener Deklaration“.

Repressive Maßnahmen via Polizei und Justiz wären in Sachen Drogen fehlgeschlagen: „Über die vergangenen Jahrzehnte hinweg haben nationale und internationale Drogen-Beobachtungssysteme ein generelles Muster von fallenden Preisen für Drogen und steigende Reinheit von Giften gezeigt. Dies trotz massiver Investitionen in das Durchsetzen von Drogengesetzen.“
Immer schärfere Maßnahmen hätten international nur negative Ergebnisse gebracht: „Weiters gibt es keinen Hinweis, dass zunehmend verschärfende Maßnahmen von Polizei und Justiz die Häufigkeit von Drogenkonsum verringern. Die Daten zeigen klar, dass sich die Zahl jener Staaten erhöht, in der Menschen illegale Drogen injizieren, immer mehr Frauen und Kinder sind davon betroffen.“

HIV in Gefängnissen, destabilisierte Staaten …
Die Verfasser führen im Einzelnen folgende Konsequenzen falscher Anti-Drogen-Strategien an:

  • „Die HIV-Epidemie wird durch die Kriminalisierung von Benutzern illegaler Drogen noch vergrößert, ebenso durch die Verhinderung von Opiat-Substitutions- und von Spritzentausch-Programmen.
  • Die Inhaftierung von Drogenkranken als Konsequenz von Strafgesetzen führt zu HIV-Ausbrüchen unter den Häftlingen. Gerade in Gefängnissen gebe es aber einen Mangel an Präventions-Maßnahmen.
  • In vielen Staaten sei es durch die Drogengesetzgebung zu einer Rekordrate an Inhaftierungen gekommen. Gleichzeitig hätte das die Rassendiskriminierung erhöht. Die Autoren: „…dieser Effekt war besonders stark in den Vereinigten Staaten, wo zu jedem gegebenen Zeitpunkt jeder neunte Bürger afro-amerikanischer Herkunft in der Altersgruppe zwischen 20 und 34 Jahren inhaftiert ist – zum größten Teil wegen Drogendelikten.“
  • Ein riesiger illegaler Markt im Umfang von jährlich 320 Milliarden US-Dollar (260 Mrd. Euro). Die Autoren: „Die Profite bleiben gänzlich außerhalb der Kontrolle des Staates. Sie fördern Kriminalität, Gewalt und Korruption in zahllosen Städten und haben ganze Staaten destabilisiert, wie Kolumbien, Mexiko und Afghanistan.“
  • „Milliarden von Steuergeldern (US-Dollars, Anm.) sind in diesem ‚Krieg gegen Drogen‘ fehlinvestiert worden, ohne das Ziel der Kontrolle des Problems zu erreichen. Stattdessen hat das massiv zu den angeführten Schäden beigetragen.“

Keine Zwangstherapie
Die Verfasser der „Wiener Deklaration“ fordern deshalb eine transparente Analyse der Wirksamkeit der derzeitigen Drogenpolitik, die Verwendung und die Bewertung von Maßnahmen, die auf wissenschaftlicher Basis stattfinden.

Drogenkonsumenten sollten „entkriminalisiert“ werden. Auch alle Zwangstherapie-Zentren sollten geschlossen werden, da sie die Menschenrechte verletzen. Und schließlich sollte es mehr Geld für die Verhinderung von HIV-Infektionen geben.
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I had it already a few days ago but it is important for every one,

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Please sign the declaration here.

Between now and 2012 it’s up to you and your friends, communities, governments, newspapers, to advocate for evidence based drug policy and strengthen the call for policies driven by evidence. Join the movement to end the failed war on drugs, sign the declaration and share it with your networks today.

The Vienna Declaration is a statement seeking to improve community health and safety by calling for the incorporation of scientific evidence into illicit drug policies. We are inviting scientists, health practitioners and the public to endorse this document in order to bring these issues to the attention of governments and international agencies, and to illustrate that drug policy reform is a matter of urgent international significance. We also welcome organizational endorsements.

The declaration process was launched as the the official declaration of the XVIII International AIDS Conference (AIDS 2010) held in Vienna, Austria from July 18th to 23rd. The declaration was drafted by a team of international experts and initiated by several of the world’s leading HIV and drug policy scientific bodies: the International AIDS Society, the International Centre for Science in Drug Policy (ICSDP), and the BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS.

Backgrounder

What the Vienna Declaration Is

Why We Need It

Policy Today: A Proven Failure

The Need for Change

Lending Your Name

What Else You Can Do

1. What the Vienna Declaration Is

The Vienna Declaration is a statement seeking to improve community health and safety by calling for the incorporation of scientific evidence into illicit drug policies. The declaration is the official declaration of the XVIII International AIDS Conference (AIDS 2010) to be held in Vienna, Austria from July 18th to 23rd, 2010. The declaration was drafted by a team of international experts and initiated by several of the world’s leading HIV and drug policy scientific bodies: International AIDS Society, the BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, and the International Centre for Science in Drug Policy (ICSDP). It was prepared through an extensive consultative process involving global leaders in medicine, public policy and public health.

2. Why We Need It

The world needs a new approach to dealing with illicit drugs. The primary international response to the health and social harms posed by drug use has involved a global “war on drugs” aimed at reducing the availability and use of illegal drugs through drug law enforcement.

3. Policy Today: A Proven Failure

In June 1998, the UN General Assembly hosted a Special Session on illegal drugs under the slogan “A drug free world – We can do it.” The session set out international drug control strategies and law enforcement goals for the subsequent decade in which it was hoped the world could be made “drug free.”

However, it is now clear that drug law enforcement has not achieved its stated objectives. In fact, illicit drugs remain readily available worldwide, and the previous three decades have seen drug prices continue to fall while drug purity continues to increase. In addition, the over-reliance on drug law enforcement has resulted in overwhelmingly negative health and social consequences. This includes the enrichment of organized crime and associated violence, the spread of HIV among injection drug users, as well as other devastating harms as outlined in the Vienna Declaration.

The negative effects of drug control efforts in the United States led to a unanimous resolution at the 2007 annual United States Conference of Mayors that stated that the War on Drugs has failed. The resolution called for a “New Bottom Line” in drug policy, and demanded a public health approach focused on reducing the negative consequences associated with drug abuse while ensuring that policies do not exacerbate problems or create new social problems of their own.

4. The Need for Change

The need for evidence-based public health approaches is clear, yet drug law enforcement continues to be the dominant policy approach at the expense of all others, including public health interventions that have been proven effective. For instance, methadone maintenance therapy remains illegal in Russia and other parts of the world where HIV is spreading most rapidly among heroin users. This ban persists despite the fact that methadone is on the World Health Organization’s list of Essential Medicines and is recognized as one of the most effective treatments for heroin addiction.

The status quo cannot be tolerated any longer: illicit drug policy must be based on scientific evidence to protect and improve the health and well-being of individuals and communities around the world.

5. Lending Your Name

By signing the Vienna Declaration, you will be adding your name to those who have already called for the implementation of evidence-based policies that can meaningfully improve community health and safety by reducing the toll of drugs globally.

6. What Else You Can Do

To spread the word and support the organizations bringing forward this important work, click here. If you are a scientist, academic or health practitioner holding a PhD or MD who would like to continue to speak out about the need for evidence-based drug policy, please click here.

The Vienna Declaration

The criminalisation of illicit drug users is fuelling the HIV epidemic and has resulted in
overwhelmingly negative health and social consequences. A full policy reorientation is needed.

In response to the health and social harms of illegal drugs, a large international drug prohibition regime has been developed under the umbrella of the United Nations.1 Decades of research provide a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of the global “War on Drugs” and, as thousands of individuals gather in Vienna at the XVIII International AIDS Conference, the international scientific community calls for an acknowledgement of the limits and harms of drug prohibition, and for drug policy reform to remove barriers to effective HIV prevention, treatment and care.

The evidence that law enforcement has failed to prevent the availability of illegal drugs, in communities where there is demand, is now unambiguous.2, 3Over the last several decades, national and international drug surveillance systems have demonstrated a general pattern of falling drug prices and increasing drug purity—despite massive investments in drug law enforcement.3,4

Furthermore, there is no evidence that increasing the ferocity of law enforcement meaningfully reduces the prevalence of drug use.5 The data also clearly demonstrate that the number of countries in which people inject illegal drugs is growing, with women and children becoming increasingly affected.6 Outside of sub-Saharan Africa, injection drug use accounts for approximately one in three new cases of HIV.7, 8 In some areas where HIV is spreading most rapidly, such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, HIV prevalence can be as high as 70% among people who inject drugs, and in some areas more than 80% of all HIV cases are among this group.8

In the context of overwhelming evidence that drug law enforcement has failed to achieve its stated objectives, it is important that its harmful consequences be acknowledged and addressed. These consequences include but are not limited to:

HIV epidemics fuelled by the criminalisation of people who use illicit drugs and by prohibitions on the provision of sterile needles and opioid substitution treatment.9, 10
HIV outbreaks among incarcerated and institutionalised drug users as a result of punitive laws and policies and a lack of HIV prevention services in these settings.11-13
The undermining of public health systems when law enforcement drives drug users away from prevention and care services and into environments where the risk of infectious disease transmission (e.g., HIV, hepatitis C & B, and tuberculosis) and other harms is increased.14-16
A crisis in criminal justice systems as a result of record incarceration rates in a number of nations.17, 18 This has negatively affected the social functioning of entire communities. While racial disparities in incarceration rates for drug offences are evident in countries all over the world, the impact has been particularly severe in the US, where approximately one in nine African-American males in the age group 20 to 34 is incarcerated on any given day, primarily as a result of drug law enforcement.19
Stigma towards people who use illicit drugs, which reinforces the political popularity of criminalising drug users and undermines HIV prevention and other health promotion efforts.20, 21
Severe human rights violations, including torture, forced labour, inhuman and degrading treatment, and execution of drug offenders in a number of countries.22, 23
A massive illicit market worth an estimated annual value of US$320 billion.4 These profits remain entirely outside the control of government. They fuel crime, violence and corruption in countless urban communities and have destabilised entire countries, such as Colombia, Mexico and Afghanistan.4
Billions of tax dollars wasted on a “War on Drugs” approach to drug control that does not achieve its stated objectives and, instead, directly or indirectly contributes to the above harms.24

Unfortunately, evidence of the failure of drug prohibition to achieve its stated goals, as well as the severe negative consequences of these policies, is often denied by those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.25This has created confusion among the public and has cost countless lives. Governments and international organisations have ethical and legal obligations to respond to this crisis and must seek to enact alternative evidence-based strategies that can effectively reduce the harms of drugs without creating harms of their own. We, the undersigned, call on governments and international organisations, including the United Nations, to:

Undertake a transparent review of the effectiveness of current drug policies.
Implement and evaluate a science-based public health approach to address the individual and community harms stemming from illicit drug use.
Decriminalise drug users, scale up evidence-based drug dependence treatment options and abolish ineffective compulsory drug treatment centres that violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.26
Unequivocally endorse and scale up funding for the implementation of the comprehensive package of HIV interventions spelled out in the WHO, UNODC and UNAIDS Target Setting Guide.27
Meaningfully involve members of the affected community in developing, monitoring and implementing services and policies that affect their lives.

We further call upon the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, to urgently implement measures to ensure that the United Nations system—including the International Narcotics Control Board—speaks with one voice to support the decriminalisation of drug users and the implementation of evidence-based approaches to drug control.28

Basing drug policies on scientific evidence will not eliminate drug use or the problems stemming from drug injecting. However, reorienting drug policies towards evidence-based approaches that respect, protect and fulfil human rights has the potential to reduce harms deriving from current policies and would allow for the redirection of the vast financial resources towards where they are needed most: implementing and evaluating evidence-based prevention, regulatory, treatment and harm reduction interventions.

REFERENCES
1. William B McAllister. Drug diplomacy in the twentieth century: an international history. Routledge, New York, 2000.
2. Reuter P. Ten years after the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS): assessing drug problems, policies and reform proposals. Addiction 2009;104:510-7.
3.United States Office of National Drug Control Policy. The Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981 through the Second Quarter of 2003. Executive Office of the President; Washington, DC, 2004.
4. World Drug Report 2005. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2005.
5. Degenhardt L, Chiu W-T, Sampson N, et al. Toward a global view of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, and cocaine use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys. PLOS Medicine 2008;5:1053-67.
6. Mathers BM, Degenhardt L, Phillips B, et al. Global epidemiology of injecting drug use and HIV among people who inject drugs: A systematic review. Lancet 2008;372:1733-45.
7. Wolfe D, Malinowska-Sempruch K. Illicit drug policies and the global HIV epidemic: Effects of UN and national government approaches. New York: Open Society Institute; 2004.
8. 2008 Report on the global AIDS epidemic. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; Geneva, 2008.
9. Lurie P, Drucker E. An opportunity lost: HIV infections associated with lack of a national needle-exchange programme in the USA. Lancet 1997;349:604.
10. Rhodes T, Lowndes C, Judd A, et al. Explosive spread and high prevalence of HIV infection among injecting drug users in Togliatti City, Russia. AIDS 2002;16:F25.
11. Taylor A, Goldberg D, Emslie J, et al. Outbreak of HIV infection in a Scottish prison. British Medical Journal 1995;310:289.
12. Sarang A, Rhodes T, Platt L, et al. Drug injecting and syringe use in the HIV risk environment of Russian penitentiary institutions: qualitative study. Addiction 2006;101:1787.
13. Jurgens R, Ball A, Verster A. Interventions to reduce HIV transmission related to injecting drug use in prison. Lancet Infectious Disease 2009;9:57-66.
14. Davis C, Burris S, Metzger D, Becher J, Lynch K. Effects of an intensive street-level police intervention on syringe exchange program utilization: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. American Journal of Public Health 2005;95:233.
15. Bluthenthal RN, Kral AH, Lorvick J, Watters JK. Impact of law enforcement on syringe exchange programs: A look at Oakland and San Francisco. Medical Anthropology 1997;18:61.
16. Rhodes T, Mikhailova L, Sarang A, et al. Situational factors influencing drug injecting, risk reduction and syringe exchange in Togliatti City, Russian Federation: a qualitative study of micro risk environment. Social Science & Medicine 2003;57:39.
17. Fellner J, Vinck P. Targeting blacks: Drug law enforcement and race in the United States. New York: Human Rights Watch; 2008.
18. Drucker E. Population impact under New York’s Rockefeller drug laws: An analysis of life years lost. Journal of Urban Health 2002;79:434-44.
19. Warren J, Gelb A, Horowitz J, Riordan J. One in 100: Behind bars in America 2008. The Pew Center on the States Washington, DC: The Pew Charitable Trusts 2008.
20. Rhodes T, Singer M, Bourgois P, Friedman SR, Strathdee SA. The social structural production of HIV risk among injecting drug users. Social Science & Medicine 2005;61:1026.
21. Ahern J, Stuber J, Galea S. Stigma, discrimination and the health of illicit drug users. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 2007;88:188.
22. Elliott R, Csete J, Palepu A, Kerr T. Reason and rights in global drug control policy. Canadian Medical Association Journal 2005;172:655-6.
23. Edwards G, Babor T, Darke S, et al. Drug trafficking: time to abolish the death penalty. Addiction 2009;104:3.
24. The National Centre on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (2001). Shoveling up: The impact of substance abuse on State budgets.
25. Wood E, Montaner JS, Kerr T. Illicit drug addiction, infectious disease spread, and the need for an evidence-based response. Lancet Infectious Diseases 2008;8:142-3.
26. Klag S, O’Callaghan F, Creed P. The use of legal coercion in the treatment of substance abusers: An overview and critical analysis of thirty years of research. Substance Use & Misuse 2005;40:1777.
27. WHO, UNODC, UNAIDS 2009. Technical Guide for countries to set targets for universal access to HIV prevention, treatment and care for injection drug users.
28. Wood E, Kerr T. Could a United Nations organisation lead to a worsening of drug-related harms? Drug and Alcohol Review 2010;29:99-100.

Vienna Declaration Writing Committee

For comments and insights from members of the Vienna Declaration writing committee and other signatories click here.

Evan Wood, MD, PhD (Chair)
Director, Urban Health Research Initiative
Associate Professor, University of British Columbia
Canada

Frederick L. Altice, MD
Professor of Medicine & Director of Clinical and Community Research
Yale University School of Medicine
USA

Dennis Altman AM, FASSA, MA
Professor of Politics, La Trobe University
Director, Institute for Human Security
Australia

Judith D. Auerbach, PhD
Vice President, Science & Public Policy
San Francisco AIDS Foundation
USA

Anurita Bains
Senior Advisor, Office of the Executive Director
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
Switzerland

Prof. Françoise Barré-Sinoussi, PhD
Nobel Laureate
Professor and Head, Unit of Regulation of Retroviral Infections, Department of Virology
Institut Pasteur, Paris

Damon Barrett
Senior Human Rights Analyst, International Harm Reduction Association
Australia

Jacqueline Bataringaya, MD, MA
Senior Policy Adviser

, International AIDS Society
Switzerland

Chris Beyrer, MD
Professor, Department of Epidemiology
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
USA

Maria Patrizia Carrieri, PhD
Researcher, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale
France

Grant Colfax, MD
Director of HIV Prevention and Research
San Francisco Department of Public Health
USA

Marcus Day, DSc
Director, Caribbean Drug & Alcohol Research Institute
Saint Lucia

Don C. Des Jarlais, PhD
Professor of Epidemiology
Director of the International Research Core Center for Drug Use and HIV Research
USA

Françoise Girard
Director, Public Health Program, Open Society Institute
USA

Robin Gorna
Executive Director, International AIDS Society
Switzerland

Carl L Hart, PhD
Associate Professor of Psychology
Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry, Columbia University
USA

Ralf Jürgens, PhD
Consultant, HIV/AIDS, Health, Policy and Human Rights
Canada

Adeeba Kamarulzaman, MD
Head of Infectious Disease Unit, University of Malaya Medical Centre
Malaysia

Michel D. Kazatchkine, MD
Executive Director, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
Switzerland

Thomas Kerr, PhD
Director, Urban Health Research Initiative
Associate Professor, University of British Columbia
Canada

Danny Kushlick
Head of Policy, Transform Drug Policy Foundation
England

Rick Lines
Deputy Director, International Harm Reduction Association
Australia

Barbara McGovern, MD
Associate Professor of Medicine, Tufts University School of Medicine
USA

Julio S.G. Montaner, MD, FRCPC, FCCP, FACP, FRSC
Professor, Chair in AIDS Research and Head of Division of AIDS, University of British Columbia
President, International AIDS Society
Canada

David Nutt, MD, FRCP, FRCPsych, FMedSci
Director, Neuropsychopharmacology Unit, Division of Experimental Medicine
Hammersmith Hospital, Imperial College of London
England

Thomas L. Patterson, PhD
Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Diego
USA

Tim Rhodes, PhD
Professor and Director, Centre for Research on Drugs and Health Behaviour
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
England

Brigitte Schmied, MD
President, Austrian AIDS Society, AIDS 2010 Local Co-Chair
Head of HIV Outpatient Clinic, Otto-Wagner-Spital Vienna
Austria

Steffanie Strathdee, PhD
Harold Simon Professor and Chief, Division of Global Public Health, Department of Medicine
University of California, San Diego School of Medicine
USA

Sharon Walmsley, MD, MSc, FRCPC
Professor, Department of Medicine, University of Toronto, Division of Infectious Diseases
Canada

Dan Werb, MSc
Research Associate, BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS
Canada

Alexander Wodak, FRACP, FAChAM, FAFPHM, MBBS
Director, Alcohol and Drug Service, St. Vincent’s Hospital
Australia

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
PRÄAMBEL _____________________________________________________________________________ 6
1. Die Substanz Diazetylmorphin______________________________________________________________ 8
1.1. Pharmakologie_______________________________________________________________________ 8
1.2. Medizinische Verwendung _____________________________________________________________ 8
1.3. Pharmakokinetik _____________________________________________________________________ 8
1.4. Wirkungen und Nebenwirkungen von Diacetylmorphin ______________________________________ 10
1.4.1. Wirkungen ______________________________________________________________________ 10
1.4.2. Nebenwirkungen / Unerwünschte Wirkungen___________________________________________ 10
1.4.3. Interaktionen ____________________________________________________________________ 11
1.4.4. Intoxikation _____________________________________________________________________ 11
1.4.5. Entzugssymptomatik ______________________________________________________________ 11
1.4.6. Anwendungseinschränkungen und Vorsichtsmaßnahmen – EXKURS: Heroin und
Verkehrstüchtigkeit ________________________________________________________________ 11
1.5. DAM-Zubereitungen und Einnahmeformen _______________________________________________ 12
1.6. Heroinabhängigkeit __________________________________________________________________ 15
2. EXKURS über Heroinmythologie und Heroinkontrolle _________________________________________ 16
2.1. Der Mechanismus der Drogenkontrolle – Die Entwicklung der Internationalen Kontrolle der Narkotika 16
2.2. Der historische Hintergrund der Heroinkontrolle ___________________________________________ 16
2.3. Heroin als Problemdroge ______________________________________________________________ 16
2.4. Die Heroinmythologie ________________________________________________________________ 18
2.4.1. Die Ebenen der Dämonisierung des Heroins in den USA __________________________________ 18
2.4.2. Heroin in Europa _________________________________________________________________ 21
2.4.3. Ergebnisse der Literaturanalyse 1920-1945_____________________________________________ 22
2.4.3.1. Außermedizinische Literaturquellen _______________________________________________ 23
2.4.3.1.1. Heroin in Frankreich ________________________________________________________ 24
2.4.3.1.2. Heroin und Okkultismus _____________________________________________________ 25
2.5. Kontrolle und Mythologie 1923-1931 ____________________________________________________ 25
2.6. Die Auswirkungen der amerikanischen Heroinmythologie auf die europäische Einstellung in der
Zwischenkriegszeit __________________________________________________________________ 26
2.7. Die Situation nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg________________________________________________ 27
3. Heroin in der Behandlung der Heroinabhängigkeit _____________________________________________ 28
3.1. Überblick über grundsätzliche Positionierungen in den verschiedenen Heroinstudien _______________ 29
3.1.1. Das Ungenügen der Methadonsubstitution _____________________________________________ 29
3.1.2. Ärztliche Heroinverschreibung als schadensbegrenzende Maßnahme ________________________ 30
3.1.3. Die Kontroverse um die Heroinverschreibung __________________________________________ 32
4. Heroinprojekte international_______________________________________________________________ 33
4.1. SCHWEIZ _________________________________________________________________________ 33
4.1.1. Entwicklung und rechtliche Grundlage der HeGeBe______________________________________ 33
4.1.1.1. Die legistischen Rahmenbedingungen______________________________________________ 34
3
4.1.1.1.1. Drogenpolitik als Aufgabe des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens ______________________ 34
4.1.1.1.2. Die katalysatorische Wirkung von AIDS ________________________________________ 35
4.1.2. Überprüfbare Zielsetzungen der schweizerischen Drogenpolitik seit 1991_____________________ 37
4.1.3. Die Schweizer Studie zur medizinischen Opiatvergabe (PROVE) ___________________________ 38
4.1.3.1. Supervisionsorgane, Expertengremien und Begleitgruppen _____________________________ 40
4.1.3.2. Praktische Umsetzung __________________________________________________________ 41
4.1.3.3. Begleitforschung ______________________________________________________________ 43
4.1.3.3.1. Substanzforschung _________________________________________________________ 43
4.1.3.3.2. Medizinische Forschung _____________________________________________________ 43
4.1.3.3.3. Sozialwissenschaftliche und ökonomische Forschungsthemen________________________ 45
4.1.3.4. Die Ergebnisse der Versuchsphase ________________________________________________ 47
4.1.3.4.1. Der Schweizer Synthesebericht________________________________________________ 47
4.1.3.4.2. Bericht der externen Expertenkommission zur Beurteilung der schweizerischen
wissenschaftlichen Studien über die ärztliche Verschreibung von Betäubungsmitteln
an Drogenabhängige ________________________________________________________ 50
4.1.4. Zusammenfassende Darstellung des Ablaufes der Entwicklung der kontrollierten
Heroinverschreibung – eine Chronik __________________________________________________ 65
4.1.5. Die Entwicklung der Schweizer Versuche nach der Versuchsphase __________________________ 68
4.1.5.1. Die legislative Regulierung – die drogenpolitische Auseinandersetzung ___________________ 68
4.1.5.2. Der drogenpolitische Diskurs ____________________________________________________ 68
4.1.5.2.1. Die Befürworter der HeGeBe _________________________________________________ 70
4.1.5.2.2. Verbände und Initiativen, die gegen die HeGeBe auftraten __________________________ 71
4.1.5.2.3. Das Referendum gegen den dringlichen Bundesbeschluss zur ärztlichen
Heroinverschreibung vom 9.10.1998 – Argumentarium_____________________________ 75
4.1.6. Die Entwicklung der Projekte zur HeGeBe _____________________________________________ 78
4.1.7. Situation 2001 ___________________________________________________________________ 80
4.1.8. Bislang vorliegende Ergebnisse der ersten Routinephase __________________________________ 81
4.1.9. Abschließende Bewertung des Schweizer Modells der heroingestützten Behandlung ____________ 83
4.1.10. Best Practice – Best Control? Das Schweizer Handbuch HeGeBe 2000, herausgegeben vom BAG 86
4.2. NIEDERLANDE___________________________________________________________________ 122
4.2.1. Die Niederländischen Studien und ihre Ergebnisse ______________________________________ 124
4.2.1.1. Ergebnisse __________________________________________________________________ 127
4.2.1.2. Die Kosten der HeGeBe im Niederländischen Modell ________________________________ 129
4.2.1.3. Schlussfolgerungen ___________________________________________________________ 129
4.2.1.4. Empfehlungen _______________________________________________________________ 130
4.3. DEUTSCHLAND __________________________________________________________________ 130
4.3.1. Der Entwicklungsprozess der deutschen Projekte _______________________________________ 130
4.3.2. Struktur, Dauer, Kosten und Rahmenbedingungen des deutschen Modellprojekts ______________ 133
4.3.3. Methode und Design _____________________________________________________________ 134
4.3.3.1. Studienaufbau _______________________________________________________________ 137
4.3.3.2. Zeitplan ____________________________________________________________________ 138
4.3.3.3. Voraussetzungen _____________________________________________________________ 138
4
4.3.3.4. Der aktuelle Stand des Projektes _________________________________________________ 138
4.3.3.5. Der bisherige Verlauf der Studie in Bonn __________________________________________ 138
4.3.3.6. Die deutsche und die niederländische Heroinstudie im Vergleich _______________________ 141
4.4. ENGLAND _______________________________________________________________________ 142
4.4.1. Drogenpolitischer Hintergrund _____________________________________________________ 142
4.4.2. Die Veränderungen in den sechziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts __________________________ 144
4.4.3. Der Einsatz injizierbarer Zubereitungen in der Behandlung Abhängiger _____________________ 146
4.4.3.1. Das Ausmaß der Verschreibung von injizierbarem Methadon und injizierbarem DAM_______ 146
4.4.3.1.1. Aktuelle Situation _________________________________________________________ 149
4.4.4. John Marks: ein Traditionalist des „Britischen Systems“ _________________________________ 154
4.4.4.1. Bericht über die Behandlungsmethode von John Marks _______________________________ 156
4.4.4.1.1. Die abgegebenen Substanzen und ihre Darreichungsformen ________________________ 157
4.4.4.2. Arbeitsweise bis 1995 _________________________________________________________ 157
4.4.4.2.1. Die Arbeit der „drug dependency clinic“ von John Marks im Spiegel der Statistik _______ 159
4.4.4.3. Die Arbeitsweise nach 1995 ____________________________________________________ 160
4.4.4.4. Bewertung durch die örtlichen Strafverfolgungsbehörden _____________________________ 161
4.4.5. Die Verwissenschaftlichung der Opiatverschreibung an Abhängige in England________________ 161
4.4.5.1. Die Untersuchung von HARTNOLL 1980 _________________________________________ 161
4.4.5.2. Die Untersuchung von METREBIAN 1998 ________________________________________ 162
4.5. KANADA ________________________________________________________________________ 163
4.5.1. Drogenpolitischer Hintergrund _____________________________________________________ 163
4.5.2. Opiatgestützte Behandlung Abhängigkeitskranker ______________________________________ 164
4.5.3. Die Entwicklung des Heroinproblems ________________________________________________ 165
4.5.4. Die Entwicklung der Behandlung Opiatabhängiger______________________________________ 166
4.5.5. Die NAOMI – Initiative___________________________________________________________ 167
4.5.5.1. Das Konzept der NAOMI ______________________________________________________ 169
4.5.6. Laufende Heroinprojekte in Kanada _________________________________________________ 171
4.6. SPANIEN ________________________________________________________________________ 172
4.7. AUSTRALIEN ____________________________________________________________________ 173
4.7.1. Drogenpolitischer Hintergrund _____________________________________________________ 173
4.7.2. Der Entwurf des ACT ____________________________________________________________ 174
4.7.2.1. Zielvorstellungen und erwartete Ergebnisse ________________________________________ 174
4.7.2.2. Pilot-Studien ________________________________________________________________ 175
4.7.3. Australien 1997-2002 ____________________________________________________________ 176
4.7.3.1. Die drogenpolitische Diskussion _________________________________________________ 176
4.8. DÄNEMARK _____________________________________________________________________ 178
5. ZUSAMMENFASSENDE DARSTELLUNG________________________________________________ 179
5.1. Überblick über den internationalen Stand der heroingestützten Behandlung _____________________ 179
5.2. Die wissenschaftliche Ausrichtung der internationalen Experimente ___________________________ 179
5.2.1. Methodische Probleme der wissenschaftlichen Designs __________________________________ 180
5
5.2.2. Die Bedeutung der Projekte zur HeGeBe für die Forschung und die Bedeutung der Forschung
für die Praxis der HeGeBe _________________________________________________________ 184
5.2.2.1. Die problematischen Nebeneffekte der Forschungsauflagen für die Praxis ________________ 184
5.2.2.2. Beurteilung der Kritik _________________________________________________________ 185
5.3. Zusammenfassung der bisher vorliegenden Ergebnisse _____________________________________ 185
5.4. Die europäischen Studien im Überblick _________________________________________________ 187
5.4.1. Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der Zielvorgaben der Studien____________________________________ 187
5.5. Diskussion der Ergebnisse und Einschränkungen hinsichtlich ihrer Validität und Generalisierbarkeit _ 191
5.5.1. Bemerkungen zur Frage der „Haltekraft“ der Programme_________________________________ 191
5.5.2. Weiterhin offene Fragen __________________________________________________________ 192
5.6. Ein Zukunfts-Szenarium _____________________________________________________________ 194
5.6.1. Die Registrierung des DAM als Arzneimittel __________________________________________ 195
5.6.2. Die Position der Internationalen Suchtmittelkontrolle____________________________________ 196
5.7. Ausblick: Vorstellungen über die notwendige Differenzierung der heroingestützten Behandlung_____ 197
5.8. Schlussfolgerung und Empfehlung _____________________________________________________ 199
6. LITERATURVERZEICHNIS ____________________________________________________________ 203

Ein dicker Brocken, wie immer sehr interessant meiner wirklich ganz bescheidenen Meinung nach:

040622_expertise_heroinverschreibung